

# TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

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Genève, le 8 Juillet 1949.

Pour la Commission Mixte :

WILLIAM E. RAPPARD,  
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EXCH

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## ABBREVIATIONS

S. I. A.	Survey of International Affairs.
D. I. A.	Documents on International Affairs.
O. M.	Oriente Moderne.
D. S.	Documents Secrets du Ministère des affaires étrangères d'Allemagne.
C. H.	Current History.
R. P. T.	Revue de la Presse Turque.
T. O.	Turkish only.

## INTRODUCTION

### TURKEY'S ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR ONE

From the point of view of foreign policy, Turkey-during the latter half of the 19th century and indeed right up to 1914—was trying to balance two irreconcilable forces, imperialism and nationalism. Imperialism had existed since the 11th century ; and the very structure of Ottoman society was built on the basis of military rule by the Turks. Foreigners and Minorities within the Ottoman Empire fitted into the scheme of things as essential classes, classes that were subordinate in some ways, in so far as they were forbidden to bear arms and were generally not entrusted with high state offices; superior in other ways, in so far as they controlled the trade and the general economy of the entire Empire.

Turkish nationalism was a later phenomenon, one that mainly grew out of the lamentable failure of late Ottoman diplomacy. As piece by piece the Turks saw their Balkan Empire cutting itself adrift by combined intrigue and violence, there arose a spreading conviction among reforming circles that the attempt to hold down the Empire was costing too much blood, that Anatolia was the true centre of the Turkish world, and that the European provinces so long kept under the Ottoman sway were useless encumbrances.

This nationalistic spirit has been most clearly expressed by the writer, Ziya Gokalp, chief literary spokesman of the Young Turk movement. But he is by no means a nationalist pure and simple; for in his writings we find a blend of the notions of nationalism and of imperialism. This same confusion seems to have affected most of the Young Turk reformers, who, while recognizing that the European Empire was a failure, and that Anatolia was the fatherland of the Turks, introduced an element of compromise by preaching that Anatolia should be combined with the Turkish races to the East, and that a new confederation of Turkish peoples should arise, firmly tied together by a common faith in Islam and by a use of the Turkish tongue. Pan-Turanism was in fact one step on the road towards nationalism; it was however still a far cry from the pure Nationalism of Ataturk.



This ideological background possessed by the Turkish reformers has to be born in mind when one comes to consider Turkey's embroilment in the First World War. The members of the Committee of Union and Progress had also been revolutionaries before their advent to power in 1908, and their actions continued to be conditioned by these neo-imperialistic conceptions.

1911 was the key year for the future of Turkey, it was the year in which events took shape which were finally to plunge Turkey into war and to end entirely the old order of things. In this year the Ottoman leaders had roughly three main policies that they might follow. Firstly, they might seek to continue their traditional friendship with Great Britain. Secondly, they might seek for an understanding with the traditional enemy Russia. Thirdly, they might move closer towards the greatest military power in Europe, Germany.

In September, 1911 the Italians attacked Turkey's north African possessions, where the Turks had practically no defending troops. This led Cavid bey in October to write to Mr. Churchill proposing an Anglo-Turkish Alliance.<sup>2</sup> Churchill discussed this with Grey but without favourable results. Grey was afraid of enstranging Italy, and Churchill was only empowered to write back in vaguely friendly terms stating England's neutrality in the Turco-Italian conflict, and adding «we cannot enter upon new political relations».

In December, Charykov, the Russian Ambassador to the Porte proposed a Turco-Slavonic league based on a political bargain. Russia was to give a territorial guarantee to the Turks, and in return Russian warships were to be allowed passage through the Straits. The Porte rejected this interesting proposal, influenced by both England and Germany neither of which power wanted to see Turkey return to a clear-cut Russian alliance.<sup>3</sup>

The early months of 1912 brought with them further disasters to the Porte. Encouraged by Italy's successes, the Balkan Christian States were able to settle for the time their own disputes and to enter into Alliance. This Alliance did not actually move against Turkey until October by which time the Turks were ready to sign an armistice with Italy. In this they were forced to cede Tripoli and Cyrenaica as well as the Dodecanese Islands to Italy.

The first Balkan War only lasted from October to May 1913, but this was long enough to show the fatal weakness of the Turkish armies. The Bulgarians advanced into Thrace, the Serbians into the sancak of Novibazar, and the Greeks took Salonica. An armistice was signed in December between Bulgaria

and Serbia on the one hand and Turkey on the other, whereafter an attempt was made to reach a pacific settlement by representatives of the interested powers in London. These talks went on through December, 1912 and January of the new year; but little headway was made, and the war was resumed. Events went from bad to worse for the Turks. The Bulgarians and Serbs took Adrianople, the Greeks Janina; and the Montenegrans advanced into Scutari. Finally a peace treaty was signed in May, 1913 by which Turkey withdrew to the Enos-Midia line and gave up Crete besides. So completely had the Turkish Army collapsed that there was no military reason why the Bulgarians should not have entered Constantinople. The reason they did not was that Sazonov brought strong pressure upon Sofia, and insisted that the Bulgarian advance should halt.<sup>4</sup>

The Treaty of London instead of bringing peace brought a reshuffle in the way of Balkan alliances. The victors of the first Balkan war could not agree about their respective shares in the spoils, and on June the 29th the Bulgarians launched an attack upon the Greek and Serbian positions in Macedonia. The Bulgarians were defeated and their defeat was turned into a rout by the unpredictable attack of Rumanian armies from the north. The Turks were able to profit from the general Balkan chaos by reentering Adrianople. This was both a personal triumph for Enver Pasha and also a first fruit of Turco-German cooperation, for during the war the Turks had been forced to make an appeal to the only great European power which seemed anxious to help Germany. From 1912 onwards Army instructors were beginning to arrive in Turkey. The Germans took up a sympathetic attitude during the First Balkan War at a time when England and France were openly supporting the Balkan coalition. Germany's support, practical as well as moral, certainly paved the way for the eventual Turco-German alliance.

The Balkan wars had revealed to the Turks their own military plight. They had been within an ace of losing Constantinople. It is small wonder then that to reequip and modernize their army the Turks had recourse to the assistance of Germany, «the only power which desired to see Turkey strong».<sup>5</sup> In the middle of 1913 the Turkish war office had written to Germany requesting the sending of a German military mission. The Germans undertook this work very willingly and very thoroughly, so that by the end of the year officers, equipment, and modern arms were coming to Turkey at an ever-increasing pace.

The arrival of a large-scale Military Mission with Liman von

Sanders at its head naturally greatly upset the Entente powers. There was however a strongly pro-Entente party in influential Ottoman circles. This party would-right up to the end of 1914 -have been only too willing to come to terms with the Entente. The latter however did not consider the Turks as a serious military factor; and Grey and Churchill thought the Greeks more useful Allies to acquire than the Turks.<sup>6</sup> There were overtures made to the Entente even in 1914. Cemal Pasha went to Paris attempting to set on foot a Turco-French rapprochement; but he was politely refused.<sup>7</sup>

The Entente throughout the early part of 1914 stood by and allowed the Germans to turn an initial advantage into what by the Summer amounted to a dominant influence over the Turks. Their statesmen were instructed to make no offers of preferential treatment to the Turks nor to seek to compensate them for their recent territorial losses. The British Naval Mission continued its work and the Gendarmerie was placed under the training command of a Frenchman, General Baumann. These influences were however insignificant compared with the active steps being taken by the Germans.

All through 1914 it was the Germans that were setting the pace, and by July the Turkish Grand Vizier was already negotiating a military Pact with Germany. The pact was actually signed on August the 2nd. The Entente did not hear of this agreement till long after; but nevertheless they seem to have regarded Turkey's alignment with the Central powers as fixed and final.<sup>8</sup>

On the eve of war between the Entente and Germany the British Admiralty made the unwise decision to commandeer the «Sultan Osman» and the «Reshadiye», Turkish war vessels that were being built in Portsmouth dockyards for the Turkish navy. This raised a storm of indignation in Turkey where these ships had been paid for out of public subscriptions. The British government fearing Turkey's entry on the enemy side, and reflecting that the dispatch of these ships would make the Turkish fleet more formidable than the Greek navy, was perhaps acting within its rights; but the Admiralty can hardly have realised what a deplorable effect this action would have upon public opinion. The harm done to English prestige in Turkey was far greater than any material destruction these ships might have caused if used in action against the Entente.

«This (confiscation) let loose throughout Turkey an immense wave of indignation and even hatred against England. All those

Turks who had given their subscriptions felt personally cheated. England could not have done better propaganda for us, for her behaviour sensibly increased Turkish gratitude for the warships Germany sent them as compensation.»<sup>9</sup>

With superb opportunism the Germans supplied the answer to the Turkish navy by sending the Goeben and Breslau to the Dardanelles. Having signed an Alliance a week earlier, the Turks could hardly now refuse entrance to these German ships. The correspondence that developed over the right of these ships to take refuge-interesting as it may be from the juridical point of view—was of little political importance except that its acrid nature served to undermine further the already deteriorating relations between Turkey and the Entente.

Enver Pasha, the War Minister, and a violent Germanophile, had been the chief figure on the Turkish side in engineering the Alliance with Germany. Having secured this, he now toyed with the idea of a Russian alliance possibly just to see how far Petersburg might go in the way of concessions. On August the 9th Enver offered Giers a 10 year's Turco-Russian Alliance for Defence based on the following points:

- I. The Turks would withdraw their troop concentrations from the Caucasus, and
- II. Would dismiss the German Instructors, while
- III. The Turks would receive compensation in the shape of the return of the Aegean Islands and also in a return of territory in Thrace up to the 20th Meridian line.<sup>10</sup>

Russia was distinctly interested by these proposals. Giers urged on Sazonov to accept the Alliance, pointing out that this would be the easiest way for Russia to establish a dominance over Constantinople. Sazonov however could hardly undertake to guarantee any territorial concessions to Turkey without the consent of the other members of the Triple Entente. Accordingly on the 17th of August Delcassé and Grey were consulted and replied swiftly that though they were willing to give Turkey a guarantee of integrity, they were not prepared to make territorial concessions.<sup>11</sup> It had become clear that Russia was the only Entente Power willing to make concessions to Turkey in order to hold her favour. This factor was further emphasised in the question of abolishing the capitulations, a point that Cemal Pasha raised with Mallet on August 20th. England and France were flatly against any abolition of long-standing legal privileges held by their subjects in Turkey; whereas Russia was prepared to



concede to the abolition against certain guarantees. Needless to say, the German and Austrian Ambassadors raised no protests against the abolition of these rights.<sup>12</sup>

The majority of Turkish writers regard the Capitulations controversy, and the ill-feeling resulting from it, as being one of the major causes of Turkey's entry into war on the German side.<sup>13</sup> It would seem in fact, however, that by the time the issue was raised Entente relations with Turkey had so far deteriorated, that the Turkish cabinet in raising the question at the critical juncture they did, were merely finding an excuse to show their independence as an answer to the coolness of the Entente.

In September the Germans were planning how to bring Turkey into the war so as to fulfil her compact; and Enver and Talaat were trying to talk round the other members of the cabinet to war. Heavy bribery of the Turkish Press and of leading political personages was also having its effects. The British Naval Mission received orders to leave in view of the impossible situation, though Mallet was instructed to at any rate keep Turkey neutral.

On September the 26th the British Flotilla watching the Dardanelles stopped a Turkish destroyer and turned it back. Colonel Weber, the German Commandant of the Dardanelles, at once took the opportunity of this incident to close the Straits. War was now inevitable, and the Entente policy was simply to keep Turkey neutral as long as possible. The Germans were in full control of the Army and Navy. Enver was a willing puppet in German hands, and Wagenheim was urging war on him as early as September the 5th. The Grand Vizier and a majority of the cabinet were opposed to Turkey's entry into war. They had not foreseen when signing with Germany how imminent would be the general outbreak of war. Halil Pasha temporised, excused himself, and pointed to the inadequate state of war preparation in Turkey.<sup>14</sup> He as Grand Vizier was nominally responsible for the foreign affairs of the Porte. Enver Pasha however possessed more real power, and it was he who gave personal orders to the German Admiral Souchon to begin hostilities.

«The Turkish fleet will gain naval supremacy in the Black Sea. Seek the Russian Fleet and strike it without a declaration of war, wherever you find it.»<sup>15</sup>

Souchon put these orders into effect, and on October the 28th made an unprovoked attempt on Theodosia, Novorossyk, and Odessa. The news of this was received with consternation in

Constantinople where even many members of the Cabinet did not know of the war move, and had supposed that Turkey was intending to remain neutral.

Still after the attack, Russia proved very reluctant to declare war, and left the door open for apologies and compensations. The Turkish Cabinet met, and a majority decided that these Russian demands should be conceded to. Talaat, Minister of the Interior, while agreeing that this course alone could preserve the peace, stated that as the City of Constantinople and the government of Turkey were under the threat of German guns, such salvation was now impossible.<sup>16</sup> A section of the liberal press also spoke of preserving the peace, and referred to the attack on Russian ports as merely a border incident.

In spite of all these things, Russia received no apologies, and she was obliged to declare war on November the 4th, 1914.<sup>17</sup>

«The whole Turkish Nation was dragged into the war as a result of a fait accompli, the work of a German Admiral who received his orders from the Kaiser. In other words, a great and historic Empire had become the toy of this German Admiral whose very name was unknown to the Turkish people. Turkish ministers who submitted to such steps look more like obedient, submissive servants of the Kaiser than ministers responsible for the welfare of Turkey.»<sup>18</sup>

This remark admirably illustrates the Turkish view in retrospect. But the outbreak of hostilities can be traced to a variety of causes. Firstly, there were the negative, and uninspired policies pursued by England and France from 1911 onwards. Secondly there was the active pro-Turk policy that their German rival so successfully and astutely applied. Thirdly there was the character of Enver Pasha himself, vain-glorious and bellicose, the archetype of the military adventurer.

Fourthly there was the all-important attitude adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress towards foreign policy. Cemal Pasha explains this most lucidly.

«As a result of the Balkan War the Committee of Union and Progress adopted the principle that the old and passive policy must be condemned in favour of an active foreign and domestic policy. Their reason was that it had become clear that this was the only way of saving Turkey from the complications which threatened on every side, building up her strength, and giving her her true place among the nations.»<sup>19</sup>

The implications of this policy are only too clear. Instead of waiting to be attacked and dismembered, the Porte was to

join a strong alliance, and to seek solace for her internal economic problems by military successes abroad. This frame of mind could hardly result in a prudent and peaceful policy. Turkey's ambassadors knew too well of this dangerous tendency in the minds of the party leaders. Rifat Pasha sent in September 1914 a curiously prophetic warning to his government.

«German interferences must promptly be brought to an end. The Entente is ready to condemn us to death if we act as her enemies. Germany has no interest in saving us. She considers us as a mere tool. In case of defeat she will use us as a means of satisfying the appetite of the victors, in case of victory she will turn us into a protectorate. The Entente is in a position to injure us even in the event of an Entente defeat. We are on the direct road to dismemberment. We should recall the fact that an extremist foreign policy has always been the cause of our misfortunes.»<sup>20</sup>

This staking of Turkey's fortune upon the extremist policy certainly spoilt Turkey's chances of neutrality. Cemal in his memoirs acknowledges his deep misgivings at Turkish policy. The Turco-German pact was kept from him till after its signature, as he was supposed to be pro-Entente in sympathies. Cemal describes his reactions thus :

«Judging by all the signs, a terrible conflict at a very early date between the countries of the Alliance and those of the Entente seemed inevitable. If at such a time we were not bound to either side, it would always be possible for us to throw in our lot with the party which offered us the greater advantages; and now we had taken our decision beforehand and chosen our partner.»<sup>21</sup>

In fact, by August, 1914, Turkey had few cards left with which to play for neutrality. The extremist foreign policy had tilted her fortunes too sharply to one side. German military control of Constantinople was enough to prevent the arising of a moderate policy that might have kept Turkey out of war and have preserved her vital interests.

The events of 1914 were a tragic lesson to the Turks, the teaching of which they were to take very much to heart.

## II

## THE EFFECTS OF DEFEAT

The Turco-German agreement entered into in August, 1914 held together until 1918 when the sweeping advance of Allenby's armies made further resistance useless. In spite of sharp differences of opinion among the German and Turkish commanders, an outward semblance of complete unity was maintained throughout the entire course of the war.<sup>22</sup>

The collapse of the Turkish war machine brought with it a wave of utter despair and ushered in a short period of complete military and civil demoralisation. The bitter feelings of the Turks were enhanced by the conviction that the invincible Turkish armies had only been defeated by means of an Entente conspiracy. In the course of the war the Turkish armies at Gallipoli had won an entire victory over picked European troops. Liman Von Sanders had been in command of the whole action, but it had been the dashing initiative of a Divisional commander, Mustafa Kemal, that had turned and broken the fierce British attacks at Ariburnu and Suvla Bay. Apart from this resounding victory of 1916, Townshend's army had been forced to surrender at Kut-el-Amara, the Turkish vanguards had been able to threaten British possession of Egypt; besides which on the Eastern front, the Turks had rallied after the appalling disasters of Enver Pasha's campaign and had profitted from the Russian revolution to advance their north-eastern border up to Batum. Turkish troops had fought in Galicia under German command. Everywhere, on all fronts, the Turkish soldier had been ill-nourished and raggedly clothed. Yet he had proved more than a match for the best Western armies equipped with modern arms. The dying Ottoman Empire had made a supreme sacrifice in a bid for survival. «The Ottoman Empire had nearly 4 million men under arms in the course of the World war of which almost 1½ million were at the fronts. This means that the most gigantic Ottoman army in history was welded together. When considering this unprecedented phenomena of Ottoman history it is not difficult to praise and assess the wonderful successes and virility shown by the Ottoman Empire.»<sup>23</sup>

The Turks did not feel that their armies had been defeated in a straight fight. The Sultan as head of the Moslem world had issued a number of 'fetva's calling for Moslem unity against the



Christian infidel. This attempt at religious propaganda was all the more absurd in so far as the Ottoman Empire had allied herself with the Christian coalition of the Central Powers. It proved a miserable failure, so entire that her German Allies strongly urged on the Turks the abolition of the Caliphate.

«No one bothered to listen to the 'fetva's and other religious proclamations... Indian, Algerian, and Tunisian Moslems, feeling no religious conscience, came as soldiers to fight against the Caliph and his armies.»<sup>24</sup>

On the other hand Entente «Nationalist» propaganda fell right from the first on willing Arab ears. Engineered and fomented by British intelligence officers, the Entente were able completely to turn the tables on Turkish policy by offering the Arabs independence. After the first insurrection of the Sherif of Mecca, the Turkish hold of her Middle-Eastern Empire became ever less secure and the Turkish armies frequently found themselves fighting in areas where the local population were openly hostile. The Arab revolt, a movement that is generally looked upon by Western writers as a splendid bid for independence by the Arab peoples, calls forth acid comment from Turkish historians, whose general views are well-summed up in the following judgment:

«Even those people who were through-and-through Moslems—the Arabs in particular—treacherously passed to the side of the Caliphate's enemies and waged war against the Ottoman Turks. At their head were the Sherif of Mecca and his sons who claim actually to be descended from the Prophet himself.»

The end of hostilities therefore left a deep hatred in the Turkish mind against her principal enemies, the English, who though failing to break up the morale of the Ottoman army in 1915 had been able to undermine the whole structure of Ottoman rule, and thereby to make inevitable Turkish collapse.<sup>25</sup>

### III

## TURKEY AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Turkey accepted an armistice at Mudros on October 30th 1918 on the following terms. I) Immediate opening of the Straits to be ensured by the dispatch of an Allied occupation force along the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. II) Immediate Turkish demobilization. III) General withdrawal of Turkish troops and surrender of specified garrisons to Allies. IV) The Allies reserved a right to occupy strategic points.

The armistice put Constantinople effectively into English hands. British warships were anchored in the Bosphorus and off Sarayburnu as an ever-present reminder to the Turks of their defeat. Moreover the English chose to interpret the terms of the armistice in a highly cynical way. Though it had been agreed at Mudros that both armies were to maintain the position as held on 30th October, yet the very day after the signature the British army began hustling the Turks back. The Turkish commander of the 6th Army, Ali Ihsan, somewhat naturally protested in strong terms against this violation to which General Marshall replied that he was taking the British troops forward in the 'interests of law and order'. The British push continued until the whole of the vilayet of Mosul was in her hands. Ali Ihsan was driven by the end of November to warn the General staff that Great Britain «will end by making us retreat as far as Sivas». He had refrained from counter-action 'in order to avoid further bloodshed'!<sup>26</sup>

Turkey along with the other defeated powers was awaiting anxiously the opening of the Peace Conference. This august body held its first sitting in January, but the Turks were not allowed to send a delegation. The Turkish question was soon raised and different plans for the partition of her Empire and also of Turkish homelands were discussed, whereupon a wide divergence of aims and views among the Entente powers at once emerged. Already by the end of January it became clear that the victorious powers intended to impose crushing terms. Not only was the conference determined to give independence under a mandate to the regions that had formed the Turkish middle-eastern Empire, but they were also proposing to amputate large slices of Turkish soil in order to create Kurdistan and a greater Armenia.

Not till February did a Turkish delegation have permission to present a memorandum to the Conference, and even then the delegation was only a semi-official one composed of the Liberal Turks, a party of exiles who had stayed out of their country during the world war, and who were consequently isolated from the political currents of Constantinople. Sherif Pasha, the chief spokesman, put the blame for Turkey's disaster upon the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. He submitted a «Memorandum on claims of the Kurds» in which his party conceded the view that since the Arabs were to have their independence, then the Armenians and Kurds could hardly be denied theirs. The central motive of the thesis was, however that Turkey should remain an intact unity, and above all that Constantinople,

as being a « Turkish city par excellence without which the very existence of Turkey cannot be conceived, should remain not only Turkish but under Turkish control. »<sup>27</sup>

The attempt of a Liberal party to whitewash themselves and their sympathizers from responsibility for past events did not have any more relevance to the decisions of the Peace conference than did the pleas put forward by the various other liberal parties of the defeated Central Powers. In June however Damad Ferid Pasha, head of the official Turkish delegation, was allowed to put Turkey's case before the supreme council in the form of a long and carefully-prepared memoranda. His case was simple. Not seeking to excuse or even minimise the atrocities committed by the Turkish war leaders, he nevertheless claimed that Turkey had now a right to be judged according to the same principles that were to govern the settlement of other nations' problems. On this assumption, he argued, Turkey's borders should be rearranged according to the Wilson doctrine. « The Ottoman people wishes ardently to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of the « status quo ante bellum » which has during the last forty years been reduced to its minimum limit. » Damad Ferid Pasha clarified this principle by stating that Turkey would certainly grant autonomy to Syria, Palestine, Hejaz, Assyria, Yemen, and Iraq, but under Ottoman sovereignty. Though prepared to let the Empire virtually go, Damad Ferid changed his tone, and clearly warned the Peace Conference powers :

« All peoples at the heart of the Ottoman Empire are firmly decided not to be downtrodden by the circumstances of the hour. They are firmly decided neither to accept the dismemberment nor the repartition of the Empire into various mandates. No government can act in this way against the resolve of a nation »<sup>28</sup>

His speech finished up on a somewhat ironic note : « Confident in the spirit of justice and impartiality of the Paris conference, the Ottoman nation nourishes the stirring hope that her aspirations regarding unity and independence will be maintained. »

Already one month before, the Greek armies had been landed at Smyrna by the Allied navies, and there had been great slaughter. On May the 10th the Greeks had landed; the very next day Mustafa Kemal Pasha had left for Anatolia. Damad Ferid's plea before the peace conference came somewhat late. The reply read by M. Clemenceau on behalf of the Peace Conference left no further doubts about Entente intentions.

« The Council is desirous not to engage in useless contro-

versies nor to cause unnecessary pain to your Excellency and to the Turkish peoples, whose sterling qualities it greatly admires. But the ability to govern foreign races cannot be counted amongst these aptitudes... Not a single case is to be found, in Europe, in Asia, in Africa too, where the establishment of Turkish domination over a country has not been followed by a sinking of material prosperity and a lowering of the whole standard of culture. Whether among the Christians of Europe, or among the Moslems in Syria, Arabia, and Africa, the Turk has brought only destruction wherever he has gone : never has he shown himself capable of developing in peace what he has gained in war. It is not in this direction that his talents lie. »<sup>29</sup>

The Turkish delegation left Paris in spite of Clemenceau's rough taunts with the assurance from the Peace Conference that « The declarations of the Ottoman delegation have received and will continue to receive the minute attention that they deserve. Damad Ferid was not in despair, and is reported to have returned to Constantinople with a smile on his face. »<sup>30</sup>

In fact, the centre of Turkish affairs had already shifted from Paris and Constantinople to Eastern Anatolia where Mustafa Kemal was even then infusing political and military cohesion into a movement of armed resistance against the blatantly anti-Turkish intentions of the Entente powers.

#### IV

### CONTROL OF THE STRAITS

The breakdown of Turkey created a vacuum at the all important strategic point of the Straits. The Peace Conference spent nine months of 1919 in intermittent discussions as to how this gap was to be filled.

By the armistice terms, Turkey had surrendered all military equipment in the Constantinople area, and had suffered Allied invasion forces to land and to take over control of all key points in the Straits and in the city of Constantinople itself. Turkey was therefore completely 'hors de combat' in this vital region, and the news that the Peace Conference had agreed on leaving Constantinople to the Turks came in September, 1919 as some solace to the Turkish nation. The Sultan was to remain in power, and the city was to remain the Turkish capital. The news however was tempered by persistent rumours that the Sultan



Vahdeddin had been prevailed upon to come to a secret arrangement with the English whereby Turkey was to become a Mandate under England.

One of the principle Russian war aims had been the 'radical solution' of the Straits question, and she was aiming not only at naval domination of the banks of the Straits but also at possession of the city. The changed foreign policy, however, as declared by the Bolsheviks, had renounced all foreign agreements entered into by the Czarist government, had published the war agreements between the Entente Governments, and had repudiated all Czarist dreams of conquest-including of course the Constantinople adventure.

England and France were thus free of their embarrassing promises to Russia, and were able, ignoring previously valid Russian claims, to dispose of the Straits as an Allied zone of influence.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless England and France were extremely jealous of each other's Middle-Eastern pretensions. England was aiming at direct control over Turkey. Rather than permit this there were already signs by the end of 1919 that France would prefer to come to some understanding with a Turkish government.

The Greek claims had also to be taken into consideration. The Greeks had for long coveted possession of Constantinople where some fifth of the population were Greeks. At the Peace Conference Venizelos obtained a full hearing and put forward some ambitious territorial claims. He was however wise enough not to claim Constantinople too for the Greeks. What he did demand was all of Thrace up to the Black Sea extending down to the Chatalja range, the entire Vilayet of Aydin with its capital of Smyrna, and a corridor besides along the Southern coast of the Marmora.

The United States, moreover, had a strong though negative interest in the settlement of Constantinople. Wilson wanted to avoid at all costs the responsibility of sending American troops to this distant theatre of operations and was flatly against the acceptance of American tutelage for either an Armenian or a Turkish Mandate.

Some compromise solution obviously had to be found, one that while fully satisfying no one power, gave at least partial recognition to the rival claims of the Entente powers; and it is in this light that the decisions drafted into the clauses of the Sèvres treaty can best be understood.

## THE TREATY OF SEVRES

The crushing terms that the Entente proposed to inflict upon Turkey were not made known to the Turkish Constantinople government till May, 1920. The delay in settling the peace was proving absolutely fatal to Entente interests.

Damad Ferid Pasha's conciliatory government was losing Turkish support even in Constantinople itself. Damad Ferid Pasha, himself leading the delegation to San Remo, protested strongly against the dismemberment of Turkey,<sup>32</sup> but all in vain. Alone of influential Turkish statesmen he had pinned his faith in a firm alliance between the Sultanate and England. His policy was now anathema to the vast majority of Turks whose sympathies openly or otherwise had switched over to support of the nationalists. In August, 1920 Damad Ferid reluctantly signed the Turkish death-warrant, but the hand that signed no longer represented the will of the Turkish people.

The main clauses of Sèvres as they applied to the Turks were :

I. The establishment of an International Commission to control the Straits on which primarily Turkey would not even be represented.

II. The Sultan remained in charge of Constantinople and Turkey remained littoral on the Asiatic side of the Marmora, while Greece gained control of the European side.

III. Iraq, Syria, and Arabia were lost.

IV. Most of Thrace was ceded to Greece, and Smyrna was to be administered by the Greeks for a period of five years after which time a free plebiscite was to be held.

V. Turkey gave up all claims to the Aegean islands in favour of Italy.

VI. The disbandment and disarmament of the Turkish army.

VII. Capitulations were to continue and special steps were to be taken to ensure that Minorities in Turkey should enjoy full civil rights.

VIII. Armenia was to be independent, and was to include the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis.

IX. An independent State of Kurdistan was to be formed in Eastern Anatolia.

X. An international Finance Commission was to supervise the financial, economic, and administrative policy of the country.

XI. A tripartite agreement between Italy, France, and England signed along with the Sèvres Treaty granted Italy economic concession rights in southern Anatolia and Adalia, and France similar rights in Cilicia and Southern Kurdistan.<sup>33</sup>

The Sèvres Treaty was never enforced: it nevertheless retains an interest as showing the maximum aims of the Entente which neither Damad Ferid's eloquence nor two years of peace had been able to diminish. It is difficult to say which of the numerous clauses of the Treaty most enraged the Turks since the whole treaty was considered a national disaster.

At the time of its signature many of the clauses already appeared as somewhat verbose anachronisms. For more than a year Turks and Greeks had been deciding the fate of Western Anatolia by a resort to arms. There had been clashes between French and Turkish troops in Cilicia. Italian detachments had landed in Adalia. In the East the Armenians were attempting to take the territories assigned to them by the Entente. Everywhere deliberation had given place to action, and those countries favoured by the conquering powers were testing the strength of the Nationalist forces.

Turkish resistance began early in 1919 when the anti-Turkish tone of the Peace Conference was made clear. Effective armed resistance began after the Greek landing at Smyrna in June of that year; but it was the peace of Sèvres that chrystallized all Turkish aims, overrode all hesitations, and united the Turks in passionate hatred against the decrees of the conquerors.

## INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER TWO

### I

## THE ORGANISATION OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE

After the Turkish collapse the Minority elements in Western Turkey found themselves for the first time under the protection of the Entente Armies, and in a favoured position. Their knowledge of local conditions and of local tongues made them the only intermediaries between the occupation forces and the Turks. In this capacity they lost no opportunities of insulting and ill treating their late masters.<sup>1</sup> Further, the Greek and Armenian nationalist movements pursued avowedly aggressive intentions towards Turkey. The Greeks formed a Society known as «Mavri Mira» for the organisation of irregular forces throughout the Vilayets. Certain sections of the organisation were concerned with meetings and with propaganda work, while another section under the disguise of the Greek Red Cross was organising scout-bands of Greek youths in Constantinople to be used as soldiers in due course. A second Greek society, the «Pontus Cemiyeti» was in touch with the Greek populace in Trebizond, Samsun and all the towns along the Black Sea Coast; its aim being to establish an independent Greek Kingdom along the periphery of the Black Sea centring on the large Greek population in Constantinople. Zaven Effendi, the Armenian Patriarch, was occupying himself with preparations amongst his flock to throw off the Turkish yolk and to help materially in the establishment of an independent Armenia. A Kurdish Independence Group operating in the Vilayets of Diyarbekir, Bitlis, and Elaziz, was similarly planning to cut away for good from the Turks.<sup>2</sup>

These openly hostile Minority movements led the Turks to take counter-measures. Thus not many months after the Armistice resistance movements began to spring up in all parts of Turkey. Only four months after the Mudros Armistice, on March 3rd, 1919, a committee was formed in Erzurum called «Defence of Rights in the Eastern Provinces», this being the first of a number of such committees.



Thrace had been overrun by the Entente Armies; but this did not prevent the formation of the «Pashaeli Group», an underground resistance movement in European Turkey. In the region of Smyrna, too, the «Reddi Ilhak» was founded, a group that bound itself to oppose Entente schemes for separating Smyrna and Aydin from Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

Until the landing of Greek forces at Smyrna on May the 15th 1919, these resistance movements were of more or less negligible importance. As movements, they lacked both leadership and clear objectives. Moreover they had no funds. The Greek aggression and especially the atrocities that accompanied it put a very different face on the situation. The will to resistance appeared overnight. The «Reddi Ilhak» changed from a party of discontented people to a mobile guerrilla force.<sup>4</sup>

Though the lethargy of defeat was gone, though all patriotic Turks were convinced by the Smyrna attack that they could expect no justice from the Entente, that they must either fight or die, yet, the will to defend the country depended on the army. What was left of it, and in what state was it? The very day after the invasion of Smyrna, Mustafa Kemal left Constantinople for Samsun. He had been sent to the East as Military inspector of the Turkish forces by Damad Ferid Pasha, who not only wanted exact information about the state of the armies, but also wanted to banish the troublesome soldier from the capital.

Kemal's first step was to confer with the Eastern military commanders. Since January small Turkish forces had been opposing the French and Armenian troops in the Taurus mountains and passes; but what Kemal had to construct was a large and combined army with which to defend the whole country.

The regular forces had shrunk from nearly two million in the war to 50,000 men; nevertheless the general position was not hopeless. «The Allies had seized and were seizing all the arms and munitions from our soldiers», said Mustafa Kemal later; but this appears to be something of an exaggeration,<sup>5</sup> for the occupation forces had been very slack about enforcing the disarmament clauses. One observer who was in the country at the time remarks: «Thanks to the negligence of the Allies, Mustafa Kemal found ready to hand all the elements that constitute an army, he and his friends only had to coordinate and complete the existing elements. The disarmament stipulated by the armistice had never seriously worked. Units of eight Army Corps had remained intact in Anatolia with their staffs and headquarters. There were even the remainders of Army Corps from Syria and Palestine that had

flowed back into Anatolia. Arms and Munitions dumps were to be found in the interior left to the charge of Allah. As for those in the proximity of Constantinople, their guard had been confided to a ridiculously inadequate numbers of troops; for example at the Gallipoli Dump which was being guarded by a sergeant and twelve men. One fine night a band of two hundred and fifty men raided the depot and lifted thousands of rifles without meeting with resistance. This took place in May, 1919. «The immense stock of war material that the Germans had accumulated at Ankara and Sivas, where the magazines of the Turkish army had been placed during the war, had remained at the disposition of the first comer... Large-scale smuggling of arms was going on under the nose of the government and with the connivance of government officials. Moreover amongst the Allies certain people were aiding the Nationalists materially and morally. Adalia under Italian occupation became the port of supply for Ankara. Rifles, machine-guns, grenades, and equipment passed through the port in an endless stream.»<sup>7</sup>

The resistance movement in the East had been without a leader. Mustafa Kemal filled this post. After conference with his generals he decided that an army could be trained in time to defend the country. He next called a Congress of both civil and military governors at Erzurum, where the broad principles of the National Movement could be discussed, and where he could be invested with sweeping powers so as to allow him to take supreme control of the country's fate.

The deliberations of this Congress excited nationwide interest, especially in Istanbul where Damad Ferid Pasha's policy of appeasement towards the Entente was becoming daily more abhorred. The Erzurum meeting took place on July 23rd under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal. Before breaking up the Congress issued a declaration of which the principal points were:

I. The Nation is a unit whose various sectors are not detachable from this Unit.

II. In the event of the Sultan's government falling as a result of invasion or due to foreign political pressure, the Turkish nation will offer full resistance to such an act of aggression.

III. Political rights such that will endanger the social equilibrium of the nation can not be granted to Christian Minorities.

IV. No foreign Mandate will be accepted.

V. The immediate formation of a «Milli Meclis» (National Assembly).<sup>6</sup>

The Erzurum Declaration was important as being the first rough draft of National Policy. It brought Turkish patriots to the East from a great number of provinces and generally paved the way for the drastic constitutional changes that the Nationalist leaders were planning. It showed too that Mustafa Kemal while taking his preliminary steps towards a definite rebellion was not yet quite sure of his designs, and therefore did not wish a clear rupture at once with the Constantinople party.

A further Congress took place at Sivas on September the 4th to which thronged delegations from all over the country. At Sivas, the previous declarations made at Erzurum were confirmed in detail. One of the most important questions on the agenda was that of an American Mandate.

« At this Congress », narrates Mustafa Kemal, « along with many letter from Constantinople, the question of an American Mandate was discussed.

Most of the Anatolian delegates were fiercely opposed to the scheme. The Sivas Congress voted by a large majority against acceptance... The Turkish Nation wanted full independence and considered that the national strength would be successful in enforcing this. »<sup>9</sup>

The effects of Sivas were firstly to weld together more securely the resistance movements in Turkey. Secondly an Electoral Assembly was declared which was to sit permanently; and the framework of a constitution was created with Kemal as the President. The conference lasted for a whole week, and news of the proceedings passed through the country. As a result of its declarations diplomatic relations were cut between the two Turkish governments. Damad Ferid Pasha's party outlawed Kemal, who had already in July been dismissed from the Sultan's service. The Sheik-ul-Islam issued a 'fetva' pouring anathema upon the wrong-doing of the nationalists. All was in vain: the pendulum had swung to the East. Constantinople had become « a Capital without a Country ».

## II

### THE TWO GOVERNMENTS

Following the two Conferences there ensued a battle of words between the Damad Ferid Cabinet and the nationalists which became so abusive that the wires were cut. Damad Ferid Pasha

had failed to arrest the nationalist movement and early in October his government resigned, to be replaced by that of Ali Riza Pasha. The new government was anxious to reestablish contact with the Nationalists; and Salih Pasha was sent to Amasya at the end of October to have a series of talks with Mustafa Kemal. Salih Pasha signed an agreement in which he recognised Constantinople's acceptance of most of the declared points of Erzurum and Sivas. The Cabinet however disowned his action on his return to the capital, and he was obliged to resign.<sup>10</sup>

It became more and more clear that some sort of « modus vivendi » would have to be sought between the two governments. The Ali Riza cabinet contained many sympathizers with the Nationalist ideas; only there remained a fundamental difference of thought between the two parties, the Istanbul party remaining attached to a continuation of the Ottoman dynasty, whereas the Nationalists had already declared a new order of things.

The Nationalists established their headquarters in Ankara in November. Early in January the New Parliament met in a mood that did not please the Entente authorities or the Sultan. The Ankara Assembly had prepared a Declaration of Rights for all Turks to accept, which after being approved in Ankara, was sent to Constantinople. This National Pact is an interesting document; and may well be regarded as the foundation stone of foreign policy of the new Turkey.<sup>11</sup>

The first article stipulated that whereas Arab areas of the old Empire should be allowed to determine their future by free vote, areas « inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority, united in religion, race, and in aim, did not admit of division for any reason ». The second article stipulated that in the three Sanjaks which had united themselves with Turkey by a general vote, recourse should again be had to a free popular vote. The Third dealt with the status of Thrace, insisting that in any peace settlement, the juridical status of Thrace should be settled by the free votes of the populace. The fourth article stated « The security of the city of Constantinople... and of the sea of Marmora must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and by all other governments concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and traffic of the world, is valid. » Fifthly, Turkey guaranteed the rights of minorities, dependent on similar concessions being made to Moslem minorities in neighbouring countries. Lastly Turkey claimed complete economic independence. « It is a fundamental condition of our life... that



we, like every other country, should enjoy complete independence in assuring the means for our development... For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, juridical, financial and other matters.<sup>12</sup>

On January 28th, 1920, the Constantinople Parliament accepted the National Pact. In March, the Allies seriously embarrassed by the appearance of unified resistance staged a military coup in the capital, making arrests of prominent pronationalists and deporting these to Malta. There was even talk in the House of Commons of thrusting the Turks out of Constantinople. The effect of this new gaffe on the part of the British Military was to create some dozen or so martyrs who had been killed in resisting the Allied soldiers and marines. A number of important members of the Istanbul Parliament who had evaded arrest were able to escape to Ankara and join the nationalists. The Sultan, now the hated slave of the English, closed the parliament.

In Ankara Mustafa Kemal was elected Commander in Chief. The stage was set for war.

### III

## THE GROWTH OF A FOREIGN POLICY

In the early months of 1920 The Turkish Nationalists had to face war on several different fronts. From the West the Greeks were attacking. In the South-West French troops were trying to make good their occupation of Cilicia, and in the East the Armenians were preparing for a general offensive; besides this in the region south of Constantinople, the Sultan's armies were doing their best to hamper national resistance.

In order to fight successfully against these many foes, Mustafa Kemal had to pay the utmost attention to the diplomatic as well as to the military front. In 1920 the Nationalist cause was still only a gamble which might or might not succeed. The best that Nationalist diplomats could do in this year was to neutralize some possible enemies.

«There was only one way of settling our problems of foreign policy in a way favourable to national interests. This was without enbarking on any one fixed line of policy to thrust out by force of arms the invasion armies that had encroached on various parts of our soil; and especially to drive out the Greeks

and French who had in some sectors captured most fertile portions of our territory... The essential point in order to achieve this was not to enter into any guarantee upon foreign problems and not to rest content with any half solutions.»<sup>13</sup>

Pursuing this policy, the Nationalists sent a delegation to Moscow in August which was successful in establishing an understanding between Turkey and Russia. A preliminary agreement of mutual good-will was signed. «By the invasion of Constantinople and the Caucasus, by English political control in Iran and Afghanistan, Russia was surrounded on land and sea by English imperialism.»<sup>14</sup> Bolshevik Russia was therefore in no mood to harm the nationalists... Russia was not however willing to commit herself to any detailed understanding with Turkey until she saw whether the Kemalists would succeed or not.<sup>15</sup>

1920, especially the Summer and the autumn, was the direst period for the nationalists. The Greeks pushed deep into Thrace. The French occupied fully Cilicia and Antalya. However the autumn witnessed the entire overthrow of one of the enemies. In June the Armenians began to advance into the Eastern provinces. The Turks mobilised all remaining males and sent an ultimatum to the Armenians to halt. This was refused, and the Armenian advance continued as far as Oltu. The Armenians had established a government over Kars and Sarikamish, areas with large Armenian populations. The Armenian hopes had largely been bolstered up by American sympathies, and by the hopes of an independent future under an American mandate. As America rightly considered Armenia to be an awkward and highly unprofitable area to support, the Armenians had been left to make good their own claims to a greater and free Armenia. This the Armenian Tashnak party proved powerless to do. At the end of September the Turks took Sarikamish, a month later Kars and on the 7th of November the Turks captured Alexandropol where on December the 3rd they dictated peace terms to the Armenians. This was actually the first treaty with a foreign power to be signed by the New Turkey. In this, the Armenians had to give up their dreams of Westward expansion as supported by the Entente. Kars and its environs that the Ottoman Empire had lost in 1878 were restored to Turkey. The Armenians were no longer a menace on the Eastern frontier, and the Turks were so far masters of the Eastern situation that they were able to turn their troops North with effect and easily to stem the advance of Georgian irregulars which had taken place almost simultaneously with the Armenian advance. A fluid situation was created on

the Eastern front. The Turks, apparently because they did not at this juncture wish to send troops on an Eastern venture, failed at first to follow up their military advantage.

The war in the Western front had now reached a decisive stage. The Turks were not only embarrassed by the Greek attacks but also by the defection of an important band of irregulars under the command of a Circassian, Etem. The rebel was resoundingly defeated, but not before he had raised all anti-nationalists in Western Anatolia to his standards.

The earliest decisive battle of the war was the first battle of Inonu, a conflict fought out in the opening days of January, 1921. A change of administration had taken place in Greece; and the Greeks had proclaimed that they would now push forward, take the Turkish nationalist capital, and bring the war to a speedy end. Instead of this a Greek force of 18.000 was held up and repulsed by some 6.000 Turks under the leadership of Ismet Pasha. Both sides were forced to retreat after the battle. The vaunted Greek offensive had made an inauspicious start, further the Turkish resistance had clearly stiffened. The small battle, indecisive as were its military effects, had concrete and immediate results upon Turkish diplomacy, for it came at the psychological moment at which a group of the most important nations interested in the Middle-Eastern situation were disposed to settle their differences with Turkey provided they could feel confident in an eventual nationalist victory.

The first Inonu victory therefore gave the Turks sufficient military credit on which to build a series of treaty negotiations that were begun in February, 1921. Afghanistan had recently recovered her independence and had signed a pact of friendship and commerce with Russia on February the 28th.<sup>18</sup> Her plenipotentiaries were still in Moscow, and it was in that capital that the Turco-Afghan Pact of March the 1st was signed. Both signatories were Moslem countries, both were striving for independence, both were intensely hostile to Great Britain.

Article two states: «The contracting parties recognize the emancipation of all Eastern nations; acknowledge their absolute freedom, their right to independence.» Article three recalls the religious unity existing under the aegis of the Caliph. Article four provides for mutual defence, though in very vague terms. «Each... agrees to consider as an offence against herself, any action taken against the other State by an Imperialistic state which follows the policy of invading or exploiting the East; and each agrees to remove any such offence with all its existing and

possible means.» Article five binds both parties to inform the other before concluding a treaty with a third party. Article six states: «The contracting parties will... conclude the necessary contracts to arrange their commercial, economic, and consular relations, and will now send ambassadors to each other's capitals.» The seventh article provides for the setting-up of regular mail service between the two countries. Article Eight is of great importance, containing the following arrangement:

«Turkey promises to help Afghanistan... and to send teachers and officers, and to keep these... in Afghanistan... at least five years.»<sup>19</sup>

The Turco-Afghan Pact while it had no immediate influence upon the existing Turkish situation was later to prove of some interest since it inaugurated the friendly and cooperative policy that the Turkish Republic was to set on foot in its dealings with Eastern and especially with Moslem countries.

The Turco-Russian Pact of March the 16th, however, had a most immediate bearing upon the general situation in Turkey and in the Caucasus. It was further of great importance since it inaugurated a new phase in Turkish foreign relations, one that was to dominate the Turkish scene for the first decade after the peace.

The «Treaty of friendship and brotherhood» as its own preamble describes it, consisted of 16 articles, the most important of which are here resumed<sup>17</sup>:

Article I. Neither party is to recognize treaties imposed by force on the other party. The North-Eastern borders of Turkey are clearly defined.

Article II. Turkey cedes the suzerainty of Batum to Georgia on condition that; a) a broad administrative and religious freedom shall be reserved for Turkish communities in the Batum area, and that, b) Batum shall be a free port for Turkish ships.

Article III. A commission of delegates from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia is to fix the boundaries of Azerbaijan.

Article IV. Recognizing that the national movements in the Orient are similar to and in harmony with the struggle of the Russian working men for the new social order, the two contracting parties assert solemnly the rights of these people to freedom, independence and free choice of such governments as they themselves desire to have.

Article V. With a view to guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits and their free passage for commercial purposes to all



countries both parties agree to entrust to a special conference, composed of delegates of all the riparian states, the drafting of the definitive and international status of the Black Sea and of the Straits, on condition that its decisions shall not prejudice the absolute sovereignty and the safety of Turkey and of her capital, Constantinople.

Article VI. All treaties between, the Czars and Sultans are declared null and void.

Article VII. Russia recognizes that Capitulations in Turkey are abolished.

Article VIII. Steps are taken to prevent subversive propaganda by Russians in Turkey and vice versa. « Both parties undertake not to allow on their respective territories the formation and sojourn of groups that would lay claim to the role of Government in the country of the other party. Russia and Turkey assume analogous obligations with regard to the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics. »

Article IX. Both parties agree to take in concert with each other all measures necessary to obtain and develop within the shortest possible time, railway, telegraphic, and other ways of communication.

Article X & XI. Both parties agree to accord the most-favoured treatment to the citizens of each party residing on the territory of the other party.

Article XII. Mutual provisions are made for the exchange of populations in the ceded areas (as per. Art. 2).

Article XIV. Both parties agree to conclude in the near future such treaties regulating economic, financial, and other questions as are necessary for the establishment of reciprocal friendly relations. »

Article XV. Russia undertakes to effect all necessary steps to secure the recognition by the Transcaucasian Republics, in special treaties with them, of such stipulations of the present treaty as relate directly to them.

The return to the policy of Unkiar Eskellesi naturally caused a great deal of apprehension in the West. Not only had the ancient enemies been able to compose their differences; but they were prepared to show a common front over the international question of the Straits at the next peace settlement. The Ankara government, moreover, had won recognition from an important power; and this power was to take active steps to influence the Transcaucasian Soviet republics and to force them to compose their differences with Turkey. It looked to the eyes of the world

in March, 1921, as if Turkey had gained a friend, and secured a diplomatic victory.

In fact however a closer examination of the Articles shows that — except over agreement at the Straits — the Pact is distinctly negative in character and is notable for its absences. There is no agreement about the supply of arms, and no indication in Article XIV. that « the economic, financial, and other questions », will be regulated in time to affect the fortunes of war on the Turco-Greek front. Though Article VIII. states that Russia will bring about an understanding with the Transcaucasian states, yet in fact these states were not at this time prepared to parley with Turkey. The Transcaucasian states were anxious to see more of the war fortunes; and it was not to be till October, by which time the Turks had fought the Sakarya battle, that Turkey was able to effectively settle her Eastern borders. The extremely cautious nature of the rapprochement becomes most clear in Article VIII. where both parties warn off the propagandists of the other.<sup>17</sup>

A Turkish writer speaking of the two races at this time states simply, « Their enemies were the same »; and this is indeed the ground motive for the treaty. « Necessity », continues the same author, « common necessity over the broad, mutual interests of the two nations produced a friendly joint-policy. However in the mutual relations between the two countries there was one most important and subtle point. Nationalist Turkey could not allow the spreading of the Bolshevik revolutionary doctrines in her own terrain. Bolshevik Russia, too, did not find it convenient to allow the spreading of the Turkish nationalist movement in Russia. On both sides this feeling prevented an Entente. »<sup>18</sup>

#### IV

### PEACE ATTEMPTS

While the Turkish delegation was in Moscow, the Supreme War Council was sitting in London trying to settle the long-delayed Eastern problem, and attempting to find a peace formula. There were delegations present from Athens, Constantinople, and from Ankara. The Greeks were sure of victory and were unwilling to make any concessions. Bekir Sami Bey, the Ankara foreign Minister put Turkey's nationalist case over forcibly, but nevertheless declared that the Nationalists were willing to submit to

a general commission of inquiry throughout the war fronts. The Greek delegation flatly refused this suggestion even though it had been approved by the conference.<sup>19</sup>

While in London Bekir Sami was also able to come to a preliminary agreement with the French and with the Italians. With France the Nationalists agreed on an immediate cessation of hostilities, the French evacuation of Cilicia, and exchange of prisoners. The understanding though signed on the 9th of March never actually came into force as fighting broke out again between the French and the Turks on March the 31st. However the agreement showed the direction in which French policy in this theatre was turning.<sup>20</sup>

Count Sforza also signed an agreement with Bekir Sami Bey while in London. In this Italian interests in Adalia were fully recognized by the Nationalists in return for immediate evacuation of the Italian troops, and an Italian promise of diplomatic support at the forthcoming peace treaty.<sup>21</sup>

Both these agreements were kept secret for a while. Turkey was however confirmed in the opinion that the Entente powers were no longer able to act in concert. The Nationalists had not been able to get the war stopped; but one by one they were neutralizing their numerous opponents and thus making it possible for the trained army to concentrate on the main objective-complete overthrow of the Greek invasion.

The end of March saw the Nationalist Army confirm the good opinion it had established for itself by arresting the Greek advance. Both sides were forced to retreat, but the second battle of Inonu was a decided check for the Greek forces. During the Summer the Greek commanders were pressing for a final decision on the field of battle; and their armies advanced deeper into Anatolia until in high Summer Ankara itself was threatened.

On August the 23rd a decisive battle was fought along the line of the Sakarya River; after a fortnight's uninterrupted fighting the Greeks were forced to retreat. The Turks had saved Ankara, and had won a great victory, but their armies were too exhausted to follow up the success, and the Greek army was able to retire to new positions. The Greek morale was severely shaken, but the Greek armies were still intact. Thus the war was able to drag on another year while Mustafa Kemal made elaborate preparations for this decisive attack. Time was now on the side of the Turks and they could afford to be patient.

The nationalists were able to secure further diplomatic triumphs due to the enhanced prestige of the Turkish armies

and the now universal belief in an eventual Turkish victory. In June, a French representative, M. Franklin Bouillon, had payed an extensive visit to Ankara where he had conferred with the Nationalist leaders. Bouillon had been anxious to come to an understanding with the nationalists, but the French determination that Capitulations in some form should continue had proved an insuperable obstacle. Mustafa Kemal Pasha wanted Bouillon to recognise the National Assembly. Bouillon was hesitant and sceptical as to the final success of the Kemalist movement. «Monsieur Bouillon fully understood the aims of the Turkish nation, and comprehended the full tragedy of what was taking place before his eyes. Nevertheless the French government hesitated to sign with Turkey a Pact that could be acceptable to the latter.»<sup>22</sup> French hesitation was ended by the concrete proof of Turkish power at the Sakarya battle.

This pact was no less than a separate peace signed between the countries.<sup>23</sup> Hostilities were to stop immediately; the French were to evacuate Cilicia; a settlement of the future border between Syria and Southern Turkey was made, a large strip of the Baghdad Railway passed into Turkish hands, further, Turkish troops were to be sent through parts of North Syria, so that they could more easily arrive at other areas of Turkish territory. In return for these important concessions France received all concessionary rights on the Baghdad Railway between Bozanti and Nusaybin, and other railway concessions in the Adana Vilayet.

Article seven regulated the status of Alexandretta and stipulated. «A special administrative régime shall be established for the Alexandretta region. The Turkish inhabitants of this region shall enjoy every facility for the development of their cultural needs. Turkish shall be made the official language.»

France had abandoned her territorial claims in Turkey; and had in exchange received some important railway concessions besides some vague promises from Yusuf Kemal Bey, Turkey's negotiator, that «Turkey desired specialists and would view with favour other requests for concessions.»<sup>24</sup>

The Ankara 'accord' further stabilised Turkey's position. She had succeeded in creating a clear split between the Eastern policies of the greatest Entente powers as was made clear from the acrimonious correspondence that took place between Great Britain and France over the treaty.<sup>25</sup>

Further, Turkish strategy was now vastly simplified. Some 10,000 square miles were cleared of enemy troops, and the Turks could deploy large contingents to the Greek front. Equally



important, the French in their evacuation abandoned large stocks of arms and even heavy guns. The French withdrawal gave the Turkish troops some approach to arms' parity with the Greeks thus considerably reducing the effect of the material aid supplied by England to the Greek forces.

In October also the Turks signed the Treaty of Kars with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The clauses of this agreement went over almost exactly the same ground as that covered in the Turco-Russian Moscow Pact.<sup>26</sup> In addition article 15 declared a general amnesty for war crimes committed by both sides on the Caucasian front. Article 17 also is of interest, as it declared: « The contracting parties agree to take all necessary steps for the maintenance and development of railways, telegraphic, and other communications. » Article 18 envisaged another meeting between the signatories to « arrange economic and financial questions ». The seven month interval between the Moscow and Kars pacts might appear somewhat puzzling since the contents of the two treaties were to all intents and purposes the same. The Turkish explanation that the Transcaucasian republics wished to see which way the military situation would turn, is doubtless accurate. Had the nationalist army shown signs of failure, the Transcaucasian republics would probably have revived their claims to portions of Turkey's Eastern territories.

The Winter saw a lull in the fighting. The Spring of 1922 witnessed a further attempt by the Allied ministers to end the war. In March the Allies offered an armistice to the two belligerents on the following conditions<sup>27</sup>:

- 1) A neutral zone was to be created between the two armies.
- 2) Neither side was to be allowed to bring up reinforcements of men or weapons.
- 3) The armies and military dispositions of both belligerents were to be placed under the supervision of an Allied Military Commission.

The year before it had been the Greeks who had turned down the peace terms; now it was the Turks. They, confident in final victory, were not to be tricked into any false dependence upon Allied mediation. Nor were they at all convinced that the Allied commission would be impartial as between Greeks and Turks. The Greeks at once accepted the armistice terms. Mustafa Kemal Pasha however instructed his Foreign Minister: « We accept the armistice in principle; but we will not put our army under the control of a foreign commission ».<sup>28</sup> Bekir Sami wrote to London agreeing in principle to an armistice but insisting on receiving

guarantees against the renewal of the Greek offensive. These were not forthcoming. The Turks felt the peace offer was a trick with the aim of saving the Greek army; they also did not intend to let the Allied mediators dictate terms. The rejection of the peace offer appears to have been the personal decision of Mustafa Kemal. This action along with his determination to wait till the nationalist army was ready for a final attack, caused much dissent within the nationalist ranks.<sup>29</sup>

The policy, however, justified itself by complete success when the Turkish army passed to the attack in late August, routed the Greeks at Afyon and Dumlupinar, and sent the enemy columns in headlong retreat to the Aegean coast. The Greek collapse was total. On September the 9th the Turks recaptured Smyrna, and the war was over.

There was for a time a serious danger of a clash between Turkish and English troops. Mustafa Kemal requested the English to effect an immediate evacuation of Constantinople. To this demand Harrington refused to comply. Mustafa Kemal however had no intention of creating further hostilities. Armistice discussions were able to take place at Mudanya. Some semblance of Entente unity had reappeared with the intense threat to the Straits, so that the English representative was able to insist that Allied troops should be stationed between the belligerents in Thrace while the Greek troops made good their retreat behind the Maritsa river. While the Allied governments made these reservations, they nevertheless clearly stated their intentions to hand over Eastern Thrace and Adrianople to the National Government.<sup>30</sup> The Sultan's cause was lost, and he himself fled on a British warship to avoid arrest and trial.

The Mudanya agreement paved the way for a general peace conference, and removed the pressing danger of a second Turco-British war.

## INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER THREE

### THE LAUSANNE TREATY

#### I

#### THE RIVAL ATTITUDES

Before peace could be restored in the Middle East, questions of a most complex nature that concerned the primary interests of many nations besides the late belligerents had to be considered; it was indeed the Turco-Greek antipathies that were to prove the least troublesome of the diverse problems to be resolved.<sup>1</sup>

The following powers met at Lausanne on November the 20th, Great Britain, France, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Belgium, Jugoslavia, Japan, Turkey, Greece. In addition to these powers, Russia insisted on her delegation taking part in the discussions on the Straits; while America, though refusing to send a delegation was represented by «unofficial observers» who were to take a highly active part in the settlement of certain questions.

The various national delegations came to Lausanne with most varied aims. Only one point was unanimously desired—peace. For the Turkish delegation the Peace Conference was purely and simply a continuation of the war of independence, only now to be waged on the diplomatic front.<sup>2</sup> The Turks had survived as an intact nation largely through a judicious blend of diplomacy and military heroism. Their representatives were now determined to reap the full fruits of victory. Ismet Pasha had handled the Mudanya negotiation with great tact and skill, showing himself to be as astute a diplomat as a general. The Turkish leaders were unanimous in appointing him to the important role of chief delegate at Lausanne.<sup>3</sup> The Turks at Lausanne were the first of the defeated Central powers to be able to negotiate peace; nevertheless they felt that they were negotiating at a great disadvantage.

All through the conference they feared the solid formation of an anti-Turkish block.

«We could not afford to allow the European nations to do what they had so often done to the Ottoman Empire; to for-

mulate prior peace terms, and then as a united front to impose these by force upon the New Turkey.»<sup>4</sup>

It was this natural suspicion entertained throughout by the Turks that was to prolong the duration of the conference; and to make every clause of the treaty a subject for infinite discussion.

The Greeks after their rout in Asia Minor had as their main aims to stabilize their Thracian frontier in such a way that the readjustment should not unduly favour the victorious Turks. As the vanquished foe they could not hope for much from the conference.

Lord Curzon, Britain's representative, planned to draw Turkey away from a system of Eastern Alliances. Particularly he wanted to get Turkey out of Russia's sphere of influence, and Britain was successful in limiting Russia's part in the discussions to those debates concerned with the Straits.

France's tone at Lausanne was to be formerly at unity with the British one; but at the same time to attempt to gain the role of mediator in cases where the Turkish view came into conflict with those of the other delegations. Russia, concerned with her vital interests at the Straits, was determined to stand fast on the basis of the Turco-Russian pact.

On November the 22nd the delegations met for the first time and proceeded to deal with the territorial problems at stake.

#### II

#### TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT

The Thracian frontier was the first point to come up for discussion. Ismet Pasha demanded all of Thrace while conceding the principle that Western Thrace should determine its own future status by a plebiscite. The other delegations though not challenging Turkish sovereignty over Eastern Thrace rejected the idea of a plebiscite for the West. Other proposals were made. It was suggested that a neutral strip should be formed between the new Turco-Greek frontier. The issue was further complicated by the Bulgarians reviving their old demand for an outlet to the Aegean. This, the conference appeared willing to institute, if it could be worked into the plan for a demilitarized and neutralized zone in Thrace. The early months of the conference saw tension growing once more between Turkey and Greece; however in May, 1923 the two countries came to an agreement independent of the conference, by which a frontier along the Maritza river was agreed



upon, Karaagatch went to Turkey; and the Turks waived their reparations claims. The other conference powers accepted the Turco-Greek 'accord'; and the Bulgarian claims were allowed to lapse.<sup>5</sup>

Considerable debate developed over the fate of the Aegean and Dodecanese Islands. Ismet Pasha, while claiming Imbros and Tenedos for Turkey on account of their situation near the Dardanelles, wished to see the setting-up of an independent constitution in the other Aegean Islands. Finally Turkey received sovereignty over the two islands claimed; while the remaining went to Greece. Italy kept the Dodecanese Islands which she had gained from Turkey in 1922; but the islands within three miles of the Turkish coast were to remain Turkish, except where the treaty expressly declared the contrary.<sup>6</sup>

A border with Greece had been arranged, and a demarcation line agreed upon in the Aegean; but determining Turkey's southern border was by no means so easy a matter. The Turks had already come to terms with the French over the Sanjak of Alexandretta and over the Turco-Syrian border; but no arrangement had been made over Mosul.

Mosul was to prove a stumbling-block to the whole conference because over this question the Turkish and English theses were fundamentally opposed. Furthermore both delegations considered a favourable settlement of this matter to be of the greatest importance. The Mosul question raised political and economic questions of the highest order. In the discussions at Lausanne, the political problems were always to the fore whilst the economic problems were relegated to the background. Curzon indeed, frequently denied that England's Mosul policy was actuated by economic motives at all. Nevertheless, it was a fact generally realised by both delegations, and fully acknowledged by the world press, that the crux of the Mosul impasse into which Turkey and England drifted was conditioned by oil considerations, as well as by territorial ones.

It is as well perhaps to consider first the political problems raised. The Turkish thesis ran as follows:

1. Turks and Kurds formed the great majority of the population.
2. The inhabitants desired a return to Turkish rule.
3. The Mosul Vilayet should be restored as other dismembered parts of Turkey were now to be restored.
4. Geographically, politically, and economically the Vilayet formed an integral part of Anatolia. It could only maintain

close relations with the Mediterranean ports if it remained linked with Anatolia. Mosul was the «point of intersection of all the roads connecting the southern parts of Anatolia», and its possession was indispensable «for the economic life and security of that region».<sup>7</sup>

The British thesis was in essence simple. Great Britain was mandatory over Iraq as a result of the decision of the League of Nations. It was therefore incumbent on her to defend Iraq. Great Britain had three duties, to the League of Nations, to the King of Iraq, and to the people. She thus could not surrender the Vilayet to Turkey.<sup>8</sup>

Mosul had an enormous strategic value in both Turkish and English hands but in this respect its value was certainly greater for England. For the Turks it could have been a strategic frontier threatening Iraq and Syria. For the English, Mosul guarded the route to India; it was a pivoting point in the Middle East control system. Had indeed the future of the Mosul Vilayet been no more than a territorial problem, it would have been no less insoluble than were the other problems of a like nature which confronted the Lausanne delegations; there was however an underlying oil rivalry of long-standing. Prior to the world war German, English, French and American interests had been competing against one another for concessions, for railway contracts, and for oil exploitations in the Ottoman territories. Indefinite concessions had been granted by Sultan Abdul Hamid to a number of foreign firms, concessions which in their vagueness often overlapped one another. Further, Abdul Hamid had been deposed in 1911 so that the right to grant concessions had — according to the Turks — legally passed into the hands of the Ministry of Economy.<sup>9</sup>

The war had postponed exploitation of the Mosul oilwells, but, after it Britain came to terms with France, and by the Long-Berenger agreement of 1919 France abandoned Mosul to England in return for England's support for France's Middle-Eastern claims as staked in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. This Franco-British economic agreement had not only been confirmed at San Remo (April, 1920) but the principle of joint exploitation of mineral riches had been extended to cover vast areas of the World's surface including the French and British colonies.

The San Remo agreement had led to a wordy battle between the foreign secretaries of England and America, Curzon and Colby. The latter had insisted on the «open door» principle for American economic participation in all theatres of the world.<sup>10</sup>

The Turks were able to profit from the oil disagreement, and well before Lausanne they had begun to take diplomatic action to accentuate the strife. The British claim was based on concessions granted to the Turkish Petroleum Company, a British-run venture with mainly British capital that had been founded in 1900. The Deutsche Bank had strong counter-claims, but these were not taken into consideration after the German defeat. A third claimant to the Mosul concessions was an American, Admiral Chester. The Nationalist government decided to back the American claim so as to split the front of her potential enemies. In 1922 the Turkish Commissar for Public Works signed several agreements with representatives of the « American Ottoman Development Company » which were kept a secret.<sup>11</sup>

When the Lausanne conference was convened the Turks refused to « ratify all engagements and concessions made by the Ottoman government up till 29th October, 1914 ». The Allies knew nothing of the Chester agreement, but American activity behind the scenes was suspected.<sup>12</sup> In February the Conference broke up, having failed to achieve any agreement on a number of points including the all-important one of Mosul. Before departure, Ismet Pasha suggested to Curzon that the Mosul question should be excluded from the conference agenda and « should be settled by common agreement between Great Britain and Turkey ». Curzon agreed to this, stipulating that if no common agreement could be reached, the affair should be submitted to the League for adjudication. Before the Second Part of the Conference began Ismet Pasha returned to Ankara where the National Assembly duly ratified the American claim to Mosul, thus driving deeper the wedge between Anglo-French and American interests.

The Mosul question had proved quite insoluble at the conference table; moreover it had stirred up so many animosities that it had threatened to undermine the whole success of the talks.

### III

## INTERNAL PROBLEMS

The question of minorities called for a good deal of discussion. Public opinion throughout Europe had not yet forgotten the Armenian massacres, and Ismet Pasha felt himself called upon to defend the historical point of view of the Ottomans towards Minorities. Turkey's aims in this issue were quite clear. She

wanted to be able to deal with the minorities in Turkish courts. The best hope for these minorities lay in obeying the liberal laws of the new Turkey. The Turks were willing to give written guarantees in the treaty of equal treatment for all racial and religious minorities. Curzon not only wanted guarantees from the Turks; but demanded the formation of an international commission to control the question. Over this latter point the Turks were adamant in their refusal. They stated that in Ottoman times the minorities had only suffered because foreign powers had interfered with the internal affairs of the country; this could not be allowed to happen again. The Turks also refused downright to countenance the formation of an independent Armenia particularly as this already existed in the republic of Erivan.<sup>13</sup>

In the end the Turks had their way. A compulsory exchange of Greeks and Turks was to take place over which the Turkish and Greek government signed a separate convention; the question of a free Armenia was dropped along with the scheme for League supervision over the rights of minorities. The Turks gave the necessary guarantee. Article 38 of the treaty stipulates:

« The Turkish government undertakes to assure full and complete liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion. » and Article 39 declares further: « Differences of religion... shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or in the exercise of professions and industries. »

Though in theory restrictions were put upon the treatment of minorities in Turkish courts, yet in practice Curzon had failed to bind the Turks to any special agreement as to the status of minorities.

Along with the question of minorities, went the question of the status of foreigners in the new Turkey. The Allies consented in principle to the abolition of capitulations, but insisted that some special arrangements must be made for the time being until Turkey had created an acceptable judicial system. Over this question at least all the delegations were united in their pressure on the Turks, as they all felt that their nationals would need protection in the new Turkish state. The Allies were determined to gain mixed courts for the trial of foreigners; but to this principle the Turks would not adhere. Ismet Pasha rejected proposal after proposal on this score.<sup>14</sup>



Finally—the matter having been debated more or less continuously from December 1922 till July, 1923—The Turks gained their aim, a complete abolition of the Capitulations regime. Along with this too foreign institutions in Turkey whether of an educational, religious, or charitable nature were to be placed solely under Turkish law.

The Turkish delegation had been able to win this singular victory only by making radical concessions to the Allies' views on Control of the straits. Nevertheless this complete judicial freedom that they had won was to have great consequences.

#### IV

### ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

Article 246 of the Sèvres Treaty had provided for the setting up of a committee to be composed of representatives of France, Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom who were to supervise the financial, economic, and administrative policy of Turkey. Had this system ever been enforced, the economy of the country would most certainly have passed entirely out of Turkish hands into those of groups of European financiers.

Against this danger of economic servitude the Turkish delegation waged a bitter struggle. The chief problem that presented itself to the Economic commission at Lausanne was the Ottoman Debt. The decaying Ottoman Empire had been in a state of permanent insolvency, and had had to be supported by continual loans from the European governments interested in Ottoman survival.

The Turkish aim in 1923 was to make a long-term plan for the liquidation of the enormous debt in such a way that the economic life of the new state should not be crippled in the process. Agreement had first to be reached over the question of debt liabilities. The Entente powers were claiming additional payments to cover the expenses of the military occupation since 1918; but the Turks refused to consider the liability. The Turks were willing to honour their debtor obligations but they insisted that a payment formula should be arrived at by which the successor states of the Ottoman Empire should contribute their share.

An agreement was eventually reached in July, 1923, fixing the Ottoman debt at L. T. 141 million, of which Turkey was to

be responsible for 84 million and the succession states for the remainder. Turkey acknowledged her responsibility for payment of this debt and the powers of the Ottoman Debt Council were abolished.<sup>15</sup>

The question of concessions also produced a conflict of ideas; for if Turkey was now to be independent the European nations all had interests in establishing commercial understandings with the new State. Those countries with interests in Ottoman Turkey were naturally pressing for the Turks to sign Article 90 of the draft treaty by which Turkey was to recognize the validity of all treaties and economic concessions granted up to October 29th, 1914.<sup>16</sup>

The Turks not only flatly refused signature of this article; but they managed too to play off the rival interests of the great commercial powers against one another by letting it be known that concessions in the new Turkey might be gained in return for diplomatic support at the conference table. France in particular had received vague promises from the nationalist ministers which led her politicians and her capitalists to believe that France might profit from a sympathetic and lenient attitude towards the Turkish case.

Turkey's refusal to ratify the concession claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company has already been referred to as a factor which embarrassed the English delegation, and which placed English, French and American oil interests in full opposition. Throughout the economic discussions Ismet Pasha was insisting on the sufficiency of Turkish law and thereby its ability to sort out the concession tangle by judging each claim on its legal merits. Ismet Pasha demanded that Turkey « would regulate in entire independence the conditions of her economic independence ».<sup>17</sup> Behind the Turkish refusal was American support, and the American observers declared themselves strongly opposed to Article 90 of the draft.<sup>18</sup>

Another proposition that the Turks were successful in turning down was that of an International Sanitary Commission which would have exercised sanitary control over all shipping passing through the Straits. The Turks maintained that they could quite well fulfil this function themselves, and they fought against external control in this realm as jealously as in the economic sphere.<sup>19</sup>

The results of Turkey's prolonged opposition to the European theses were certainly very striking. The capitulations were abolished; the Ottoman debt was diminished and also part of

the burden was transferred onto other nations' shoulders. In economic and in fiscal matters the principle of international control—or as the Turks called it—international interference, was completely set on one side. Turkey was on the road to financial independence.

## V

## THE STRAITS

In order for Turkey to have her will over a variety of points essential to her future well-being, it was necessary for her to develop the age-old method of «pazarlik». The Turkish delegation asked always for far more than they expected to get; it thus became possible for them to make spectacular concessions to the Allied point of view and at the same time to preserve great firmness over the main issues.

Turkey's original thesis on the subject of the Straits was flatly opposed to the Allied thesis presented previously, which had called for the creation of an International Commission of the Straits. The Turks in reply rejected the proposal to create this body to watch over the Straits, for they regarded its proposed functions as being the sole responsibility of the riparian. The Turks accepted the principle of Demilitarisation, and shared the opinions of the Allied thesis that a collective guarantee had to be given to assure the inviolability of the vital area.<sup>20</sup>

Settlement of the Straits, however, being by no means a purely Turkish affair, the Turkish delegation's attitude was naturally swayed by a number of conflicting aims. The Straits is an international waterway that has formed the tension point of Russo-British rivalry ever since the 18th century. The Turks, seeing in the preliminary discussions over the Straits settlement the fundamental difference of views between England and Russia were forced to take up a cautious position over the matter.

Turkey was Russia's ally; but the enthusiastic support that the Russian thesis gave to the Turkish plan greatly alarmed the Turks. Chicherin, Russia's chief delegate, pressed for full Turkish control over the Straits. In conformity with clause 6 of the Moscow Pact he stated that the Straits should be open for merchant ships both in peace and war, but «must be closed permanently both in peace and war to warships, armed vessels, and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey». <sup>21</sup> If the strong support given by the Russians to the Turkish plan

succeeded in giving the world a surface impression of Turco-Russian solidarity, its underlying motive was nevertheless diametrically clear. If the Black Sea were to become a mare clausum, the Russian navy would then be able to control both the Black Sea and the Straits.

Faced by this possibility, the Turks gracefully withdrew their opposition to the Allied scheme for an International Commission. Acceptance of the International Commission while satisfying the demands of all the European powers, also partly withdrew Turkey from the Russian sphere of influence.

Curzon had come to the Conference intent on separating Turkey from her Eastern Alliance; this the Turks could not allow to take place, the Russian alliance being still of paramount importance to them. Nevertheless Turkish statesmen fully realised that sooner or later Turkey—if she were to retain her independence—would have to come to amicable terms with the West, and that the Lausanne conference would be a failure if it only served further to widen the breach between Turkey and the Western powers. There was also the attitude of Rumania and Bulgaria to be taken into consideration. These two states favoured wholeheartedly an international arrangement at the Straits, arguing that as the Danube Statute had placed the mouths of that river under international control, the logical continuation of that free régime should be at the Straits. Freedom at the Danube mouths would be useless without freedom in the Straits, they opined.<sup>22</sup>

The principle of an International Commission once agreed upon, discussion over the drafting of the Straits Convention developed along three main lines:

- I. Liberty of Passage.
- II. Demilitarization.
- III. The International Commission's scope.
- IV. Measures against violation of the established statute.

The first principle Turkey was prepared to recognize fully so that in effect Art. 37 of Sèvres contains very much the same wording as Art. 1 of the «Convention on the Régime of the Straits» included in the Lausanne treaty. This latter stipulates: «The High Contracting parties agree to recognize and declare the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea, as well as by air, in the Straits.»<sup>23</sup>

The second and third points were for the Turks problems of degree only. As far as demilitarisation was concerned the Turkish aim was to lose military rights over as small an area as possible.



The Sèvres clauses dealing with demilitarisation had deprived Turkey of the European bank of the Dardanelles; had forced them to destroy all fortifications; and had put all the waters of the Straits under the direct jurisdiction of the Straits Commission. This body was to have its own locally-recruited police force and to have the right to enforce its jurisdiction on shore. Ismet Pasha bargained and reduced the extent of demilitarisation so appreciably that M. Barrière was provoked into exclaiming: « Que reste-t-il de cette démilitarisation? Il n'en reste guère qu'un symbole », and in truth when the final draft was drawn up, great modifications had been made from the demilitarisation clauses of Sèvres.

Ismet Pasha also insisted that the carrying out of demilitarisation clauses should be left to the Turks, and should not be among the duties of the International Straits Commission.<sup>24</sup>

When it came to the question of a guarantee, the Turkish thesis was for an individual and collective undertaking from all the Lausanne signatory powers to assist Turkey « by all the means at their disposal » in the event of an act of aggression in the Straits or Marmora.<sup>25</sup> The Allied answer however was to suggest a guarantee under Article 10 of the League Covenant. The Allies considered at this time that this formula would give not only a protection to the areas of the Straits but also inviolability from attack to Turkish soil generally.

The Turks were obliged to accept this form of guarantee, so that the final wording of Art. 18 ran thus: « Should the freedom of navigation of the straits or the security of the demilitarised zones be imperilled by a violation... or by a surprise attack... or by some act of war or threat of war. The H. C. P., and in any case France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, acting in conjunction will meet such violation, attack, or other act of war... by all the means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide for this purpose. » There were obvious disadvantages to the Littoral power in the acceptance of such a nebulous form of security. This art 18 was to form a future platform for discussion, and its wording was to be one of the main causes for the Montreux revision talks. It is however interesting to note that in 1923 the Turkish delegates who in so many ways were meticulous about securing their country's rights, considered this article to be sufficient protection to the Turkish state.

## VI

## SHIPPING REGULATIONS

The Straits Convention imposed an extremely liberal regime for the passage of ships, a clear distinction being made between the dictates of war and of peace.<sup>27</sup>

In Peace time full freedom was given to the passage of merchant ships « by day and by night under any flag and with any kind of cargo ». This freedom also embraced civil aircraft and submarines. Warships under any flag were besides given free passage subject to an important reservation introduced to appease the claims of the Black Sea powers. This modification stipulated that (i) no power might send into the Black sea a naval force larger than that of the strongest Black Sea naval power, but (ii) Non-Black-Sea powers were allowed to send into the Black Sea a Maximum of three warships none of which should exceed 10,000 tons.

In war time the regulations were more complicated. Merchant ships and neutral warships were allowed to pass under the same conditions as in peace time. The passage of belligerent warships was however made subject to the conditions agreed upon in Convention XIII of the 1907 Hague Convention, this step being in conformity with the regulations governing the passage of belligerent men-of-war existing in the régimes of the other international Straits and canals. The most important of these restrictions on belligerent warships in transit were the vetos against their committing hostilities in the Straits, against exercising any right of visit, search, or capture, and against a delay of more than 24 hrs. in passage.

In the case of Turkey being belligerent herself, the waterway was not to be closed to neutral shipping and even neutral warships were to be allowed passage. Neutral military aircraft could fly over the Straits at their own risk. Neutral submarines had to surface while in transit. Towards enemy belligerent ships Turkey naturally retained full belligerent rights.

## VII

## CONCLUSIONS

The results of the Lausanne Conference are generally considered to represent a major diplomatic victory for the Turks; and

there is a good deal of truth in this view. Turkey gained the status of an independent nation losing at the same time the last vestiges of an Empire that had long ceased to be faithful and that had never been profitable. Ismet Inonu won for the Turks economic, political, and judicial freedom—this too in the teeth of great opposition from the Entente powers. That he was able to do so was due both to his shrewd estimate of the points over which the Entente were divided, in which instances Turkey's case could be pressed, and also to his understanding of the issues—notably that of the Strait's international and liberal régime—which were all-important to the international community and over which it was necessary for the Turks to compromise.

The diplomatic victory was however by no means complete. The way towards a Turco-Greek understanding had been paved but an Anglo-Turk understanding, in spite of the goodwill of Lord Curzon and Ismet Inonu, was still far from realisation.

The Straits settlement arrived at had, while adopting the tenets of the Allied project, i. e. Demilitarization and an International regime regulated by an international commission, yet succeeded in its shipping clauses in shaping a compromise between the Allied demand for freedom in the Black Sea and the Russian insistence on a 'mare clausum'.

It is true that Turkey had suffered some diminution of her territorial sovereignty in submitting to the presence in Constantinople of the commission with its independent judicial powers to control shipping.

Certain nations besides had received small comfort from the conference. Bulgaria's claims to an outlet to the Aegean had been set aside as had Armenia's pretensions to large areas of Eastern Anatolia.

A permanent peace settlement had nevertheless been achieved after infinite wrangling, one whose broad principles formed a spring board from which the Turkish Republic could launch out upon its ambitious plans of social revolution. And it was above all else peace that was desired by Turkey's new rulers.

## PART ONE

### CHAPTER FOUR

#### THE FIRST DECADE OF THE REPUBLIC 1923-1932

The first few years after Lausanne witnessed a grim struggle in Ankara; one to make good the revolution in Turkey itself. Mustafa Kemal in the closing days of battle against the Greeks had warned his soldiers that far sterner tasks lay ahead.<sup>1</sup>

Spring 1924 saw the coming in of the new constitution. As early as 1922 the secularisation of the new state had begun with the submission of the caliphate to the decrees of the Grand National Assembly. Two years later the Caliphate was abolished altogether, and its former functions were transferred to the Evkaf Ministry.<sup>2</sup>

The secularisation of the Turkish state aroused strong opposition in all parts of Anatolia. This opposition was strongest in the Kurdish areas where political grievances fomented the anger that the Kurds—as fanatical Moslems—felt against the central government's policy. The result was the Kurdish rebellion, which besides costing Ankara much time and money to suppress, considerably shook the prestige of the new ruling caste in Ankara. Its repercussions were felt not only in Turkey but also abroad where foreign observers had watched curiously to see how the Turkish reforms would be met inside Turkey herself.<sup>3</sup>

The Kurdish rebellion persuaded Ankara to press ahead with radical religious reform. In September, 1925, the religious sects, several of whom were important politically, were suppressed and in 1928 the wording of the 1924 constitution was amended, and Article 2, declaring that «The state religion of Turkey is the religion of Islam», was deleted.

Along too with these politico-religious reforms went legal and social reforms of an equally wide-sweeping nature. In 1926 the Turkish legal system was changed; the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian criminal code, and the German Commercial code were adopted with some modifications. In 1928 the Latin alphabet was



made to take the place of the Arabic. In 1930 the emancipation of women was made complete by a law providing them with full voting rights.

In this period of transition, the Turks were deeply suspicious of the designs of the western powers. They were determined that the early difficulties of the Revolution should not be solved by any return to dependence upon the foreigner.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore the failure of the National Assembly to deal pacifically with an opposition party, and the subsequent suppression of this opposition, caused cynical comment from the Western powers. Perhaps however the greatest deterrents to the establishing of friendly relations between Turkey and the Western powers were the continued animosities caused by territorial problems. Economically too the Turks after Lausanne were not prepared to bind themselves to any engagements which could hinder the new policy of rigid state control. Even towards the Russians, with whom they were on supposedly friendly relations, the Turks maintained a guarded and protectionist policy.

The frontier disputes which occupied so much of the time of the Turkish foreign ministry from 1922-1926 naturally formed a great barrier between Turkey and the other countries; and it is only after these had been solved that the Republic was able to formulate an active foreign policy. It is however first necessary in some detail to consider these territorial problems.

# I

## THE GREEK SETTLEMENT

As was to be expected the first exchanges between the Greek and Turk delegates at Lausanne were far from friendly. Turco-Greek enmity dates back to 1823. The Greeks had been successful in driving the Turkish armies out of Western Anatolia; but they had finally come to grief over the dream of a Hellenic empire in the East.

The Greeks, firmly supported by the British until their military collapse, had managed to alienate the affections not only of their open enemies—the Turks—but also those of their co-aggressors, Italy and France. Even the British enthusiasm for the Greek cause had begun to wane from 1921 onwards when the Greeks began repeated *démarches* to be allowed to turn their troops northward to the capture of long-coveted Constantinople

as a more agreeable alternative to pushing forward into the high, hostile plateaus of Anatolia.<sup>5</sup>

Greece thus came to the conference table viewed by the great powers with rather less favour even than the ex-enemy Turkey. Venizelos was not slow to turn the general feeling further against Greece by the uncompromising spirit his first speeches showed.

The Armistice of Mudanya had actually saved the retreating Greek army besides preventing untold horrors of reprisals upon the civilian population by the setting-up of an inter-Allied zone in Thrace. Venizelos's only thanks for this was to declare: « As for Eastern Thrace, it has been lost not as a result of military operations, but in virtue of the Armistice Convention of Mudanya. » Venizelos declared that Greece had been the sufferer in a war in which the aggressor was Turkey. The position of Greece before the conference was sensibly damaged by the news of the execution of the defeated Greek leaders, an event that took place a week after the Conference had begun its sitting.<sup>6</sup>

The points at contest between Turkey and Greece were territorial, financial, and Minority problems.

Ismet Pasha claimed in the first instance a Turkish return to her 1913 border in Thrace, and also proposed a plebiscite to determine the future status of Western Thrace. The powers while raising no objections to Turkey keeping Eastern Thrace, firmly opposed a plebiscite for the West. The opposition to a plebiscite, voiced loudest by Greece, also received backing from the other Balkan powers. Yugoslavia and Rumania wanted to see a demilitarized zone running right along Westward and Southward from the Black Sea to the Aegean. M. Stambulisky on behalf of Bulgaria also reminded the conference of his country's right to an Aegean port as recognized in the Treaty of Sèvres.

The project of a demilitarized area, after receiving considerable attention, eventually lapsed since the powers were unable to give the Turks any effective guarantee of neutralization of the area in question. Failing such an undertaking the Turks were somewhat naturally unwilling to demilitarize any portions of Turkish Thrace.<sup>7</sup>

In February, 1923 the Territorial commission's report awarded Eastern Thrace to Turkey, but refused a plebiscite for the disputed Western areas. On February the 4th, the Turks accepted its findings, giving way over the question of Western Thrace while the Allies renounced the demilitarization scheme.<sup>8</sup>

The first territorial arrangement did little to appease Turco-Greek animosities, the seeds for further discord having already

been sown by the lengthy discussions of financial and minority problems in dispute. The First conference of Lausanne broke up on the 4th February, not to be resumed until the end of April. The martial spirit was reviving in Greece and there was war talk again. General Pangalos, the Greek commander in Thrace, sought to take advantage from the rupture in negotiations between Turkey and the West as well as from Allied impatience at Turkish stubbornness, by restoring Greece's military fortunes in a new attack on Constantinople.<sup>9</sup> It needed Allied diplomatic intervention to remove any fresh disruption of the status quo.

Much ill-feeling had been caused over the questions of war damages and reparations. Ismet Pasha stated that the Greek Army had 'sacked, burned and rased' all the villages on their multiple retreat routes. In answer Venizelos stated, « Certainly damages have been caused by the Greek army which in its retreat lost cohesion and discipline... (But) if she (Greece) is to pay, she must also be payed for the damages imposed upon her. The expulsions of Greeks—before, during, and after the war—have been on such an enormously large scale as to seriously jeopardise the social, economic, and political future of Greece... If Greece is to pay, she must obtain the reimbursement of the sum that these expulsions have cost her. »<sup>10</sup>

When the Lausanne conference was resumed, a basis of agreement was however soon arrived at, a compromise that linked up the territorial and financial issues. Turkey gave up her claims for war damages in return for the cession of Karaagac, (an outer suburb of Adrianople), and of the islands of Tenedos and Imbros, which latter pair Turkey had demanded as being indispensable to her national defence. This settlement was not unsatisfactory to both disputants. Its text was embodied in a special protocol signed along with the other clauses of the conference in July, 1923.<sup>11</sup> Bulgaria alone failed to receive any satisfaction from the arrangement, her claims for an outlet to the Aegean being allowed to lapse.<sup>12</sup>

The third problem at stake, that of Minorities, was to prove far the most difficult one to resolve. The question was first brought before the Conference by Dr. Nansen in December, 1922. He read a paper suggesting that an exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities would be a solution to ethnical problems; and that this work could best be effected through the good offices of the League Council.<sup>13</sup> A sub-committee formed to examine the question reported in favour of the establishment of an international commission in Constantinople to manage the transfers, and

included in the project the exchange of other minority groups besides the Greeks.

Both Greek and Turkish delegates had previously assured Dr. Nansen of their agreement in principle with the formula of a whole-sale population exchange; but when the discussion came to develop there was seen to be a wide difference of opinion between Ismet Pasha's and Venizelos's point of view. The Turks were for a radical solution of the problem and therefore supported the idea of a compulsory exchange as being a 'painful necessity but logical'. The Turks were opposed to the setting-up of an international commission to handle the exchange.<sup>14</sup>

A key problem proved to be that of whether the Greek colony in Constantinople should be allowed to stay. The Turks eventually consented to their remaining on the express condition that the Patriarch should only remain in Constantinople as the symbolic head of the Greek church and should not henceforth be allowed any political influence. A compulsory exchange of populations was to take place under League supervision but without the formation of an international body.

A mixed Commission of the control of populations was established and from 1923 onwards the exchanges began to take place. These however caused so much social upheaval in both countries that the immediate effect was to further envenom Turco-Greek feelings. An important exception to exchange had been made in the proviso that the Greeks in Constantinople were to stay and that the Moslems in Western Thrace were to do likewise. However, in practise the position of these two minorities were made infinitely difficult in the years immediately following Lausanne. « The homes of the Moslem population of Western Thrace were in many cases seized by the Greek government for the shelter of the refugees. »<sup>15</sup> The Turkish government was not slow to take reprisals by the confiscation of Greek property in Constantinople. There thus began a long chain of reprisals and counter-reprisals, violations and counter-violations which made any effective Turco-Greek understanding appear more remote than ever.

In February, 1925, the Turks expelled from Istanbul the Greek patriarch, Constantine, on the grounds that he was an 'exchangeable subject'. The Greeks felt themselves insulted, Constantine was obliged to abdicate and to give way to another patriarch, Basil, that the Turks finally allowed the Holy Synod to elect.<sup>16</sup> This move, causing the greatest indignation in the Greek world, only made the outstanding problems of refugees



and minorities yet more difficult to solve in the atmosphere of acrimonious dispute in which negotiations between the Turk and Greek governments were carried on during the years 1925-1929. In this span the severe friction between the two countries called forth some apprehension of a renewed conflict. These melancholy possibilities were obviated by two factors; firstly Italian influence and secondly the statesmanship of Venizelos and of Mustafa Kemal.<sup>17</sup>

Italian diplomacy in 1928 was aiming at a Tripartite Pact between Italy, Greece, and Turkey, for the regulation of which the signing of the Turco-Italian agreement was actually delayed for several months. Finally however the outstanding differences between Greece and Turkey were recognised to be still stiff enough obstacles to allow of no immediate tripartite understanding. The Italian government therefore decided to rest content with the establishment of separate bilateral agreements with the two disputant countries.<sup>18</sup> In spite of this the Italian initiative, sustained after the 1928 failure, did materially assist towards the final rapprochement that took place two years later. The second factor was the change—if not of heart at least of policy—among the leaders of the two countries.

The Greeks were perturbed by a rearmament move that the Turks took in 1929. This was the reconditioning of the Yavuz Selim (Ex-Goeben). The Greek government for a time toyed with the idea of obtaining another pre-war German capital ship, the «Salamis». But Venizelos, who had had sufficient experience of imperialistic adventure, wisely prevented the danger of a rearmament race with Turkey, one that could only have affected very adversely the slender resources of the two countries. In a speech before the Greek chamber he outlined a constructive alternative policy, one that was to meet with the wholesale approval of the Turks. This expressly gave up the idea of a Greek bid for naval supremacy in the Aegean. He persuaded his government, «to invest instead in light naval craft and aircraft which would be effective for defence and at the same time patently incapable of being used for aggression».<sup>19</sup> Venizelos further declared his belief in Turkey's peaceful intentions, adding that at all events a further disruption of the Aegean and Thracian «status quo» by a Greco-Turkish conflict would not be permitted by the League of Nations. The close of the speech forecast a full understanding between Greece and Turkey, a Pact of Friendship, and a naval agreement.<sup>20</sup>

The conciliatory attitude of Venizelos excited immediate

response from Ankara. Thus in June, 1930 the long-delayed Pact was brought about, the way having been paved by preliminary negotiations. On the 10th an agreement was signed about the long-debated problems of population transfer. Firstly it was decided that the properties of non-returnable emigrants were to pass into the hands of the government whose territory they had forsaken. Secondly, an 'established status' was given to «all Turkish subjects of Greek Orthodox religion» who were present at the time in Constantinople, and all Greek subjects of Moslem religion who were present at the time in Western Thrace.<sup>21</sup> Thirdly an adequate financial settlement was agreed on along the following lines. The Greek government was to pay £ 425,000 to the Mixed Commission from which sum the Orthodox Christians in Istanbul (now to become established as Turkish subjects) were to be compensated for the loss of their properties outside the Istanbul area.

This winding-up of questions under dispute was effected on a sound common-sense basis. It in fact «constituted a definitive financial settlement as between the two governments themselves, while it was left to the governments—at their discretion—to compensate the 'exchangeable' and the 'non-returnable', 'non-exchangeable' persons who had migrated to the territory of the one government from the territory of the other for the properties which they left behind».<sup>22</sup>

The question of ratifications led to some adverse criticisms in both the Greek Chamber and in the National Assembly at Ankara; in spite of this the ratifications were agreed upon by sweeping majorities in both parliaments.

In October the Turco-Greek 'accord' was given substance by the Greek premier's official visit to Turkey on a Greek warship. Everywhere Venizelos was enthusiastically received, the Turks having been prepared for this new turn in policy by their press. The instruments signed at Ankara on the 30th October were threefold; a Treaty of neutrality, conciliation and arbitration; a naval protocol; and a commercial convention. The first was highly similar in content and even in wording to the Turco-Italian agreement of 1928, though the explicit agreement to refer future disputes to the League Council may be considered of even greater significance in this instance due to the long-standing tradition of enmity between the Turks and the Greeks. The Naval protocol stipulated that «The H. C. P... being desirous of forestalling useless increases in their expenses on naval armaments, and of advancing... along the road of a parallel limitation of their

respective forces... undertake not to proceed to any order... without first giving the other party six months' notice in advance in order... to forestall... a race of armaments by means of an amicable exchange of views... »<sup>23</sup>

The agreement reached between the two countries was hailed throughout the world as an important step forward in pacific relations. As a local agreement too it had a vital and stabilising influence on the Aegean situation. In the eyes of the world it reflected great credit on the Turks and appreciably raised the standing of that country in Europe. The Turco-Greek understanding further greatly assisted the conciliatory aims of the Balkan Entente. Not only did diplomatic relations enter a new and more propitious phase; but also the attitude of the two peoples towards one another was slowly beginning to reflect less hostility. The respective minorities too after the settlement were able to enjoy somewhat less precarious existences in the countries of their 'establishment'.

The effects of the compulsory exchanges have been compared to a surgical operation. Certainly as a cure for minority problems the solution was a highly drastic one. The patient took long to recover from the deep incision. By 1926 however the exchanges were more or less complete, and by 1930 the respective governments had to the best of their capacities settled in the immigrants. Remarkable as the friendship pact indeed seemed after more than a century of strife, its signature was but the following-up of a realistic policy by the astute leaders of both countries, who, desiring an era of peace, were willing to let bygones be bygones.

## II

### THE MOSUL QUESTION AND RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN

At Lausanne, a solution of the Mosul question had proved impossible not only due to the tenacity of Ismet Pasha and Lord Curzon, but also due to the international question of concessions, involving besides English and Turkish interests, American, French, and German claims as well.<sup>24</sup>

The question had been withdrawn from the conference agenda; and it had been left for England and Turkey to settle the matter. The Standard Oil company had at Lausanne managed to come to terms with the Turkish petroleum Company so that

the question was now one solely between Turkey and Great Britain.

While Ismet Pasha's and Curzon's confidence in settlement showed a certain good-will and expectation of eventual agreement, events on the disputed border hardly justified this optimism. The question of the border was left so vague that serious incidents took place. In August, 1923 the British Air Force bombed Suleymaniye causing thirty-seven casualties. A strong complaint was made to Mr. Neville Henderson, the British Representative at Istanbul. Mr. Henderson in his answer claimed that as the whole of the Vilayet of Mosul belonged to Great Britain (as mandatory for Iraq) that consequently « the operation in question has nothing to do with the violation of the status quo; being in effect a simple measure of local administration rendered necessary by a menace to public security ». The Turks rejected this opinion appealing to para 2 of Article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty which stipulates: « The Turkish and British governments engage themselves—while awaiting a decision as to the frontier—not to proceed to any movement, military or otherwise. »<sup>25</sup> The correspondence continued for several months, each party maintaining its original point of view. The Suleymaniye incident was only the first of a growing score of border incidents.<sup>26</sup> The Turks claimed firstly that the R. A. F. constantly made reconnaissances over the frontier. The second cause of friction were the Christian tribes who lost no opportunities of making raids over the frontier. The Turks claimed that the British were not only encouraging these tribesmen to attack the Moslem villages over the frontier but were also arming them.

The dispute was often carried on at the highest level in direct exchanges between Ismet Inonu and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, who both at that time held the joint posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of their countries.<sup>27</sup> Ismet Pasha wrote to Macdonald on the 16th September, 1924, stating that he had proof of the activity of British agents, claiming indemnities for the frequent violations of the status quo by British and other forces, and expressing the apprehension that « contrary to the pacific aims of all the world England is tending to create a 'fait accompli' by allowing armed force to settle the difference over the frontier. »

Such was indeed far from the British mind for, though British policy was aimed firmly at keeping Mosul, she was as keen as were the Turks upon a pacific solution, and had sent a delegation headed by Sir Percy Cox, then High-Commissioner in Irak, to



negotiate the question in Constantinople. The conference had sat between the 19th of May and 5th June, without achieving any tangible results.<sup>28</sup>

The Constantinople talks showed a strong desire for conciliation on both sides. Fethi Bey, Turkey's chief delegate, stated in opening the conference: «We must ardently hope that we can arrive at a satisfactory settlement of this important question, one which has already been the subject of a long discussion between the Turkish and British delegations at Lausanne, and whose negotiation had to be postponed to a calmer period. On the friendly solution of this matter will depend the whole edifice of future relations between the Turkish Republic and the British Empire.»<sup>29</sup> Sir Percy Cox in reply fully agreed with the sentiments expressed, recognizing that «The settlement of the problem before us... constitutes the sole obstacle to the entire reestablishment of those intimate relations between our two governments which have existed for so many years before the cataclysm of 1914.» Cox also warned the Conference that whilst Great Britain was willing to submit the dispute to the League of Nations, such a course would undoubtedly undermine the establishment of an «atmosphere of reciprocal confidence which is so necessary from the point of view of future relations between the two countries».<sup>30</sup>

It was when the rival theses were read that the wide gulf between the two views became clear. Both spokesmen took up their national cases at the point where the Ismet Pasha-Curzon talks had broken off. The Turkish claim to Mosul was still in the main the ethnical one. Fethi Bey argued in the following way: «The British Delegation at Lausanne itself recognised that the vast majority of the population of the Mosul Vilayet are Turks and Kurds, two sister nations which have united their political destinies in perpetuity. They have founded a Republic and they live on a footing of perfect equality enjoying the same political prerogatives and the same sovereign rights.»<sup>31</sup>

Sir Percy Cox insisted that the Turks and the Kurds must be considered as two separate races with separate political aspirations. Curzon, he stated, had demolished the myth of a Turkish majority in the Mosul Vilayet by showing that the Turks in that locality formed indeed only one twelfth of the whole population. The point of disagreement was clearly in what way should the Kurds be counted, for as both parties admitted, the Kurds formed a large part of the population. Fethi Bey claimed them as Turks, while Sir Percy Cox claimed them as independent elements

«satisfied with the measure of local autonomy granted to them».

To widen the gulf even further, Sir Percy Cox introduced the claims of the Assyrians, a Christian minority inhabiting the Mosul Vilayet who had put forward themselves claims to the Turkish vilayet of Hakkari. Sir Percy Cox declared that his Government was anxious to «assure the establishment of this race conforming to their reasonable pretensions and aspirations».

Sir Percy stated that this tribe had asked to become a British Protectorate but that the British government had refused, not wishing to «envisage so grave an increase of her responsibilities».<sup>32</sup> Fethi Bey was mildly sarcastic on the score of the British delegate's interest in such a small Minority. «The Turkish delegation», he said, «Does not think it would be reasonable to tear away from their mother country several hundreds of thousands of Turks and Kurds in order to take under British protection some ten thousands of Assyrians of whom a part have migrated from Persia». He added: «The Assyrians being Christians I understand the British Government considering them worthy of a special support». Fethi Bey was wondering whether the interests of the Moslem elements might not be endangered by this suggestion.<sup>33</sup>

Two sessions sufficed to show the impasse into which the discussions were leading. Later sessions were mainly given over to the question of the representation of Mosul delegates in the Irak and Turkish Parliaments. The Turks had for long objected to the British allowing representatives from the disputed Vilayet to take their part in the Irak Assembly. Sir Percy Cox argued from the participation of freely elected delegates that the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet were disposed towards political unity with Irak. Fethi Bey on the other hand claimed that the Vilayet of Suleymaniye had sent deputies to the National Assembly in Ankara. Sir Percy Cox, being informed of the delegates' names discredited the 'bona fides' of each one of them; and, insinuating that they were no better than political puppets, he denied their relation to the problem since in any case they were «delegates not elected deputies».<sup>34</sup>

The most telling argument of the Turkish thesis was certainly Fethi Bey's reminder to the British chief delegate that in the Sykes-Picot Agreement England had been prepared to let Mosul be separated from Irak and form a part of Syria. Sir Percy replied that «During the first years of the war, Great Britain had envisaged the cession of the Vilayets of Basra and Bagdad to Great Britain... however, this proposition was meditated between

the two Allied powers at a time when they expected that a third Allied power, Russia, would be their neighbour on the north. More thorough investigation of local conditions have clearly shown how impractical this arrangement was; and it has consequently been abandoned. In any case there has never been any question of returning the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey.»<sup>36</sup>

The deadlock was reached. An atmosphere of official cordiality still existed amongst the delegates, and Fethi Bey expressed his deep regrets that «Our labours have strayed so far from the aims we meant to reach».<sup>37</sup> The sole agreement that could be reached was on an annexe to the Procès Verbal which stipulated that «The negotiations... not having reached the aim sought, and no accord having been arrived at, it only remains for the litigation to be brought before the Council of the League of Nations for settlement».<sup>38</sup>

The failure of the Constantinople Conference inevitably brought about a worsening in Anglo-Turkish relations. Though the matter was submitted to the League at the end of September, the fact of the dispute having been referred to this body did not relax the state of disorder on the undefined Turco-Irak border. On the contrary, as previously stated, local incidents assumed such importance that the correspondence relating thereto was carried on by the heads of the two governments. Feeling ran high in both countries on the Mosul issue.<sup>39</sup>

When the dispute came before the League both litigants submitted their cases in full, cases which went over the same ground as that already covered at Lausanne and at Constantinople. Neither party would make concessions to the other's case. Turkey strongly urged a free plebiscite in the Vilayet, but Great Britain maintained her opposition to that.<sup>40</sup>

The two countries approached a League settlement in a somewhat different spirit. Great Britain declared herself willing to abide by a League decision, whereas Turkey needed assurances that she should be represented on an equal footing with Great Britain before she would send her representatives to Geneva. These assurances were given; but still Fethi Bey was not prepared to commit his country to accept a final arbitration by the League.<sup>41</sup> A provisional frontier line was fixed in October, and both parties bound themselves to recognise this. Further, a commission was appointed which proceeded to get in touch with the British and Turkish governments; the members set out for Mosul itself and conducted their researches on the spot.<sup>42</sup> The enquiry commission asked for assessors from Turkey. The fur-

nishing of these provoked yet one more incident; as the British declared that the interpreters sent along with the Turkish assessor were political agitators, and they protested to Ankara against their continued stay in Bagdad.<sup>43</sup> The Turks felt that England had an unfair pull over the Enquiry Commission by their presence as military conquerors in the Vilayet.

The Commission made a thorough study of the problems, and entered into lengthy correspondence with the Turkish government, asking them in questionnaire form for numerous details to support their thesis. Early in September, 1925 the Commission reported its findings. It recommended the unity of Mosul with Irak, this being dependent on the maintenance of Irak under a British mandate for a term of twenty-five years. It stipulated also that the rights of the Kurds should be guaranteed.<sup>44</sup>

The Turkish representative at Geneva, Tevfik Rüstü Bey, refused to recognize the report, refused his country's recognition of the Irak mandate, and maintained that his country was still determined to retain Mosul. The Turkish delegate objected to the Council procedure; he stated that Turkey should be allowed a vote in the decision.<sup>45</sup> It had however previously been ruled that neither of the disputants should have a vote. Turkey refusing to abide by a decision of the Council, the juridical question of the council's role was submitted to the Permanent Court of Justice.<sup>46</sup> The Court reported in November, 1925 that whereas the Council had power to settle the dispute, the parties to that dispute could not themselves vote.<sup>47</sup>

The Turks rejected this decision, and withdrew their representatives from the League gathering, while Great Britain accepted the mandate for twenty-five years along with the award of the Mosul Vilayet (without Hakkari), which was made by the Council on December, 16th, 1925.

The effects of this decision upon Turkish public opinion were drastic. The Turkish press spoke of war as a likelihood, and a military council was held in Ankara. Anti-British feeling reached a new high-water mark.<sup>48</sup> However, in fact, the Turkish rulers were in no mood for war even over so important an issue as Mosul. Great Britain became once again the hated imperialist enemy, and Turkey was obliged to return to her Russian moorings, this time in a more stringently binding form. The very day after the Council award of Mosul to England, Turkey signed a non-aggression pact with Russia.<sup>49</sup>

1925 marks the final year of the Turco-British struggle that had been waged since 1913. The Mosul dispute—however vexing



its termination may have been to Turkey—did remove the last existing bone of contention between the two countries. Turkey's anger with the British and her thrust-back towards Moscow were to prove weighty delaying factors in the eventual Turco-British rapprochement. Nevertheless this last was bound to come once Turkey could be convinced of Great Britain's disinterestedness in her affairs.

In June, 1926 after preliminary parleys Great Britain and Turkey at last reached a settlement.<sup>50</sup> Turkey recognized the Irak mandate and the Mosul award was agreed upon with only small modifications. Turkey was to waive concession claims for Mosul in return for a 10 % royalty on the oil rights. Later the Turks agreed to accept a lump payment of £ 500,000 instead of receiving the annual royalties.<sup>51</sup>

The way was thus cleared for an Anglo-Turkish understanding. The Press of the two countries were still very cool. In England the significance of Kemal Ataturk's revolution was not fully grasped and a great deal of scepticism was even felt as to the ability of the Ankara government to effectively control the nation's future destinies.

The year 1929 however saw the beginnings of a purely diplomatic rapprochement. A British naval squadron paid an official visit to Constantinople. The British Admiral and Ambassador went to Ankara and interviewed Ataturk.<sup>52</sup> The way was being paved towards an understanding. Turkey's willingness to approach England again on friendly terms was certainly due to the dubious success of Turco-Russian friendship promoters. Turkey was toying with the idea of joining the League of Nations; while Russia was making strenuous efforts to prevent her doing so. The British navy's visit to Constantinople was closely followed by that of Karakhan, Russia's assistant commissar for foreign affairs.<sup>53</sup> Turkey as master of her own house, now felt strong enough to launch out into positive relations with the West; and Russian diplomacy was becoming less able to prevent her doing so.

On March, 1930, Great Britain and Turkey signed a treaty of commerce and navigation.

### III

## TURCO-FRENCH RELATIONS

The prestige of France in Ottoman Turkey had been high. Not only in the arts but also in the realm of practical affairs aristocratic Turks had been accustomed to send their sons and daughters either to French schools in Turkey or when possible to French universities and training colleges. French was the second language in Turkey, and it is no exaggeration to say that what Western culture the Ottomans imbibed was French culture. Given these accumulated advantages it might well be supposed that the French would have been able to play as lively a part in the affairs of Republican Turkey as in the old régime, especially when one recalls Yusuf Kemal's statement at the time of the Franklin-Bouillon agreement to the effect that « Turkey desired specialists and would view with favour other requests for concessions ».<sup>54</sup>

However—as in the case of Italy—the French gained little in the way of concessions after the actual signature of an agreement with the Ankara government. Preliminary discussion before the Franklin-Bouillon 'accord' had met with the greatest difficulties over the question of capitulations. The French, while ardently wishing to come to terms with the Nationalists as early as 1921, had been loth to concede the principle of abolition of capitulations. Of all the Western nations, France's capital holding both in the Ottoman debt and in property were highest. France therefore suffered most when the Economic commission at Lausanne agreed upon the formula of abolition of capitulations. Moreover, France's opposition to that move at the Conference had excited the indignation of the Turks, who felt that the French were thereby contravening the spirit of the Franklin-Bouillon 'accord', and were swinging again to Entente solidarity aimed against full Turkish independence.

In the years after Lausanne the French Levantine community was heavily hit. Not only was this felt by the trading companies who had formerly handled the large bulk of Turkish export and import with Western Europe, but there was also a clause of Lausanne which led to the liquidation or turcicisation of many charitable institutions, hospitals, and schools.<sup>55</sup> The French government were curiously reticent in their protests against Turkish moves. No active steps at all were taken to assure the continued existence of a livelihood to French subjects who had

for long made their living in Turkish commerce. French as well as other foreign firms were very badly hit by the imposition of long-antedated taxation by the Turkish authorities. This with the addition of countless other restrictions caused French companies to withdraw their capital and personnel from the country.

The French had their own troubles to deal with in the Middle East, in Syria; and the Turks as their northern neighbours were able to cause them a good deal of additional anxiety. The extraordinarily feeble support given by the Quai d'Orsay to the French community in Turkey would indeed seem to be partly explainable by the French anxiety to placate Ankara over Syrian affairs in general and over Alexandretta in particular.

The Franklin-Bouillon agreement had seen both a territorial adjustment in favour of the Turks and also a French promise to institute a special régime in Alexandretta. These decisions were further confirmed at Lausanne. France had at once proceeded to put the agreement into effect. An arrêté from the High Commissioner in Syria in August, 1921 proclaimed the special status of Alexandretta.<sup>56</sup> The laws in force in Alexandretta were to be identical with those of the State of Aleppo, and the Alexandretta Sanjak was to be represented on the Aleppo Representative Council. However the Mutasarif was to have almost the full powers of a governor, being in direct charge of administration and being responsible for preparing an autonomous budget. The governor's powers were therefore great; further the Turkish language was given parity with Arabic and French as an official language not only throughout the Sanjak of Alexandretta but also in the State Representative Council of Aleppo.<sup>57</sup> The unification of Aleppo and Damascus into a single Syrian State which took place in December, 1924 did not affect the autonomous status of Alexandretta.

The widespread troubles with which the French were faced in Syria led to the sending of a new High Commissioner in late 1925. M. De Jouvenel's announcement of a liberal policy favourable to self-governing aspirations raised hopes not only amongst the Syrians, but also amongst the Alexandrettan and Antiochene deputies who in January, 1926 advanced the claim that they should be completely separated from Syria and be put directly under the aegis of the High Commissioner. The deputies were allowed to go as far as the formation of a Representative Council which in March, 1926 proclaimed the independence of its territory and actually voted a constitution. Negotiations in Alexandretta however were successful. The Council rescinded its declaration

of independence, and agreed to 'remain within the framework of Syrian unity under a régime of decentralization'.<sup>58</sup>

The special considerations shown by the French authorities in Alexandretta had not managed to prevent the frequent incidence of border troubles between Syria and Turkey. Turkish «Chete's» had been carrying on an incessant guerilla warfare which according to the French Governmental Report reached its climax in 1924.<sup>59</sup> It will be recalled that Article 8 of the Franklin-Bouillon agreement had called for the creation within one month of a Mixed Commission of Delimitation whose job it was to settle the exact frontier between the two countries.

This commission did finally meet in September, 1925, but only to find that the Turkish delegates were laying claim to certain villages south of the line previously agreed upon. The work of the Commission had no sooner begun than it was brought to a stop by these additional Turkish claims. This was the unsatisfactory position in which M. De Jouvenel found Syro-Turkish relations on his arrival as High Commissioner; and he therefore decided to visit Ankara in person to attempt to ameliorate them.<sup>60</sup>

M. De Jouvenel's visit to Ankara resulted in a firm agreement being reached in February, 1926. A Convention of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations was initialed by Tefvik Rüstü and the Syrian Commissioner.<sup>61</sup> In this it was agreed that all disputes between Turkey and France (in her position as mandatory for Syria) should be settled by arbitration. Both countries further pledged themselves to an attitude of benevolent neutrality in the case of an attack upon one of the contracting parties by a third party.<sup>62</sup> An arrangement for mutual cooperation in the suppression of border raids was included in a special protocol, as were the details of respective rights on the Baghdad Railway, the regulation of the waters of the Euphrates and Kuwaik rivers.

Article 2 of the Convention reaffirmed the necessity of a Delimitation Commission as previously agreed by Article 8 of the 1921 Ankara agreement. Delimitation was made subject to certain changes, notably in Protocol I where France gave way to certain Turkish claims on the Payas and Kiliz sectors.<sup>63</sup>

Two factors hindered the actual signature of the agreement. In the first place the Permanent Mandates Commission drew attention to article 4 of the French Mandate stipulating that «the mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign power».<sup>64</sup> The French



government had to reassure the Mandates Commission that this territorial adjustment was in fact a clearing-up only of a point unresolved in the 1921 agreement. M. De Caix assured the Mandates Commission that the Syrian section of the railway 'should not be used by the Turks in any military operations against Irak'.<sup>65</sup>

The threat of war between Turkey and Great Britain was at this time very real; and the French government felt it necessary to point out to the Turks that the benevolent neutrality clause in the new Turco-French agreement would be overruled by France's obligations to the League of Nations in the event of an armed conflict. In consequence of these factors the Turco-French agreement was not actually signed till May 30th, only six days before the signature of the Anglo-Turco-Irak agreement.<sup>66</sup>

The work of the Delimitation Commission got swiftly underway, and little difficulty was encountered in fixing an exact border for the North-Western and North-central borders of Syria. Where dispute arose was over the extreme North-Eastern border of Syria<sup>67</sup>, between Nüsaybin (Nisibin) and Cizre (Jeziret Ibn Umar). The frontier agreed on was 'the old road'<sup>68</sup>. The determination of this set a puzzle to the commission. It had been provided that in such a contingency a Neutral decision should be given. General Ernest, the Danish president of the Commission—after obtaining both parties' agreement to accept in advance his decision—undertook himself responsibility for the investigation of this sector. His award made in January, 1928 more or less coincided with the line drawn by the French Commissioner. The Turkish government disputed the award on the grounds that firstly the President of the Commission had not the powers to make a would-be arbitral decision, and that secondly the basis for an award, i.e., the finding of 'the old road, had not been effected'.<sup>69</sup>

The fact was that the Turks had been in 'de facto' possession of a more southern line than General Ernest's award drew; and that they were extremely reluctant to retire, their reluctance being stimulated by brushes between the Turks and a Kurdish chieftain, Osman Aga Hajo, who was supported by the French. The refusal of Ankara to recognise the Commission's decision led to the continuation of border troubles in the disputed sector throughout 1928. In November of that year renewed negotiations in Ankara were unable to break the deadlock.<sup>70</sup>

The Summer of 1929 did however bring a solution to the boundary dispute. A Demarcation Protocol was signed which

while more or less enforcing the previous decision detached one-fifth of the disputed territory from Syrian soil so as to give the Turks a method of policing the northernmost of the roads between Nüsaybin and Cizre. A Frontier Protocol defined the steps to be taken to maintain security, and the regulations applicable to the passage to and fro of nomadic tribes. To ensure frontier security a permanent mixed Frontier Commission was formed to sit twice a year. This body held its first meeting in Beirut in October, 1929; furthermore the French Government after the signature of agreement reported «a marked improvement in conditions of security» throughout the frontier zone.<sup>71</sup> In October too the Demarcation Commission recommenced its work which was satisfactorily completed by June, 1930, in which month French troops were able to move unopposed up to the agreed line between Nüsaybin and Cizre.<sup>72</sup>

## IV

## TURCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

From 1921 onwards Turkey was considered by Soviet Russia as being definitely within the sphere of Russian influence. Russian diplomacy, completely successful in the Transcaucasian Republics, aimed at creating a Middle-Eastern ring consisting of Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey, united under Russian influence in their common detestation of British Imperialism.

In order to pursue this policy Russia had to create special facilities for these countries in which her interests lay. In the early years of the Turkish revolution Turco-Russian relations were on the whole concerned mainly with commerce. There were official visits exchanged and there was talk of closer cultural relations; but the tangible field of cooperation was trade. In the years up to 1914 Russia had taken no special care to expand her trade with Turkey, her exports to Turkey in 1913 being but 2.4 % of the total Russian exports for the year.<sup>73</sup>

During the Turkish war of independence the Soviet government were occupied with the problems of how to increase their exports to Turkey, and also of how to combat foreign competitors on the Turkish market. Art. 14 of the Moscow Pact stipulated that «Both parties agree to conclude in the near future such treaties regulating economic, financial, and other questions as are necessary for the establishment of reciprocal friendly relations.»

Provision was also made in the 1921 treaty for the free transit of all goods passing to and from Turkey over the Batum border.<sup>74</sup>

In spite of these provisions in the Friendship Pact, it was to take six years of protracted and often-interrupted parleying before a Commercial agreement could be drafted. However « Soviet trade with Turkey picked up more quickly than with any other Eastern country after the war. Between 1921 and 1923 it constituted about 25 % of the entire Russian trade with the East. »<sup>75</sup> Already in 1923 serious difficulties arose over the diplomatic status of the Russian State Trading Bureaus in the various Turkish towns where the Russians planned to operate, the Russian government insisting that their trade personnel should enjoy diplomatic immunities, the Turks with firmness refusing to grant this concession.

As the result of this dispute the Turks placed an embargo on Soviet goods, cut off wheat purchases altogether from Russia, and turned to the Australian market to supply their wheat import needs. The embargo only lasted two months but it succeeded in greatly damaging trade relations. Moreover the point at issue, namely the Status of the trade relations, was not solved; and it remained a source of trouble for the future.<sup>76</sup>

Turkey on her side seemed to be making little attempt to facilitate the expansion of her trade with Russia. The main difficulty for both countries was of course, a shortage of suitable goods for export, and this was particularly acute during the years 1919-1924. But added to this the Turks established in 1922 a protective tariff, which offered no special clauses to Russian trade. The tax on the importation of raw materials, a tax against which the Russians had often appealed, was retained; and protective duties on the import of other goods were raised.<sup>77</sup> The Turks were clearly pursuing a policy of great caution towards Russian economic aims, and one which contrasted strangely with the official cordiality existing between the two countries.

Pending a settlement of the status of Russian trade commissions, a Russian trading agency, Arcos, was opened in Constantinople and all the trade between the two countries was conducted through this channel. In 1924 a further official agency, Russo-Turk was formed, its aims being to « attract foreign capital and place Russian coal, cement, anthracite, and any other products eventually available for export from Russia on the Turkish market ».

An examination of these early years of commercial relations

shows clearly the nature of the difficulties which were shortly to become acuter. The Turks however, for all their suspicion of Russian motives, could not afford to allow their political 'accord' with Russia to disintegrate. The unsuccessful outcome of the Mosul issue forced them to forge a closer link with the Soviet Union. Thus it was that Turkey signed a Non-aggression pact with Russia on December 17th, 1925.<sup>78</sup>

The signature of this Pact might appear strange in the light of the Turkish Republic's refusal to allow the Bolshevik gospel to be spread in Turkey by either Russians or by proselyte Turks. During 1924 and 1925 the Ankara government took action against Bolshevik sympathizers and suppressed a newspaper with red tendencies.<sup>79</sup> This could not fail to antagonize Moscow though the Turks were acting within their own rights according to Article 8 of the Moscow Pact. In spite of this early set-back in Turco-Russian relations, the Turco-British quarrel had been grave enough to revive all Turkey's fears of British imperialism, and to force her foreign minister to depend on Russian support.

The Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression contained only three Articles. The first stated that : « Both parties agree to observe neutrality towards the other in case a military action should be carried out by one or more powers against one signatory party ». The wording of the second Article was of great importance, as its implications were to involve the Turks in certain adjustments for their future commitments to other countries.

« The contracting parties engage to avoid all forms of aggression against the other Party. Both parties bind themselves not to participate in any alliance or entente of a political nature directed by one or more powers against the other Contracting Party. Likewise the contracting Parties agree not to participate in any alliance or entente directed by one or by several Powers against the military or naval security of the other party. »

Article Three stipulated that the Treaty would enter into force immediately after ratification, and that it would last three years.

In 1927 a Commercial treaty between the two countries was finally negotiated.<sup>80</sup> The Soviet Press hailed this as yet another mark of Turco-Russian solidarity. The Turkish view is clearly expressed in a statement affixed to the treaty text in the Turkish Legislative Code. This states :

« As the foreign trade of the U.S.S.R. is regulated by a monopoly system, we in our turn are forced to admit the commercial representation the recognition of which has been made



a 'sine qua non' by the Russian Government in all the commercial agreements concluded with other states.»

The statement then approaches the real issue at stake :

« The Soviet delegates insisted on the establishment in certain Turkish towns—apart from the headquarters at Ankara and the office at Constantinople—of other branches of the Commercial delegation, in particular at Smyrna, Trebizond, Mersin, Erzerum, Konya, Kars, and Ardvin. After long negotiations we prevailed on them to abandon the offices in Kars and Ardvin.»<sup>81</sup>

The Turks were clearly afraid of letting the Russians establish any sort of branch organisations in Anatolia which would be legally free of Turkish supervision. In this way we may interpret the Turkish exclusion of the Russians from Kars and Ardvin, areas recently relinquished by the Russians, areas too inhabited partly by non-Turkish elements over which the Turks had established a rigid military control prohibiting even Turkish civilians from right of visit and sojourn there.

As for the agreement itself, most-favoured nation terms were to benefit most of Turkey's exports into Russia. Turkey was thus receiving the same special trade concessions as the other Eastern countries receiving privileges from Moscow. Most-favoured nation treatment was also to cover the acquisition, possession, and protection of property on a reciprocal basis. Stipulations were also made as to the exact percentage of trade which the respective State Trade organisations would handle, and as to how much of the volume would be left to private enterprise.<sup>82</sup>

The Soviet government declared: « In granting these facilities to Turkish commerce we are convinced that for the future economic relations between the two countries are established on a thoroughly satisfactory basis for both great friendly powers.»<sup>83</sup>

This rosy estimate was to fall very short of the reality achieved. In fact trade between the two countries did increase between 1926 and 1930, and whereas Turkey took 3.6 % of her imports from Russia in 1926, she took 7.2 % in 1930, this figure being maintained in the two following years also.<sup>84</sup> Nevertheless this figure represented a minute figure in Russia's total exports. Besides the incessant trade disputes, there were constant economic factors motivating against any more appreciable rise in inter-trade. Firstly, whereas Russia was exporting necessity goods to the Turks—wheat, oil, coal, timber, metal and cotton textiles, Turkey could only export semi-luxury goods such as fruits, tobacco carpets, and nuts. General Soviet policy was against the importation of such non-essentials; and it was therefore hard for Russian

merchants to make suitable purchases in Turkey. For this reason the trade balance was always unfavourable to Turkey.<sup>85</sup>

The disagreements between the two countries were by no means silenced by the 1927 agreement; on the contrary great ill feeling in Turkey grew out of the alleged non-observance of certain clauses in the agreement. In this it had been stipulated that Turkish merchants should be allowed to export currency from Russia to Turkey, but in practice « The Russian authorities disregarded these regulations, prevented Turkish merchants from removing their money, insisted that it should be spent in the U. S. S. R., and thus forced them to export Soviet goods to Asia Minor.» The Turkish consulates in Russia also met with great difficulties in changing their money into Turkish currency. In 1929 a Turkish journal charged the Russians with having confiscated the funds of Turkish merchants held in Soviet Banks. Official complaints against these and other irritations were of no avail. A further fact of interest in the two countries' trade relations is the very small volume of trade that passed over Turkey's north-eastern border with Russia. In the average year between 1926 and 1930 this was only one tenth of the trade that passed by other routes. This was partly due to the prevalence of smuggling on the Batum frontier<sup>86</sup> and partially due to the undeveloped state of the Eastern trade route to Russia.

Russia looked askance at Turkey's conciliation policy towards the west which began to make itself manifest in 1928, when Italy and Turkey signed a treaty, and which became quite patent in the year 1930 when Turkey came to terms with the two ex-enemy states, Great Britain and Greece. Russian policy was aimed at forestalling this turn to the West, but with Turkey's suspicion of the West on the wane, she no longer had any effective means to enforce this policy. 1929 saw the reaffirmation of the Turco-Russian Non-aggression Pact on which occasion M. Karakhan was in Ankara. This move, however, did nothing to forestall the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement; and by 1930 it was abundantly clear that Russia was beginning to lose her influence over Turkish foreign policy.

A further attempt to bolster up the waning friendship was made in 1931 with the signature of a fresh Commercial Treaty between the two countries. Karakhan had again visited Istanbul in 1930, but throughout the year violent complaints had been made by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and the Turkish press against Soviet dumping.<sup>87</sup> The world economic crisis was producing its dire effects upon Turkish trade also: and one Turkish

paper claimed that «The invasion of the market by Russian coal, the ruin of the cement industry, the fact that the exportation of Turkish tobacco to Germany and of Turkish wheat to Greece is now impossible—owing to the Soviet competition, the threat to our cotton textile industry, make an inquiry into Soviet dumping necessary.»<sup>88</sup>

Far-fetched as many of these and other similar charges were, the Turkish Minister of Commerce was asked to investigate the problems of Russian competition. The Minister stated in reply that he was not able to take action as «Measures against dumping would lead to the denunciation of the Soviet-Turkish Commercial treaty... I will not assume the responsibility for a measure of this nature.»<sup>89</sup> The new commercial agreement was also adversely criticized by members of the National Assembly, but in spite of this it came into force.

Litvinoff went to Istanbul and spoke very warmly on the subject of Russo-Turk relations; on the other hand the 1931 pact introduced no startling innovations. The Status of the Soviet Commercial delegation is clearly settled but not in a way favourable to Russian interests. Henceforth this body is to be subject to the 'laws and jurisdiction of Turkey'. The Russian press gave much space to Turkey, and the following passage from *Izvestiya* shows the argument adopted:

«...In the immediate future, with the growth of the Industrial power of the U.S.S.R., Soviet-Turkish friendship will increasingly extend to new fields of economic cooperation. For Turkey this economic cooperation with the U.S.S.R.—the only government not pursuing aggressive ends and a deliberate subjugation policy, and which is aiming at the economic uplift of Eastern countries—is of first-class importance. The war waged by Western imperialism against Turkish independence is far from over. The holders of the so-called Ottoman debt do not consider the precarious financial situation of Turkey and demand full payment of their bonds. In the sphere of foreign trade the activity of foreign capital is confined to the rapacious exploitation of the Turkish peasantry. Turkey is confronted with complicated problems in improving her economic position. In her serious difficulties she can expect no help from her Western neighbours. The obvious powerlessness of capitalistic countries to bring about even temporary economic alleviation of the crisis, the impotency of the League of Nations, the growth of reaction in England, and the increasing menace of War all reduce Turkey's hope of economic support from the West to the thinnest fiction. Under these cir-

cumstances the tried friendship of the Soviet Union will prove exceptionally valuable.»<sup>90</sup>

The tone of this utterance was somewhat out of date, belonging more to the early 20's when the cry of defence against Western imperialism had really struck an answering chord at Ankara. Russian attempts to scare the Turks away from the West were to continue for a few more years with ever-diminishing success. The process of Turkey's westward facing was gradual but steady. Russian trade too held up to a peak point with Turkey between the years 1929-1932, after which year both Russian imports to Turkey and Turkish exports to the former country began to show a progressive decline.<sup>91</sup>

On a diplomatic level the Turks were still on the best of terms with the Russians as was seen at the Disarmament conference in Geneva; yet under the surface tension existed. The Soviet Trade Bureau were fined in that same year—1932—for infringement of Turkish trade regulations, and their appeal to the right of diplomatic status only led to an increase of the fine.<sup>92</sup>

In May Ismet Pasha paid an official visit to Moscow, and the Russian government offered Turkey a credit of 8 million dollars in order to buy machinery in the U.S.S.R. No interest was charged, and the Turks undertook to repay the loan in twenty years in Turkish exported goods. This offer was of considerable importance to Turkey allowing her both to import badly-needed machinery as well as to place her exports as repayment.<sup>93</sup> In March 1933, the Turks accordingly sent a delegation to purchase machinery after which a group of Russian technical experts came to Istanbul to assist with plans for the new Turkish factories.<sup>94</sup>

The years under review thus show a Russian drive to control Turkish policy. The early attempt to effect this by sending Bolshevik enthusiasts to Turkey was doomed to failure as both countries had taken steps against propaganda as early as 1921. A further blow to direct Bolshevik work in Turkey had been caused by Mustafa Kemal's banning of a Turkish Communist faction, and the relegation of certain of its leaders to prison.<sup>95</sup> The Russian attempt to spread propaganda had alarmed the Ankara authorities, and had caused them to maintain strict control over the affairs of the State trading Bureaus that the Russians established in Turkey. Thus a close understanding on any save the purely official plane had been rendered impossible by the suspicion with which Ankara regarded every Russian move, and above all by the Turkish belief that Russian commercial enterprise was only a cover for other activities. The Alliance



of convenience of 1921 was confirmed by the non-aggression pact of 1925, the latter being entered into only as a result of the Mosul dispute. Thereafter in spite of the trade agreements of 1927 and 1931, the fundamental reason for Turco-Russian solidarity—joint enmity of the West—was giving way to a balanced and cautious Turkish policy by which, while good relations with the U. S. S. R. were sought as befitted a close and powerful neighbour, yet at the same time new links were forged with the Western powers, links which might spur on Russia to bid higher for Turkish friendship in the future.

v

### TURCO-ITALIAN RELATIONS

Italy was actually the first of the Western powers to reach an understanding with the Ankara government. In March, 1921, Bekir Sami Bey signed an economic and political agreement.<sup>96</sup> In this the Italian claims that France and Britain had formerly conceded to Italy were further recognized by Turkey so that Italy was to continue to have rights of economic exploitation in Adalia, Afyon, Konya and Heraclea. In return for recognition of their concession claims the Italians undertook to give up their military venture in Asia Minor, which in any case they had only pursued on a very small scale, and in which they had lost all interest after the Allies made it clear that Smyrna was to go to the Greeks.

Count Sforza had good reason for coming to terms quickly with the Turks. Firstly, he saw with some foresight the turn that events would take in Anatolia, and had early impressed on the Inter-Allied commission at Constantinople the futility of its repressive policy. Secondly, he declared: «Italy, to my mind, must look upon the whole of Turkey as a market for her industries; that is why she must, aside from moral considerations, oppose a general scramble (for Turkish soil); while Smyrna kept against the will of the Turks—as it would have been in the long run—would prove not only a costly and sterile operation, but also a great obstacle to the general peaceful penetration I was planning.»<sup>97</sup>

Even before the 1921 agreement a lively trade, though one-sided, had sprung up between Italy and the Nationalists through the port of Antalya, which had been used as one of Mustafa

Kemal's principal sources of arms and supplies; and immediately after the end of the war a brisk trade came into being between the two countries, so that in the year 1926 Italy was the principal trading country for the Turks. In that year 15 % of Turkey's imports were Italian and 27 % of the total Turkish exports were shipped to Italy<sup>98</sup>. If however Italy had hoped to be able to profit from her early 'accord' with Ankara, these hopes were not productive. The Turks were highly suspicious of foreign enterprises, and they particularly desired the mineral resources of the country to be developed by the state itself. Thus the concessions granted in 1921, as for example that in the mines at Heraclea, remained nominal only; and led to no actual participation of Italian enterprise in Turkey's mineral development. Later, in 1934, these along with all other foreign concessions, relapsed into the possession of the state by the passing of a law that nationalised all mining activities.<sup>99</sup>

Though trade relations prospered during the early years of the Turkish republic, the Italians were thus unable to win any special facilities. The Turks needed European technical experts, and a number of these selected were Italians<sup>100</sup>; but expert assistance the Turks were inclined to take when and from where they considered expedient.

The arrival of Mussolini to power and a survey of his active foreign policy made the Turks feel distinctly uneasy. The Turkish government were careful not to voice this sentiment; but clearly anticipated a possible return of Italian foreign policy to that of the Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne agreement. This anxiety came to the fore in January, 1926 when Britain's Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Ronald Lindsay, was attempting to heal the Anglo-Turkish rupture caused by the Mosul award. It was rumoured then that if Turkey invaded Irak, the Italians would land in Anatolia.<sup>101</sup>

In spite of 'currents of suspicion and lack of confidence'<sup>102</sup> the official attitude of Italy towards the Turks had continued to be friendly. Italian policy was aimed at an understanding between the Eastern Mediterranean naval powers. This policy began to bear fruit in 1928, in which year the Turks signed with Italy a pact of friendship, neutrality, and conciliation.<sup>103</sup> Italy was aiming at a tripartite agreement which would bring in Greece; but preliminary discussions in the Spring of 1928 showed too many lingering difficulties between Turkey and Greece—mainly problems of population exchange—to allow any agreement between those two countries. The Greek government insisted that a separate settlement with Turkey should first be arrived at. The

Turco-Italian pact was held up for the Turks and Greeks to come to terms. As this was not at once realisable, the Turco-Italian Pact was signed in May, 1928; and simultaneously the Italians offered a pact on similar lines to Greece while expressing their hope that a Greco-Turkish pact would later materialise.<sup>104</sup>

Article 1 of the Turco-Italian Treaty stipulates that «the two H. C. P. undertake not to enter into any understanding, either political or economic, or into any alliance directed against each other». Article 2 provided that «If one of the H. C. P., notwithstanding its pacific attitude, is attacked by one or more powers, the other Party will observe neutrality throughout the whole period of the conflict». The Third Clause stated that «the H. C. P. undertake to submit to conciliation disputes of any kind which might arise between them», and thereafter established the procedure to be adopted in the event of a dispute. Article 4 provided that «Any questions which may arise in the interpretation or in the execution of the present treaty will be submitted directly on the demand of one party to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.» The treaty was to receive immediate ratification, and to run in the first instance for a term of five years.<sup>105</sup>

The signature of the Treaty received a warm approval from the Press of both countries. Both leaders spoke of the new agreement before their respective parliamentary bodies. Mussolini stated to the Senate on June the 5th, 1928 :

«During the last two years, since the intrigue of elements, alien to Turkey but hostile to Italy, had ceased, Italo-Turkish relations have greatly improved... The horizon of the Eastern Mediterranean is now clear and free of clouds. Italy meets Turkey in a sincere and friendly spirit. Now, one must get into the habit of looking at Turkey in a new light, as a nation boldly creating a new spirit within herself after having established a new constitution, as a strong and populous nation guided by a leader, whose great prestige is linked with historical events of extreme importance, such as the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne.»<sup>106</sup>

On September the 14th of the same year Ismet Pasha spoke to the National Assembly and referred to relations with Italy. «Both countries», he said, «have suffered greatly from the currents of suspicion and lack of confidence, which have been stirred up artificially by one or the other side with the object of creating a storm of misunderstanding between the two countries. The signature of the treaty of arbitration and non-aggression

with that country has happily put an end to the lies of international speculators of all kinds, which fact has probably exasperated them. The treaty has been a blessing for the two countries as well as for the real friends of peace. The words and acts of that great statesman whose name is Mussolini have such a force, and so much sincerity, that they have contributed in no small measure to the return of confidence between the two states. I can assure you that, since the signature of the treaty, this confidence has steadily increased on both sides.»<sup>107</sup>

In the course of the same review of foreign policy Ismet Pasha spoke of relations with Greece. «There is», he stated, «no opposition between the reciprocal interests of the two countries; in other words there is no obstacle in the way of their final understanding.»<sup>108</sup> Indeed two years later, in spite of a set-back in relations in 1929, the Turks and the Greeks were able to settle their differences, and the Greco-Turk treaty of October, 1930 marked a distinct triumph for Italian diplomacy.<sup>109</sup> The value of Italy's conciliatory zeal was indeed publicly acknowledged by both Turkey and Greece, Tefvik Rüstü Bey dispatching a telegram of thanks to Mussolini on the day of signature, and M. Venizelos expressing his appreciation to the Italian Ambassador in Ankara.<sup>110</sup>

This Pact «created the third link in the chain of bi-partite pacts between Greece, Turkey, and Italy and thus fulfilled the aim which Italian statesmanship had sought to realize in the course of the preceding year».<sup>111</sup> It also marked the summit of Turco-Italian collaboration.

In the early thirties the relations between the two countries while suffering from no perceptible falling-off, were unable to advance towards closer friendship. This was largely due to two factors.

First was the growth of the imperialistic spirit in Italy, an attitude which became increasingly blatant as Fascism began to feel its hold over the Italians relatively secure. The Turks along with others of Italy's neighbours were not slow to reflect that the doctrines of Fascism would finally permeate and control Italy's foreign policy. Thus the 'pax romana' that the Italians had carefully promoted in the Aegean, in which a most important factor had been the Turco-Greek agreement to achieve naval parity, inevitably began to appear to the Turks in a less favourable light. Secondly the Turks from 1930 onwards began themselves to develop their own line of foreign policy of which the Rome connection was only one of the important links. Ankara's keen



interest in the Balkan Conferences and the large part that Turkey was playing in laying the foundations of a Balkan Entente were measures in many respects contrary to the selfish interests of Italian diplomacy which expected to find in continued Balkan disunity room for advantageous intrigue.<sup>112</sup>

We see that by 1933 the 'currents of suspicion and lack of confidence' were once more circulating, the cooling in relations being also reflected in a slight but steady decrease in commercial relations.<sup>113</sup> The Turks had not quite succeeded in forgetting the large claims to Turkish soil Italian imperialism had previously staked, and they feared a revival of these claims.

## VI

### TURCO-BALKAN RELATIONS

For the first few years after Lausanne Turkish diplomacy played a very small part in Balkan affairs. Turkey's interest in this region lay primarily in a protection of her Thracian border; having once renounced her claims to Western Thrace her aims were therefore limited to a maintenance of the 'status quo' as established at Lausanne.

Relations with Greece during this period have been previously discussed.<sup>114</sup> With the other Balkan states Turkey generally maintained friendly if somewhat remote connections. Turkey signed friendship agreements with a number of Balkan States; with Yugoslavia she signed a treaty of peace and friendship on 28th October, 1925 which formally ended the state of war between the two. With Hungary she signed a Friendship agreement in 1927 and was henceforth on good terms with this country for which the Turks, partly because of the racial and language affinities, feel some measure of affection and interest. A more important Treaty of neutrality and conciliation took place between Bulgaria and Turkey in 1929, the decision to refer all disputes to arbitration being here important as minority problems were still continuing to disturb the relations of the two countries. The Bulgarians—although dissatisfied with the Aegean 'status quo'—were not inclined during the first few years after Lausanne to be vociferous about their claims. As with Bulgaria, minority problems continued to hamper the establishment of firm relations between Rumania and Turkey.<sup>115</sup>

When the ideas of Balkan Unity began to be mooted, the

Turks were at once interested. The sentimental aspects of the matter hardly affected them at all but the political possibilities of a Balkan Bloc as a protection against large-nation imperialism were at once appreciated in Ankara, where the fear of Italian designs upon Turkish territory was a real factor. From 1929 onward the Turkish newspapers began to applaud the idea of such an entente though guarding a certain amount of scepticism as to its real possibilities.

For the Turks as for the Greeks the realistic basis of Balkan Union was their joint understanding of 1930, which, while being in itself something of a diplomatic revolution in so far as it converted old enemies into close friends, formed a hard core for mutual cooperation among peoples long accustomed, in their relations with one another, to fight rather than to parley.

The early meetings of the Balkan Countries, in 1930 and 1931, showed a sensible willingness to avoid the more controversial issues so that some measures of cooperation were able to be passed on the economic, technical, and cultural planes. The second Conference did however touch on the sore question of minorities in an effort to find some formula for the drafting of a non-aggression pact and a general agreement on pacific settlement of disputes. The Third Conference held at Bucharest in 1932 was politically something of a failure due to the attitude of the Bulgarian delegation, which, reluctant to appear at all in the first place, walked out on the conference and refused to discuss the Greek projects for the establishment of a permanent Minorities Bureau to be composed of delegates from all the Balkan nations and to meet annually to consider all minority complaints and disputes.<sup>116</sup>

On the economic side the Conference work had flowed smoother, it being easier in this field to avoid controversial issues. On the Conference recommendation a Balkan Chamber of Commerce had been set up in Istanbul in 1932. The 1931 conference had also recommended a Postal Union throughout the Balkans. A first step towards this was taken by a Turco-Greek postal agreement in 1932. The Bucharest conference also began consideration of a plan for a customs union.

In spite of the political set-back of the 1932 conference, the idea of a Balkan Entente had now taken form in the minds of most prominent Balkan statesmen; and the practical steps taken in the economic sphere especially had persuaded the Turkish government to give whole-hearted backing to the movement. Bulgaria's unwillingness to cooperate over a general minority

settlement and her refusal to recognize the Balkan 'status quo' were potential sources of breakdown for the Conference talks<sup>117</sup>; Turkey's relations with Bulgaria were at this time, however, by no means unfriendly; and Ankara, somewhat alarmed by the Bulgarian-Yugoslav rapprochement of 1930, actually brought pressure on Bulgaria to establish better Greco-Bulgarian relations, and to settle certain financial differences.

By 1932 the Turkish government was therefore working to bring about some stronger safeguard than bilateral agreements in the Balkans; it was a convinced advocate of a Balkan Entente, and it was therefore striving to overcome the numerous obstacles to such a Union.

## VII

### TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE-EASTERN COUNTRIES

The end of the hard struggle against the Greeks found the Turks in quite a new position vis-à-vis the Entente powers and Europe. As regards however the Eastern world their immediate position was far less clearly defined. The Turkish Caliph was still recognized as the temporal and spiritual head of the Moslem world. In Turkey's struggle against Western imperialism, the moral support of the Indian Moslems had been of importance in modifying the hostility of the English Liberal policy towards the Turkish national movement. In spite of a rather off-hand reference to the Caliphate in the National Pact, the nationalists were careful not to broach the question of the Caliphate during the course of the struggle.

The steps finally taken in the course of abandoning the Caliphate were judiciously timed. First, on November the 1st, 1922 a law was passed making the election of the Caliph subject to the vote of the Grand National Assembly whereafter the Ankara parliament proceeded to the swift election of the Caliph, Abdul Mecid, the ex-sultan Caliph having been previously declared deposed. These proceedings were variously received by the Moslem world; but in most Moslem countries they did not occasion great resentment. This move was but temporary indeed for the Republic was declared in October, 1923 and though a reaffirmation was made of the principle that the religion of the Turkish state

was Islam, the powers of President of the New Republic inevitably clashed with the temporal powers ascribed to the Caliph in the Sherieh.<sup>118</sup>

Lausanne removed the existence of the Arab-speaking Empire over which the Turks had long ruled. The temporal sway of the Caliph was thus « de facto » shorn of any political significance. The failure of arms of the Central powers had made Turkish leaders grimly realistic. Their armies had emerged victoriously from the second round of conflict, but their leaders had now expressly declared their renunciation of imperialism. The Turks—in their striving towards modernity and Westernization—were not only anxious to throw over imperialistic creeds but also Pan-Islamic ideas in general.

Once embarked on the perilous path of radical reform, the abolition of the Caliphate was but one of the mighty axeblooms at the heart of the old order. Though causing dismay and consternation throughout the Moslem universe; it created little surprise in Turkey itself where the Caliphate in the person of Vahdeddin had become associated with national humiliation and foreign interference.

The Turks had no gratitude to spare for the Arab successor states, who had won their independence at the expense of the Ottomans; further, « If the Turks cared little about the Ottoman Caliphate itself, they cared still less about the effect which the abolition of it might produce among Muslims abroad. »<sup>119</sup> Indeed the Turkish press was more concerned with answering criticism of the abolition that came from the West than it was in smoothing down Moslem attacks.<sup>120</sup>

The abolition moreover, presented the Moslem world with a fait accompli. The most violent hostility to the move arose among the Indian Moslem community whose zealous initiatives on behalf of the holy office's continuation had greatly contributed towards its precipitate downfall. The Turks by discarding the mantle of the prophet caused violent dissension throughout the Moslem universe, particularly as to the succession of the Caliphate. They themselves however suffered little tangible evil from the change.

Indeed the sympathy that they had lost among conservative elements of the Moslem world was more than made up for by the lively approval felt in many coreligionist countries for both the reforming and military successes of the Nationalists. The Arabs, the Egyptians, and the Indians were to go on bemoaning the fate of orthodox Islam as seen in the Caliphate Conference



at Cairo in 1926, but meanwhile other Moslem countries were prepared to come to terms with the Turks on a purely political basis, and to credit the reformers of Ankara with a policy which pointed out a path of salvation to the whole of the Eastern world.

It has been previously described how the Nationalists came to sign a Treaty of Friendship with Afghanistan in February, 1921,<sup>121</sup> and how this pact signed in Moscow was largely the work of Soviet diplomacy aiming at creating a close understanding between two countries menaced by Western imperialism. The clauses of that agreement—though Russian inspired—had paved the way for close cooperation between the two countries. The teachers and officers provided for in Article 7 of the 1921 Pact were promptly furnished by the Turks, and their prestige in the other country was naturally greatly enhanced by the victory of the next year.

During the years after Lausanne, increasing quantities of Turkish experts were in demand in Kabul, so that by the year 1928 the Turks were supplying military, medical, and educational staff to the Afghan training colleges and schools. A second Turco-Afghan treaty was signed in Ankara in 1928 recapitulating most of the clauses of the 1921 agreement upon the ratification of which the respective ministers in Kabul and Ankara were raised to the status of Ambassadors. The Afghans were importing numerous experts from other countries besides Turkey; but it is noteworthy that they showed a dependence upon the Turks for military training.<sup>122</sup> The facility with which good relations were established between Afghanistan and Turkey may be ascribed partly to the fact that there existed no mutual boundary to dispute over; but also a mutual sympathy of outlook between the two races must be allowed for in the count. Afghanistan was in every way more backward than Turkey, thus the former had a real interest in the establishment of friendly connections; whilst the Turks, whose foreign influence though not prestige had shrunk through the transformation from Empire to a comparatively small state, were duly flattered to play a part in the construction of modern Afghanistan. The relations between the two countries were further improved during the 1930's by the appointment to chairs in Kabul University of a number of Turkish professors and the sending of batches of Afghan students to study in the modernised Istanbul University.

The same happy relations that existed between Turkey and Afghanistan were primarily not possible to achieve between the Turks and their Eastern neighbour, Persia. In 1921 the Soviet

diplomacy had produced «a series of treaties linking Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan with Soviet Russia, the only missing link in the chain being a direct treaty between Turkey and Persia». This gap was not filled up till 1926 during which interval severe friction had arisen between the two governments mainly over the Kurds inhabiting the border areas. There was furthermore a violent hostility to the abolition of the Caliphate caused among the Persian divines.<sup>123</sup> Their activity caused Riza Khan, who contemplated following the Turkish lead and converting Persia into a republic, to change his course and to become the Shahin Shah of a new dynasty. The Persian monarch was thus prevented from leading his country into a precipitate pursuit of the radical reforms of the Ankara statesman.<sup>124</sup>

The Turco-Persian border conflict had been an old cause of friction between Turkey and Persia, pre-war attempts at delimitation not having been completed by 1914. An area of almost inaccessible mountain villages, it was ideal for guerrilla warfare, so that in this area the Persian government found itself obliged to enter into large-scale operations against a Kurdish chieftain, Ismail Sakak Simko, who had temporarily shaken off all control of the central Persian government and who was conducting raids against both Persian and Turkish villages. These episodes naturally resulted in a series of complaints being lodged by both the Turkish and Persian governments which continued to hold each other responsible for all the troubles. Simko was killed but the series of cross-frontier raids continued, the assailants retiring over the border for refuge from reprisals. The incidents, normal enough in these wild areas, might have been passed over in silence by Teheran and Ankara had not both governments been pursuing an active pacification policy in their frontier areas, one that inevitably brought their forces into clashes in sectors where the actual frontier lines were a subject of doubt.<sup>125</sup>

Frontier troubles continued until after the Turkish suppression of the full-scale Kurdish rebellion in 1925. In the following year a treaty of peace and benevolent neutrality was signed at Teheran between the two countries, the main points being an article instituting a formula for the peaceful settlement of further frontier incidents, Turkey renounced capitulatory rights for Turkish subjects in Persia. Article 6 stipulated in addition that within a period of six months separate agreements were to come into operation for «commercial, consular, customs, postal, telegraphic, and extradition conventions».<sup>126</sup>

The agreement did not at once put a stop to troubles. In

the Summer of 1927 the Turkish army was still engaged in « mopping-up » operations in the East. The effect of this seems to have been to drive the brigands over the Persian frontier so that the Persian press once more began lively accusations against the Turks, who, they said, were actually instigating Kurdish raids into Persia. « The Turks protested against these charges, recalled their Ambassador from Teheran to report, and retorted with counter charges of the same kind. »<sup>127</sup> The dispute dragged on along these lines, and though Diplomatic relations were resumed in 1928, complete harmony was far from having been attained. A more appreciable basis of settlement was finally reached early in 1932. By this time the Turkish army had had time to complete its systematic « turcicisation » of Turkish Kurdistan. Troublesome tribes had been ordered to migrate from the Turkish borders and had been given land by the government in regions nearer the control of Ankara. A definite boundary settlement was reached in January and at the same time a treaty of arbitration and conciliation was signed at Teheran. These instruments were ratified by the National Assembly in June and a further Turco-Persian Treaty of Friendship was signed on 5th November 1932. Thus at the end of the period under review a new and friendly turn in Turco-Persian relations had already begun to take place.<sup>128</sup>

The relations between Turkey and Great Britain as mandatory for Irak have already been dealt with. A fundamental change in British policy towards Irak, which showed itself during the 20's, culminated in the signature of the Anglo-Irak Treaty of 30th June, 1930, by which the Iraki were virtually to receive self-government. Though the decisions of the 1930 treaty were not fully put into practise until Irak's admission to the League of Nations in 1932, yet after the agreement with Great Britain the Iraki were free to launch out on an independent path of foreign policy.

One of the salient features of Irak's policy was to form close relations with Ankara. King Faysal payed a visit there in the Summer of 1931 as did the Iraki Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha, at the end of the year. January 1932 saw the signature of a Residence Convention and of an Extradition Treaty, while a new note was struck by a Commercial treaty<sup>129</sup>. This latter though not immediately of primary importance was to prove a useful new link for the future relations of the two countries.

Turning to consider areas of the Middle-East now remote from Turkey's national borders, we see that the realistic policy of

the Ankara nationalists inaugurated by the National Pact of 1920 had involved a definite recognition of the total independence of ex-Ottoman territories peopled by Arab majorities.

The defection of most Arab rulers under Turkish suzerainty was no doubt the primary cause of Ankara's willingness to be rid of any responsibility. There were however Arab leaders who had remained faithful to Ottoman sympathies, and who even after Turkey's defeat in 1918 continued to acknowledge the Turkish government. The Iman Yahya kept on his Turkish officers and governors in the Yemen long after the armistice; this in spite of the Surrender according to the armistice terms of a large portion of the Turkish forces in the Yemen.<sup>130</sup> In Libya too, the Senussi continued their wars against the Italians and sent a deputation to Turkey to get in touch with the Nationalists and to attempt to elicit continued military aid.<sup>131</sup> The Nationalists however showed no interest in further imperialist responsibilities, and the loyal remnants of the Ottoman Empire were not encouraged to persevere in their attitude.

The recognition of freedom accorded to ex-Ottoman countries applied equally to Turkey's abrogation of all her previous rights as suzerain over Egypt and the Sudan as well as over her rights in the Suez Canal. The effect of the Turkish revolution upon Egypt was of course both religious and political. The abolition of the Caliphate caused a severe split in Egyptian public opinion.<sup>132</sup> The Moslem priesthood set about the convocation of a Pan-Islamic conference to decide the future of the Caliphate, besides which they severely condemned the arbitrary Turkish action of abolition. The Egyptian, Western-educated intelligentsia opposed the move of the religious authorities. A conference was eventually held in Cairo in 1926 at which none of the delegates were accredited by their governments, and at which further, Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey were not even represented unofficially. The conference broke up without any decisions being reached as to the future of the Caliphate.<sup>133</sup>

The second aspect of the Turkish revolution, the political aspect, had not failed to excite sympathy in Egypt. The news of the Turkish victory over the Greeks had evoked celebration processions in Cairo, and politically it was to the Turks as the vanguard of the Eastern world in its struggle against Western imperialism that the Egyptian intelligentsia gave credit.

The relations between the two countries during the first decade after Lausanne were necessarily somewhat restricted and were necessarily one-sided, the Turks paying no attention at all



to criticisms from conservative Egyptian quarters. Indeed the Turkish ambassador in Egypt bluntly declared in 1926 that the question of the Caliphate did not exist for his country.<sup>134</sup> The Egyptians under British tutelage were not free to enter into any form of close relations with the new Turkey but the object lesson of an Eastern nation not only throwing off the shackles of foreign interference but also creating its own Western way of life was not lost upon the Egyptians, so that during these years Turkish example was more potent than direct Turkish influence.

The year 1932 was important in Middle-Eastern history as it saw the admission of two countries, Turkey and Irak into the League of Nations<sup>135</sup>; this was to be shortly followed by the entry of Afghanistan into the same international body. This almost similar move on the part of the three Middle-Eastern nations had been accompanied as we have seen by the signature of a series of interlacing treaties considerably improving the prospects of a lasting peace in the Northern and Central portions of the Middle-East.<sup>136</sup>

Four important members of the Middle-Eastern comity, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Irak had settled their outstanding differences and had thus paved the way for more constructive projects of cooperation in future years. No small credit for these diplomatic successes was due to the Ankara regime which though showing great obstinacy at times over frontier questions, had by and large showed an admirable willingness to forget old feuds and old pretensions in order to create more stable peace in the areas vital to her long-term interests.

## VIII

### TURCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

America had never been at war with Turkey which accounted for her only partial representation at the Lausanne Conference. Normal diplomatic relations were not so easy to take up again as might be supposed however; for there were several latent questions under dispute.

A separate Turco-American Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed in August, 1923, which followed the broad lines of settlement arranged between Turkey and the other Lausanne signatories including the abolition of capitulations.<sup>137</sup>

Even after the signature the Turks continued to shut up

American colleges, which had formerly been scattered over Turkey, on the grounds that they had indulged in pernicious Christian propaganda. The attitude taken since 1918 by the American people towards the cause of free Armenia had also incensed the Turks. The American Press had spoken very freely of Turkish atrocities and had championed always the Armenian against the Turk. The closure of American colleges and the Armenian question were interrelated as a large number of the students in these colleges had been Armenians.

The American Senate failed to get a two-third's majority for the passing of the Treaty's ratification; and this caused a good deal of soreness in the other country.<sup>138</sup> The democratic opposition to the treaty was more a question of internal Party Politics in America; and it so happened that the Democrats had seized on the Turkish treaty to attack as part of their «platform policy», but this view was difficult to put over to Ankara.<sup>139</sup>

Admiral Bristol was instructed to negotiate direct with Tefvik Rüstü Bey. The result of these negotiations was that the Turks agreed to allow the opening-up of a number of schools, and regular diplomatic and consular relations were to be resumed. The Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Grew, mentioned in his instructions to Admiral Bristol the importance of trade in Turco-American relations, and said «access to the markets of the U.S.A. is important for Turkish producers, especially of figs and tobacco». <sup>140</sup> These were to be used as a lever to persuade Ankara. In fact in 1925, 25.1 million L. T. worth of goods had been shipped to the States, this representing 13.0 of Turkey's total exports of the year. America's interest in the opposite flow of trade was at this time very small.

In 1927 Turkey and America exchanged ambassadors and their mutual relations continued on a friendly footing though the negotiations for the reopening of the American colleges were unduly protracted by the Turks.<sup>141</sup>

## IX

### TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

#### (ESPECIALLY WITH SWITZERLAND AND WITH GERMANY)

Towards all small countries in general and European countries in particular Turkey was pleased to turn a friendly eye. The policy of the Ankara government whereby vital foreigners, experts,

technicians, and architects were to be loaned not from foreign governments but as salaried employees of the Turkish state, meant that the Turks drew upon the skill of men from a great variety of countries.

In advisory and technical positions a number of Swiss experts were called upon; and this tendency was increased further by the adoption in 1926 of the Swiss Civil Code. Hitherto Switzerland had been looked upon mainly as a tourist country where Turkish statesmen had chanced to have signed the Lausanne Treaty. After this year however a sprinkling of Turkish students began to attend the Law faculties of the various Swiss Universities. Trade relations that developed between the two countries were not on any very great scale, however, and the contact maintained was mainly cultural and educational, individual Swiss playing important roles in Ankara and Istanbul.

Turkey's relations with Germany after Lausanne are best reflected in the trade statistics. Germany along with her own economic recovery began to play a part of steadily increasing importance in Turkish trade.<sup>142</sup> By 1925 German imports to Turkey were 27,4 million L. T. (13 % of the total Turkish imports) as compared with 37,4 million L. T. imported from Great Britain in the same year.

By 1925 the Turks were already importing more from Germany than from Great Britain, 31.6 million L. T. from the former as compared with 27.4 million L. T. from the latter. The same upward trend is clearly visible in Turkey's exports to Germany so that by 1932 Germany's share in Turkey's imports was 23 % of the Turkish total and of Turkey's exports she took 13 % of the whole.<sup>143</sup>

Politically Germany's relations with the New Republic had not been so difficult to reestablish as might have been expected. The Turks in spite of certain declarations to the contrary do not seem to have born any rancour against the Germans for embroilment in the 1914 war and the defeat and humiliation of 1918. Rather the reverse, the German business men and diplomats seem very frequently to have profitted from the honourable title of ex-comrades-in-arms.

Certainly in the first decade of the republic, Germany represented no sort of menace to the nascent Turkish state; and the Turks were only too willing to enter into friendly relations with Berlin.

## STRAITS POLICY 1923-1932

The outwardly uniform policies that Russia and Turkey pursued during the early years after their respective revolutions were conditioned partly by a common fear that both countries felt in the area of the straits. Their exact view-points were however different, for whereas Russia's chief fear was of Western naval aggression, of a Western naval power sending warships through the straits, Turkey's fears and suspicions were widespread. The ex-enemy countries, England, France and Italy were all looked upon rightly or wrongly as possible aggressors.

An alternating current of policy however had made itself clearly apparent at the Lausanne Treaty where Ismet Pasha had been careful to steer his country absolutely clear from the results of over-close collaboration with Russia. The closure of the Black Sea to all warships of non-Black sea states as suggested in the Russian thesis would have been entirely detrimental to Turkish interests as it would have put Istanbul and the straits at the mercy of the Russian Black Sea fleet.<sup>144</sup>

Turkey had thus steered a serene middle course at the Lausanne conference. Once the conference was over and the working regime of the Straits was put into force, the inconveniences of the arrangement soon became clear to the Turks. The allround diplomatic successes that Ismet Inonu had obtained for his country tended for a time to obscure the very real diminution of territorial sovereignty that Turkey suffered both from the juridical rights of the International commission and from the Demilitarisation Clauses of Lausanne. After Lausanne however a slowly but steadily rising tide of criticism against the (for the Turks) irksome restrictions began to make itself heard.<sup>145</sup>

This resentment made itself felt in the attitude the Turkish government adopted towards sanitary administration. It will be recalled that at Lausanne Turkey had reserved successfully to herself the right to carry out a sanitary inspection for ships passing through the straits. The Turks interpreted this clause in a very strict sense, insisting on the right of search of all ships, merchant and warship alike, that passed through these waters. In 1925 a dispute arose between the Straits Commission and the Turkish government over the latter's attitude towards the Article. The Turks complained of the passage of British Destroyers which had passed through the Straits without signalling their sanitary



condition. The Straits Commission in reply maintained that «No obligation of this order was imposed on ships of war». Nevertheless the Turkish government held to its view. The International Sanitary Convention declared in the following year against the Turkish conception, stipulating that sanitary visits to ships in transit through territorial waters were not normally necessary. But the Turks made an important reservation.

«The Turkish government reserves the right for the sanitary administration to place sanitary guard on board every ship of commerce passing the Straits without a doctor and coming from an infected port in order to prevent the ship touching a Turkish port.»<sup>146</sup>

The friction between the Turkish government and the Straits Commission, as guardians of the right of freedom of passage, continued. In spite of protests the Turks were able to use sanitary control as a means of checking up on the nature of the shipping that went through their territorial waters.<sup>147</sup>

Notwithstanding this source of disagreement the Turkish government was in the main careful to keep on polite relations with the International Commission and to furnish it with the necessary aid in the fulfilment of its task. Indeed the International Commission with its careful control of the Straits shipping freed the Turkish government during the first critical years of its existence of any responsibility<sup>148</sup> or likelihood of entanglement in this dangerous area.

## XI

### CONCLUSIONS

The Turkish Republic in the period under review is seen to pass through several logical stages of development before she finally emerges as a country with firm national aims conducted by practical and moderate methods. After Lausanne Turkey, having suffered overmuch from foreign influence, regarded all foreign moves with suspicion and moreover the feeling throughout Turkey went through an intensely «xenophobic phase».

This first tendency was supported by a second factor, a lack of security within the new national boundaries. The chief problem were Kurds, who being Moslems had been claimed by the Turks as belonging to Turkey; but whose national spirit had been roused by the promises of independence made at Sèvres. These Kurds

were not only internally a menace but they also complicated Turkey's relations with her Middle-Eastern neighbours, Ankara being unwilling to countenance the formation of strong Kurdish pockets on her frontiers ready at any time to make incursions over the frontier.

During these early years of friction Turkey was forced to base her security mainly on the Russian Alliance, yet her statesmen did not appear at all anxious to put Russian military help to the test even at the awkward critical moment of the Mosul crisis.

In 1926, Turkey's dispute with Britain as mandatory in Irak was solved whilst Turkey's quarrel with France as mandatory in Syria was at any rate toned down. And from this time forward a change in Turkish outlook began to be visible.

Tevfik Rüstü Bey's visits abroad began to get more frequent; good relations were established with the Balkan countries. The Friendship Pact was signed with Italy in 1928. The following year talks were begun for an Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. Surely but slowly Turkey's suspicion of the West, and therewith her exclusive dependence on Moscow were diminishing. Correspondingly her relations with her neighbours were becoming far less unfriendly than before.

The year 1930 was most important for the Turks as it not only saw a Friendship Pact with England but also witnessed a full agreement with Greece. Turkey was willing to forget recent enmities, and by this year her statesmen had already signed friendship pacts and non-aggression agreements with a number of countries.

The logical outcome of this policy was Turkey's entry into the League of Nations. This finally took place in 1932. Previous rumours that she was willing to enter had been denied by Ankara, whose statesmen were wary of antagonising Moscow. For Ankara had assured Moscow that the Turks would only consider entry as the possessor of a permanent seat. Later this claim was lowered to that of a semi-permanent seat. In the Summer of 1932 however Turkey let it be known that she was willing to join, and she was unanimously elected to membership on July 18th. She thus became the second Middle-Eastern state to be a league-member.

After one decade the Republic was ready to enter the comity of nations as a peaceable and peace-loving member.

CHAPTER V

TURKISH POLICY

(1933 TO 1939 - SEPT.)

I

TURCO-BALKAN RELATIONS

By 1933 the project of a Balkan Entente was already on the road to realisation, but in order for it to emerge from the realm of theory and for the project to become a reality, it was first necessary for the Balkan governments to arrive at bilateral settlements over some of the more controversial problems and particularly over those appertaining to minorities which were continuing to aggravate their mutual good relations.

1933 was a year of great diplomatic activity in the Balkans and the Turkish government played a large role in this. The first Balkan state that Turkey had reached sincere agreement with was Greece; and with the further strengthening of their ties by a Cordial Friendship Pact on September, 1933, Greco-Turk unity was to become one of the solid bases on which the success of the Balkan Entente was to hinge. The tangible extent of Greco-Turk cooperation can be judged by Article 3 of the Pact in which it is stated: « In all international meetings the membership of which is restricted, Greece and Turkey are prepared to consider that it will be the duty of the representative of one of the two parties to defend the common and special interests of both parties; and they undertake to endeavour to secure such joint representation, either alternately or, in particular cases of special importance, by the country most closely concerned. »<sup>1</sup>

While Turkish Diplomacy was completely successful in its full-scale 'accord' with Greece, the first-named agreement led to a serious set-back in Turco-Bulgarian relations. This resulted mainly from the fact that Bulgaria had always been—though in the early post-war years only latently—pursuing a « revisionist » policy. The signature of the Greco-Turk Pact now called forth the strongest criticism from the Bulgarian Press, particularly the Clause by which Turkey guaranteed the Greek frontiers.<sup>2</sup>

In May, 1933 the attitude of Bulgaria had already been tested by a proposed tripartite agreement guaranteeing the inviolability of common frontiers that the Greek and Turkish governments had invited the Bulgarians to adhere to. The Bulgarian refusal made it clear that the Bulgarians were more interested in pursuing their own territorial ambitions counter to the existing « status quo » than in cooperating in the scheme for a general Balkan rapprochement. This check did not of course prevent the Turkish and Greek governments from going ahead with the signature of their Cordial Friendship Agreement, which both governments looked upon as the future « foundation for a Multilateral Pact ».<sup>3</sup>

The signature of this latter agreement being ill-received in Sofia; Ismet Pasha and Tevfik Rüstü undertook a visit to that capital to try and remove Bulgarian suspicions. The Turkish statesmen still met continued Bulgarian opposition to entering into the framework of the Turco-Greek « accord », Bulgaria refusing to sign any agreement which would recognize the validity of the existing Balkan « status quo ». The only agreement the Turks and Bulgarians could come to was a five-year prolongation of the bilateral Treaty of 1929, the Turks having given an assurance that the terms of that agreement had not been affected by the Cordial Friendship Pact with Greece.<sup>4</sup> A further scheme of the Turkish politicians, that of a so-called Euxine Pact received a very negative reception in Sofia. Through the Summer of 1933 Turkey had been canvassing support for her revisionist plans in regard to the Straits régime amongst the various Black Sea riparian states. The proposed Pact was to cover neutralization of the Black Sea and the Straits; and the participants were to be Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, Russia, and Turkey. The project however failed to interest the other powers; and thus it never assumed tangible form.<sup>5</sup>

Further diplomatic manoeuvres took place at the same period of equal importance to Turkey. The Rumanian foreign minister, Titulescu, visited Ankara in October; and Turkey and Rumania thereupon entered into a treaty of friendship.<sup>6</sup> Rumania firstly was afraid of Bulgarian revisionist claims and secondly she depended on Turkey as the guardian of the Straits for safe passage of her sea-borne trade.

In the following month a Turco-Yugoslav Treaty was signed at Belgrade.<sup>7</sup> These two countries had up till now been on normally friendly relations; but this signature now completed a



chain of bi-lateral treaties of friendship and non-aggression between Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey.

The diplomatic negotiations and arrangements between the various Balkan states had by November, 1933 reached a certain stage of maturity from which a concrete plan for Balkan Union could be devised. So active had the various ministries of the Balkan countries been during the year that the Third Balkan Conference held in Salonika in November, limited itself to passing a declaration hoping that the forthcoming Balkan Pact would be generally acceptable.

Bulgaria's refusal to join the proposed Entente had caused a very unfavourable impression in the other Balkan capitals, except in Belgrade where recent discussions had done much to effect a Bulgar-Yugoslav understanding. From 1933 onwards Turco-Bulgarian relations began to show a marked decline, the Press of both countries launching open attacks upon each other mainly over the old score of minority-treatment.<sup>8</sup>

In February, 1934, the Balkan Pact was finally signed, Bulgaria still refusing any participation and Yugoslavia showing a marked reluctance to sign without the former. The blessing of England and France had been given; but Germany and Italy were both highly sceptical over the possibilities of Balkan cooperation on any useful plane. The preamble stated that «in the spirit of the Briand-Kellog Pact» the four signatories wished to contribute to the consolidation of peace in the Balkans by in Art. I binding themselves to a mutual guarantee of the security of all their joint Balkan frontiers and in Art. II by agreeing to joint consultations in emergencies to agree on measures to be taken; further «not to embark on any political action (in respect of any Balkan state) without previous mutual discussion and not to assume any political obligation towards any other Balkan state without the consent of the other signatories». Art III: The agreement was to come into force on signature, and the other Balkan states were to be open to adherence.<sup>9</sup>

No sooner had the pact been signed than the inherent weaknesses of the ties contracted began to make themselves manifest. A most important protocol, signed along with the Pact but kept secret for several weeks, was intended to clarify the actual responsibility of the signatories for armed intervention in case of an aggression. Clause 2 of this protocol stated that if a signatory were attacked by a non-Balkan power and the latter was assisted by a Balkan power, the other Entente signatories would be obliged to go to war against the Balkan aggressor. The implications of

this clause alarmed both the Turks and the Greeks. The former reassured Russia that in the hypothetical case of a Russian-Rumanian conflict, the Turks would not assist Rumania. The Greek government also contracted out of the implications of clause 3, fearing the possibility of being drawn into a conflict with Italy. The effect of the reservations made by Ankara and Athens greatly decreased the value of the general guarantee of security to Yugoslavia and Rumania.<sup>10</sup>

In spite of the allround spate of congratulations that accompanied the signature of the Balkan Entente, it could not be denied that Balkan unity had made a discouraging début. Nevertheless the machinery of the Entente was first put into operation in 1934 when in October the statutes were adopted in Ankara. The Permanent Council was to hold regular sessions and an Economic Council was to be formed; in addition a Legal Commission was formed to study the proposed question of a unification of legal codes throughout the Balkans. The proposition for a Balkan Bank was also accepted in principle.<sup>11</sup>

The Entente had never succeeded in the first place in uniting the Balkan peoples; this indeed had been frankly admitted by its most enthusiastic promoters. Albania—under the direct shadow of Italian control—was not free to participate; whilst Bulgaria had no intention of doing so, and interpreted the 1934 Pact as being an anti-Bulgarian defence measure amongst the four Balkan signatories.

«The Balkan Entente is a fragile combination of small states having a definite and limited objective, namely, to guarantee some of their frontiers against the possible aggression of certain small and weak states. The members of both ententes seem to have completely ignored the fact that they have other frontiers to guard against the aggression of great and predatory states», commented one writer.<sup>12</sup>

The German economic thrust into Eastern Europe led the individual states to come to bilateral agreements with the ever-more powerful German Reich. There was too a parallel tendency towards an isolationist foreign policy particularly in Greece and Rumania which ill-accommodated with the tangible commitments of these countries under the 1934 agreement. One of the principal points on the agenda in the 1936 Balkan Conference was the exact limit of Greece's liabilities under the Pact, and General Metaxas was successful in seriously curtailing his country's obligations.<sup>13</sup>

The Balkan Entente signatories passed a resolution support-

ing Turkey's claim to revision of the Straits regime after Menemencioglu had made a personal tour of the Balkan capitals prior to the Montreux Conference. This Balkan support was given to Turkey on certain terms; the principal of which was that she should always consult her Balkan neighbours before closing the Straits in time of war.<sup>14</sup>

At the conference table considerable discussion took place over the rights of regional pacts, including the Balkan Pact. The final decision embodied in Article 19 of the Montreux Agreement did allow belligerent warships to pass through the Straits both in « cases of assistance rendered to a State, victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey » and did allow the passage of warships on League errands.<sup>15</sup>

The Turkish attitude towards the Balkan Entente was characteristic of her real desire for world peace. Although the Turks realised only too well the deficiencies of the Balkan scheme of cooperation, they remained ardent supporters of a movement yet in its infancy which might reasonably develop given favourable circumstances. In spite therefore of the fact that after 1936 Rüstü Aras was searching for firmer security agreements than the Balkan Entente, he and his fellow statesmen wisely did not neglect the Balkan connection.

On June 14th, 1937, Ismet İnönü gave a general review of Turkish foreign policy and spoke warmly of the friendly relations continuing to exist between the Balkan signatories. He stated: « The special policies of the four Balkan States which from time to time are made manifest because of their different tendencies give rise to propaganda to the effect that their obligations emanating from the Balkan Entente are diminishing or growing feeble. We have taken notice of this propaganda; it should not nevertheless receive credulity. We have ascertained through personal and intimate contacts that the four Balkan States are sincere and persistent in the ideal of peace which unites them. »<sup>16</sup> Ismet İnönü and the Foreign Minister had that spring made an extended tour of the Balkans, which had called for numerous speeches in defence of the principle of Balkan Unity.

In the same policy review Ismet İnönü spoke too of Bulgarian aspirations. He frankly admitted differences of opinion; but resumed Turkey's attitude in the following words:

« Bulgaria is linked to Yugoslavia by a special treaty, just as she is linked to us by a special treaty. She has affirmed her decision to enter into the same relations with Greece and Rumania. Turkey can only encourage Bulgaria in these aspirations and

facilitate this task as much as possible. It goes without saying that the establishment of an atmosphere of warm friendship in the Balkans between Bulgaria and her other neighbours... would be a blessing to us all and would constitute a support to the peace of Europe. »<sup>17</sup>

No effort then was spared by Ankara to enlarge the scope of the Balkan Entente. That the Turks watched developments in Eastern Europe with growing concern and sought other fields for protection was only natural. Nevertheless right up to the outbreak of the world conflict the Turkish policy remained unwaveringly loyal to the principles of the Balkan entente; and her statesmen sought all possible means to avert the break-up of Balkan unity.

## II

### TURKEY'S MIDDLE-EASTERN RELATIONS

(1933-1939)

The Turco-Persian « accord » that came into force on November the 5th by an exchange of ratifications heralded a new era in the relations between the two countries. The age-long question of dispute, the common frontier, was fixed largely on the basis of mutual exchange of certain border sectors which allowed both governments greater policing facilities.

Hereafter Turco-Persian relations became increasingly cordial, and were made further so by the official visit to Ankara of the Persian Shahinshah in June, 1934. The extent to which security and order had now been increased in the Eastern provinces of Turkey can be weighed by consideration of the fact that Riza Pehlevi was able to make his triumphal procession over the disputed border and through Eastern Anatolia to Ankara in perfect safety.

The friendly relations now established between Turkey and Persia in addition to the long-standing tradition of Turco-Afghan amity represented the raw material for a regional understanding in the Northern sector of the Middle East but the events that were to sting these Eastern countries to some kind of joint action, namely general rearmament and the aggressive actions of Italian statesmen, had not by the year 1934 developed sufficiently to deter these countries from the « luxury of bickering among themselves ».



Turkish diplomacy in the Balkans had been for several years actively concerned with the promotion of a Balkan entente; it had had nevertheless to rest content with bilateral agreements with the Middle-Eastern states until these countries could first settle their own outstanding difficulties.

An important delaying influence upon any joint Middle-Eastern agreement was the territorial dispute between Iran and Irak which, beginning in 1932 was allowed to drag on for five years before a settlement could be reached, both parties proving highly uncompromising in their claims, the principal of which was to unchallenged control over the waters of the Shattu'l-Arab. The dispute was brought before the League Council in January, 1935, when both points of view were heard, but before the squabble could be referred to the Permanent Court of Justice, at Irak's request the matter was removed from the League Council Agenda (January, 1936).<sup>18</sup>

The reasons for this were that the foreign ministers of four Middle-Eastern countries, Iran, Irak, Turkey, and Arghanistan, had begun preliminary negotiations for a quadrupartite pact in the autumn of 1935, and were now strongly urging on the Irak and Iran governments a «settlement out of court». The first initiative for the Pact came indeed from Iran, and a draft text of the four-nation agreement was actually signed on October 2nd, 1935. From this day the agreement may be said to have been tentatively in force and to have remained in abeyance while Iran and Irak sought a definitive territorial understanding; this took longer than had been hoped; and it was not therefore till the Summer of 1937 that the nations concerned were prepared to sign the Pact.<sup>19</sup>

Meanwhile Turkey sought to put herself in a stronger position vis-à-vis the rest of the Middle-Eastern world. Relations with Egypt had always been friendly if distant. These were now linked tighter by the signature of treaty of Perpetual Friendship and by a Nationality Pact signed on April 7, 1937.<sup>20</sup> The latter agreement was important in so far as it cleared up the legal position of Egyptian nationals in Turkey and of their opposite numbers in Egypt. Article 3 granted most-favoured-nation terms to nationals of one country residing in the other country as far as their property and goods were concerned. Article 4 gave respective nationals in the other country the right to exercise every sort of industry and commerce except those expressly reserved for native nationals. Subsequent clauses defined the exact legal rights of nationals in the other country. In addition

to signature of these agreements, Turkey took every occasion to manifest friendship for Egypt and she was one of the countries that in February, 1937, sent an invitation to Egypt to join the League of Nations.<sup>21</sup>

The Turks were also preoccupied with reassuring the Arab world of their good faith; and the year 1937 witnessed a definite policy to this end being effected in Turkish political speeches and in the Turkish Press. A new turn was given to events by the inauguration in Ankara of broadcasts in Arabic, this step being the sequel to a complaint in «Tan» that the Turkish government had failed to take any action to make the Turkish point of view heard abroad. Indignation was voiced in the press that in the case of the Alexandretta dispute the foreign newspapers always reported word for word the French versions; but that the Turkish government made no effort to get its own version known.<sup>22</sup>

On 12th January, Ismet İnönü himself gave the first talk in Arabic in which he stated that «Turkey maintains and will maintain the friendliest relations with Irak, the Yemen, and the kingdom of Saudi Arabia».<sup>23</sup> This tardy interest in foreign propaganda on the part of the Turks is of some importance, as hitherto this had been a branch of political science sadly neglected by the new Republic, as a result of which—genuinely—the Turkish thesis over many controversial problems had not been made clear in other countries; and thereby Turkish motives had not infrequently been distorted in the foreign press.

In this new propaganda drive a bid was made to show the clear distinction between the old Ottoman Imperialist Turkey and the new peace-loving Republic. A leading Turkish journalist, Ahmed Emin Yalman, reviewed the situation of the Arab world in relation to modern Turkey.

«The Ottoman Empire for long leant its weight upon territories inhabited by diverse races. It took nothing from those regions; giving ever more and more until the Empire itself suffocated under its own weight and died... Revolutionary Turkey has no territorial aspirations. The soil we possess will be sufficient for generations for the needs of our growing population.»<sup>24</sup> The writer went on to point out that the path of Turkey's future development lay in peaceful commerce and that her policy had nothing whatsoever to do with a return to the old imperialist conceptions.

The day after this article was published, on January 19th, the Anatolian agency published an emphatic denial of the rumour

(which was presumably fairly widespread in the Arab world) that Turkey after claiming Alexandretta and Antioch would turn to renew her claim to Mosul.

On his way to Teheran to sign the Pact, Dr. Rüstü Aras stopped at Aleppo, and gave a further assurance to the Arabs. « We have been wrongly accused », he declared, « of being adversaries of Arab Unity. We are in favour of the Union and we respect Arab nationalism. » Furthermore his speech ended on the significant note of, « We intend to contribute to European politics, remaining nevertheless at the service of the Orient ». <sup>25</sup>

The aim of these various declarations was clearly that Turkey wanted her coming adherence to the Middle-Eastern Pact to be interpreted in a favourable light by the Arab countries. She was anxious to make it abundantly clear that the growing power and prestige of Turkey was not about to lead to a new foreign policy, to a change from the pacific to the aggressive. Turkish statesmen visualized the Middle-Eastern Entente as a regional arrangement that bore no menace of aggression to weaker and less-developed adjacent countries, and her diplomats were rightly anxious to have this benevolent motive correctly interpreted abroad.

As between Turkey and Iran a number of separate agreements preceded the Saadabad Pact. In April, 1937, the two signed conventions on frontier security, judicial and penal assistance, customs, telegraph and telephone communications, veterinary regulations. Signature took place at the same time also of a Treaty of commerce and navigation besides a transport agreement over the Trebizond-Teheran railway. <sup>26</sup>

In July, representatives of the four powers met in Teheran and proceeded to signature of the Pact. On the 8th the signatories bound themselves « to pursue a policy of complete non-intervention in their internal affairs » (Art. I); « to respect the inviolability of their common frontiers » (Art. II); and « to consult one another in all international conflicts affecting their common interests » (Art. III). Article IV carefully defined aggression, and the subsequent clause declared that all seeming cases of aggression should be brought before the League Council. Article 6 enunciated the principle that « If one power... commits an act of aggression against a third power, the other power can... without warning denounce the present treaty as far as the aggressor is concerned ». In article 7 the signatories agree « to take measures against the formation... of armed bands » in one country that might act against the authority of the other governments. Loyalty to the principles of the Briand-Kellogg Pact was reaffirmed (Arts 8

and 9). The Pact was to run for a first term of five years subject to automatic renewal unless any signatory gave a six month's notice of denunciation before the expiry of this term. <sup>27</sup>

On the same day the ministers signed a protocol establishing a permanent council for the Pact members to meet annually and to have their own secretariat. When the Council went into session the following resolutions were swiftly passed : 1) That the four powers would support the candidature of the Pact members in alphabetical order for a seat on the League Council. 2) The immediate reelection of Turkey to a semi-permanent seat should be supported by the other three powers. <sup>28</sup>

The Saadabad signature received great space and acclamation in the Turkish press which emphasised the significance of the new instrument in the promotion of peace and good-will in Western Asia. <sup>29</sup> The Turkish papers also stated that, « the promotion of Turkey to the candidature for a permanent seat on the League Council has enhanced Turkey's international position as a link between the Balkan and Asiatic (Middle-Eastern) groups ». <sup>30</sup>

It has frequently and accurately been stated that the primary mover towards Middle-Eastern cooperation was Mussolini, and that the four states were able to come to an agreement due to a like fear of his aggressive foreign policy. Though this is true, the process did introduce quite a new factor into Middle-Eastern affairs, and reflected a genuine desire on the part of the governments concerned to arrive at a regional arrangement over a wide land area.

Turkey's part in this new Pact had been as active and enthusiastic as the part her statesmen had played in helping to arrive at a Balkan Entente. The Saadabad Pact was duly ratified by the Chambers of the signatory powers; but it remained to be seen in the ensuing years of stress to what extent this Pact was to prove useful or otherwise.

### III

## RUSSO-TURK RELATIONS

(1933-1939)

The relations between these two neighbours, the one vast, the other comparatively tiny, had by the year 1933 reached a state of permanently arrested development. The year before the Soviet Government had granted a £ 8 million credit to Turkey on the



occasion of Ismet Pasha's visit, polite speeches of goodwill had been exchanged, and outwardly everything had been arranged to show the complete understanding existing between Soviet Russia and Republican Turkey. These same manifestations of friendship were to be continued during the following years; but they were to assume more and more the aspect of a diplomatic formula and less the aspect of an «Entente Cordiale».

It is most significant that during the very years when the Soviets were showing signs of emerging from their isolationist policy, and were taking pains to reassure the Western world as to their general pacific aims and as to their complete disinterestedness in the internal affairs of other régimes, Turkey was as cautious as ever in her dealings with her giant neighbour.

Such declarations to the world as «The U.S.S.R. undertakes the obligation not to intervene in a country where there is a counter-revolution» did nothing to reassure the Turks. The Russians had promised political non-interference in Article 8 of the 1921 agreement; but this had not been faithfully adhered to. The Bolshevik scare thus continued as a latent force in Turkish politics, and when the Ankara régime wished to silence its opponents it was frequently on the score of red sympathies that it did so.<sup>31</sup> Moreover the Republican government pursued an internal policy calculated to prevent the spread of Communism. The vast majority of Russians given «vessikas» in the country were white Russian refugees whose sympathies were known; and to make doubly sure this community was kept in Constantinople. The enlightened agrarian policy by which facilities were made for peasants to own their own land, and by which, through the intermediary of the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi), the peasants were able to effect long-term credits for the purchase of grain, seed and farm implements were moves with the same end in view, to create a contented peasantry. The abolition of the old crushing system of taxation upon the peasants was a further radical step in the same direction.

The importance furthermore of Russian trade to the Turks—never a decisive factor except during the years 1919-22—was steadily on the wane. Many of the products that Turkey had needed during the 20's, wheat, sugar, and timber notably, were no longer in demand. From 1936 onwards Turkey began to link her destiny closer to the Western Democratic powers, and was thereby able to secure other and more considerable loans to assist both her expanding industrialisation policy and her rearmament plan.

Russian influence being to a large extent excluded from Turkey itself, the focal point of Turco-Russian relations during these years was therefore the Straits. The Russian and Turkish delegations had to a certain limited extent made common cause at Lausanne; but always in the Turkish mind there remained the certainty that Russian ambitions in the Straits were boundless, and that the «historic dream» of control at Constantinople was merely a question in temporary abeyance. Such utterances as Trotsky's «We must cry aloud that we need Constantinople and the Straits»<sup>32</sup> did nothing to allay this underlying Turkish fear.

Russian patronage at Lausanne had resulted in the Turkish delegation adopting a more friendly attitude towards the Western proposals for the Straits régime in 1923. Turkish straits policy while aiming at full Turkish sovereignty could not but feel wary of the Russian policy of a «mare clausum», which would leave Constantinople at the mercy of a powerful Russian Black Sea fleet. The Turks favoured a general straits arrangement amongst the Black Sea powers all to be treated on a basis of equality as is seen by the diplomatic démarches indulged in by Ankara in the Summer of 1933.<sup>33</sup> The immediate aim of this move was to gain support from all the Black Sea powers for the abolition of the demilitarization clauses of Lausanne; but a secondary desire was that the dominating position of Russia in Black Sea affairs should be modified by a regional agreement with the other Black Sea countries.

When the Montreux conference was convened the Turkish delegation after having secured the most important advantages for Turkey, was prepared to step aside from the duel over the Black-Sea shipping clauses and to leave the great naval powers of Britain and Russia to resolve their issue. For Turkey neither the Russian conception of a closed sea nor the English conception of extreme liberty of entry, were suitable: it was therefore discreet and advantageous to allow the two opponents to come to a compromise.

At Montreux Russian interest in the Black-Sea shipping clauses was paramount. Litvinov proposed a very important amendment in these regulations, which if adopted would have given Russia most effective security in the Black Sea. His proposals were that both: (I) in case of a war in which none of the riverain powers were belligerent no warships of belligerent Powers should pass the Straits and, (II) If a Riverain (other than Turkey) were belligerent, non-riverain belligerent powers should not pass the Straits.<sup>34</sup>

These exclusion amendment clauses were not adopted. Russia did not gain her two main aims, (I) That the Straits should be always open to her warships from whatever direction they passed. This assurance she needed in order to be able to pass her Baltic and Pacific fleets into the Black Sea at will, (II) That the Black Sea should be closed to non-riverain warships; for only with that last objective gained would she have felt confident in the prospect of entering the rearmament naval race and of building up a large fleet at Odessa.

The result was that Russia, though she had gained added security at Montreux, emerged from the conference still dissatisfied with the shipping clauses and distinctly piqued with the Turks for the close collaboration with Britain that they had openly shown at the talks. The Soviet Press complained that Turkey was yielding to the pressure of imperialist powers.<sup>35</sup>

The Turkish government could not afford to allow any appreciable deterioration in relations with the northern neighbour and in July, 1937, just after the signature in Teheran of the Saadabad Pact, Dr. Rüstü Aras and Sukru Kaya Bey went on a mission to Moscow to reassure the Russian government that the recently-signed Eastern Pact had no hostile intention towards Russia. Shortly before Ismet Pasha had declared to the National Assembly that Turco-Russian friendship would remain a continuous factor in the politics of the two countries.

M. Litvinov gave a luncheon in honour of his Turkish guests, and spoke—perhaps not without a trace of sarcasm—of the various types of friendship possible between races.<sup>36</sup>

« It sometimes happens that one State menaces the territorial integrity or the political independence of another by invoking sacred revisionist principles, or some historical claim, or simply a racial tie. Sometimes even, if this State finds it impossible to realise these threats owing to insufficient military preparation or an international situation that does not favour her plans, she proposes to this other state that they should pass as friends. What is even more astonishing is that this other state tolerates this trumpery whilst full comprehending that the false manoeuvre is giving the aggressive state the possibility of strengthening herself so as to be better prepared for a premeditated aggression against her « friend ». Cases can even exist where friendship is concluded between two parties of very unequal strength. Then the more feeble of the two, in exchange for the friendship of her protector is forced to sacrifice a part of her real independence. Such relations between states can never be defined as friendship

except in a relative sense. Need I point out that the relations existing for 18 years between the U.S.S.R. and the Turkish Republic have nothing in common with the types of friendship that I have just been enumerating. The basis of our relations and our purposes are entirely different. »

Rüstü Aras replied stating that « Turco-Russian Friendship is a stable element and a precious one, not only in the relations between our own countries but in the Black Sea too. » An official communiqué followed once more announcing to the world the strong links that bound the two countries.

It was however evident to impartial observers that the Russian change of attitude towards the Turks after Montreux represented more than a temporary impatience. Litvinov's reference in his speech to « friendship concluded between two parties of very unequal strength »<sup>37</sup> was peculiarly appropriate to the actual circumstances. Russia ever since 1921 had been courting Turkish friendship on the safe assumption that once that was firmly established the Russians would in due course become the senior partner of the Alliance; and this not only theoretically but realistically in the vital area of the Straits. The Turks—never slow to suspect their neighbour—had also known well the fate of « the more feeble of the two (who), in exchange for the friendship of her protector, is forced to sacrifice a part of her real independence ». This feeling largely accounted for the smoothness with which—once outstanding difficulties had been removed—the Turkish republic moved into the orbit of Western alliances.

Thus by 1937 with Russian industrial power developing at a proportionally greater rate than Turkey's and with a rearmament plan that caused fears to her old enemy, Russo-Turkish friendship had reached a phase where smooth parlance sought to hide the empty interior.

The coming year saw the preservation of friendly relations with Moscow though the increasing emphasis put into the Turkish Press on the Turco-English friendship illustrated that in the line-up for forthcoming hostilities Turkey had decided to rely mainly on Western support.

Russian Diplomacy during the fateful Summer of 1939 removed all doubts as to the complete justification of Turkish suspicions. After agreement on the broad principles of Alliance with England and France (May, and June respectively), Saracoğlu paid a personal visit to Moscow. The Russians showed at first a willingness to parley, and the question of a Black Sea Pact was discussed. Russian diplomacy was however angling for a far



more important agreement. With Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow in August, Saragöglu began to receive studied discourtesy from the Russian diplomats. The form in which the Black Sea Pact was then suggested contained a clause by which Turkey should agree to close the Straits to all warships of Non-Black Sea powers. Russia was no longer taking the pains to hide her revived ambitions at the Straits.<sup>38</sup>

The results of the Moscow Turco-Russian talks were as expected. Saragöglu withdrew from Moscow, and next month entered into final negotiations with England and France for a Mutual Aid Pact.

IV

# TURCO-ITALIAN RELATIONS

(1933-1939)

In 1933 the relations between Turkey and Italy were still on a most friendly basis as is revealed by the following statement of Pietro Ferretti on the 19th May to the Italian Camera. «The recent ratification», he stated, «of friendship pacts between Italy and Greece, Greece and Turkey, Italy and Turkey, put the work of the three governments on a harmonious footing in their joint undertaking to assure the maintenance of pacific collaboration in the Near East».<sup>39</sup>

This solidarity of attitude on the part of Greece, Italy, and Turkey was abruptly shaken to pieces by a speech of veiled bellicosity that Mussolini made to the Italian Parliament on 19th March, 1934. In this he said: «The historical objectives of Italy have two names, Asia and Africa... The South and the East are the principal areas which must absorb the interests and the aims of the Italians.»<sup>40</sup>

The reactions to this in the Turkish Press were immediate and violent. «Aksam» of the 21st headed an article, «Either Caesar or nothing», Ahmed Sükrü inveighed openly against Mussolini in «Milliyet» of 7th April; while «Vakit» in an article of 25th March was more calm and rested content with the following analysis: «In spite of his declaration of not being a partisan of war, Mussolini with his ambitions openly focussed upon Asia and Africa is doing nothing else than inciting the Italian people to war and annexation.»<sup>41</sup>

The Italian government did their best to quieten Turkish apprehensions. Mussolini personally interviewed the Turkish Ambassador in Rome and tried to clarify the situation. «I assure you sincerely», he said, «that in my discourse I did not intend to refer to Turkey and had not even such an idea in my mind.» He went on to endeavour to convince the Turkish ambassador that there had been no change in Italian policy towards Turkey. On the 5th of April Tefvik Rüstü submitted this official Italian apology to the National Assembly.<sup>42</sup> Turkish suspicion was however thoroughly aroused, and the Turks organised ostentatious military manœuvres on the Aegean coast while the Press indulged in warnings as to the warm reception any Italian aggression would get in Turkey. Italian war preparations were watched askance; and Turkey declared herself ready for any emergency.

The Italian attack upon Abyssinia did nothing to clear the air as between Italy and the Turks. The latter showed a lively sympathy for the Abyssinian cause, sent a diplomatic representative to Addis Ababa, while the Turkish Red Cross undertook some measure of relief work in the stricken country.<sup>43</sup>

Italo-Turk relations at this juncture were complicated by trade considerations, neither side wishing a rupture in this field of mutual interest. Up till 1934 Italy had played a most important part in Turkey's foreign trade; and a severance of these relations would have caused considerable loss to both parties.

In April, 1934, a Trade agreement had been signed allowing for most-favoured nation terms and for payments to be settled by «Clearing». Arrangements had also been made for the Neutrality Treaty of 1928 to be extended to 1942.

The Question of Sanctions now caused in 1935 an interesting exchange of views in the Turkish National Assembly.<sup>44</sup> Turkey had voted in favour of applying sanctions against Italy in her role as a League Member. This decision was queried by the Deputy for Afyon who stated that it would be advisable for Turkey not to apply sanctions against Italy owing to Turkey's great interest in Italian trade. He added furthermore that it was extremely unlikely that the League would find any way of adequately compensating Turkey for the loss certain to accrue to her through a severance of trade relations with Italy.

In reply the ever cautious Dr. Aras insisted that Turkey's obligations to the League had to be put first, secondly that the relations of Turkey with Italy were still regulated by a Friendship Pact prolonged a year previously for a further ten year span<sup>45</sup>; and thirdly that our «relations with Ethiopia are normal».

Turkish trade with Italy did of course drop off abruptly after 1934 as can be seen by a glance at the trade figures<sup>46</sup>; but Tefvik Rustu was clearly more concerned with keeping Turkey's relations with the international community on a good footing than with preventing a partial Italo-Turkish rupture.

His policy was rewarded by the extremely favourable reception given to Turkey's official request for revision of the Lausanne Clauses in the spring of the following year. The satisfactory way in which the Montreux arrangement was able to be rushed through irritated the Italians exceedingly. Their Press gave vent to their annoyance, but the Turks did nothing to appease Italian animosity or to gain the adhesion of Italy to the Montreux Pact. Italian shipping through the Straits had greatly increased; and the shipping clauses of Montreux gave wide powers to the littoral.

It was thus clearly in Italy's interest to seek a rapprochement with Turkey. Italy realised her weak position, and in the Summer of 1936 she gave assurances to Turkey, Greece, and Jugoslavia that her intentions in the Eastern Mediterranean were pacific.<sup>47</sup> A slow improvement in relations began, and Turkey was even the first country to remove her diplomatic representative from Addis Ababa. Early in 1937 it was announced that official talks would take place between the two governments to arrange for Italian adherence to the Montreux Pact.

Important talks eventually took place in Milan in February between Signor Ciano and Dr. Rüstü Aras. Previous to the meeting the Italians had declared that they wished the talks to be «fitted into the general framework of Italo-Turkish relations»<sup>48</sup> and that they were interested in making terms with the Montreux Régime only as it affected Turkey, and not with the Montreux Convention as a whole.

That implied a willingness to bargain with the Turks if not to accept the new régime of the waterway. The outcome of the interview, namely that «no questions divided the two countries», was made known in an official communiqué; but the questions discussed remained at the time unknown. It was supposed however that Ciano was prepared to offer Italian adhesion to Montreux in return for trade concessions, «a settlement of outstanding problems of Italian property in Turkey, and Turkish recognition of the Italian Empire».<sup>49</sup> It appears too that the discussions of the two foreign ministers explored problems of wider importance.<sup>50</sup> Ciano perhaps made an attempt to interest the Turkish Minister in adherence of his country to the Axis. The Turkish government agency, however to prevent false reports,

issued a communiqué stating that «Turkey is attached only to the Bloc of Peace, and and to no other bloc», thereby making her aloofness from such a project absolutely clear. Rüstü Aras for this part sought to persuade Ciano to bring back Italy into the League of Nations.<sup>51</sup>

The talks ended with the decision «to keep in touch through the normal channels of diplomatic chancelleries». In the following year a further commercial agreement was reached, and some steps were taken to revive the place that Italy had held in Turkey's foreign trade prior to the Abyssinian war.<sup>52</sup>

Italian relations with her Aegean neighbour continued from late 1936 up till the outbreak of war to rest on a tolerably stable basis for which the 1923 Pact extended up to 1942 remained the agreed basis. In 1939 relations were hardly cordial as Count Ciano got wind of the fact that the Turks had not been anxious for Ciano to visit Ankara after the Ciano-Aras talks in Milan<sup>53</sup>; however on May the 3rd Ciano assured the Turkish ambassador in Rome that «Italy has no economic, political, or territorial designs»<sup>54</sup> on Turkey.

## v

## TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

(1933-1939)

The advent to power of Hitler more or less corresponded with the launching of the first Five-Year Plan for industry in Turkey. This was therefore an extremely propitious moment for Germany to begin to play a larger role in Turkish affairs than formerly. The Turks had been having great difficulties to place their raw products during the slump years, moreover Germany's place in Turkish imports had already been getting more and more important during the 20's. The slump on the world market showed every sign of continuing; and between the years 1930 and 1933 Turkish exports even to Germany showed a considerable decline dropping from 19 million L. T. in 1930 to 13 million L. T. in 1932 and 1933.<sup>55</sup>

Turkey's chance of getting the necessary machinery and installations for her ambitious industrialisation plan were slender in the light of a considerably diminished export trade. It was here that Nazi Germany stepped in and offered a clear-cut



solution, the political implications of which were by no means evident at the outset.

In 1934 a German Commercial Commission representing various Krupp's interests visited Turkey and had discussions with the Turkish government. The outcome was a long-term credit for 20 million L. T., and also an agreement by the Turks to purchase a large quantity of railway materials and parts from Germany.<sup>56</sup> The lively interest that the German Government professed in the Turkish five-year plan, and their willingness to assist in its realisation led to the sending—in February, 1925—of a German adviser to the Turkish Ministry of Economy. This official's job was specifically to assist with the getting under way of the five-year plan. In the same year the Turks ordered 11 million L. T. of material from Krupps for the electrification of their railways.<sup>57</sup>

Two years of active German assistance in their economy had begun to raise political doubts at Ankara. Germany's «Drang nach Sudosten» could be surveyed over a vast field of South-Eastern Europe and the Middle-East. That it was a concrete plan with a political motive was blatantly obvious. But Turkish alarm at the start of 1936 was still largely one of possible Italian aggression in the unprotected area of the Straits. The German danger was already fully perceived in 1936; but the economic results of trading with Germany had been exceedingly fortunate for the Turks. The value of their exports to Germany had rocketed up from 19 million L. T. in 1933 to 29 million in 1934, and to 35.5 in 1935. The peak was reached in 1936 with an export of 41.7 million L. T. worth of goods to that country<sup>58</sup>. It is true that the Turks were obliged to take repayment for this in the way Dr. Schacht thought best; but it so happened that munitions and the other productions of heavy industry that the Germans had available were just the materials that Turkey needed.

The Schacht plan was in the first instance more successful in Turkey than in any other European country with the exception of Bulgaria. Within the short span of a few years Germany gained a dominant grip over Turkish economy and was well on the road to making continued economic assistance a lever to effect political ends.<sup>59</sup>

Through the year 1936 Turkish statesmen began to take action to counteract the dangerous German monopoly. In June a £3 million contract for the erection of a new Iron and Steel works at Karabuk, in spite of widespread rumours that Krupps

would undertake it, went to the English firm of Brassert. The Turkish government was actively concerned over Turkey's dependence upon German economy, particularly in view of the cooling of Turco-German relations that took place during and after the Montreux revision talks.<sup>60</sup>

The German Press was very hostile to the Revision, and noted with extreme disapproval Turkey's approachment with England. However Dr. Schacht's tour of the Balkans in the summer was followed by a trip to Turkey and Iran<sup>61</sup>. Previously to this on the 1st November, «The Emden» had visited Constantinople, and the occasion had been made into one for friendly manifestations, a Turkish general along with the German Ambassador attending a commemoration service at Terabiye held for the German soldiers killed at Gallipoli<sup>62</sup>. Reference was of course made by the representatives of both countries to the abiding ties of military comradeship. The naval visit was followed by that of Dr. Schacht in the middle of the month, a visit which though it passed off quietly enough in Turkey occasioned a leader in the Times of 16th November which analysed the probable motives of Dr. Schacht's visit. Germany's influence, said the London paper, was apparently going to be extended and Turkey was to be tied by even closer economic strings to the Reich.

This prophecy proved false, as Germany seriously overplayed her diplomatic hand. In February, 1937, the German Government made it known to the Turkish government that certain shipping clauses in the Montreux Convention were disapproved of strongly by the former, and particularly those clauses which allowed Russia to send her warships into the Mediterranean.<sup>63</sup> This high-handed approach received the sharp answer that the Turkish government, strengthened by the Montreux adjustment, now felt prepared to administer. The Germans were told that not being either signatories of Montreux or a Mediterranean power, the question of the Straits shipping was not a German matter, and that Turkey would «brook no interference in matters vital to her security».<sup>64</sup>

1937 saw a Turco-German cooling in full evidence; it was reflected mainly in open attacks in the Turkish Press on Germany's Balkan intrigues. The extreme diplomatic activity of Dr. Rüstü Aras during this year; his visits to diverse European capitals, his attempts to keep the Balkan Countries in line, and lastly the Saadabad agreement, were all manifestations of the concern with which Turkey regarded the growing menace of Nazi Germany.

Nevertheless Turkish diplomacy was not willing to swivel its

affections too far towards one faction. The « tiff » with Germany was not allowed to develop into too serious proportions. Krupps had failed to get the contract for rearmament of the Straits though this firm had offered an absurdly cheap estimate for the work<sup>65</sup>; yet the trade volume—of such fundamental importance was it to Turkey—remained at a peak level. In 1938 Funk, the German Minister of Economy, visited Constantinople and established the basis for a German commercial credit to Turkey of 150 million Reichmarks.<sup>66</sup> In July a commercial agreement was signed in Berlin stipulating<sup>67</sup> the continuance of the principles that had hitherto guided trade relations between the two countries, i. e. free export and free import without restrictive clauses.

Germany's efforts to ensnare Turkey within the Nazi orbit had not been limited to commerce, though this had been the overridingly important contact between the two countries. A certain amount of initiative had also been expended on cultural propaganda. Financial backing was given to books that stressed Turco-German amity and a German newspaper, « *Türkische Post* », received backing for propagating the German view-point. In addition special facilities were made to attract Turkish students to complete their studies in Germany either at German Universities or at training colleges. Particularly by instructing young Turkish technicians, Germany hoped to form a German-trained personnel who on their return to Turkey would fill key governmental posts, and whose corporate pro-German influence would have a decisive effect upon Turco-German relations.

The policy of ambivalent and ambiguous friendships was already forming in Turkish minds as in 1938 the array for a further world conflict began to take shape. Germany and German trade were far too useful for the Turks to consider any serious rupture with that power. On the other hand firm English support as protection in the Mediterranean was essential. Turkey ardently desired to preserve a double friendship and to balance herself as mistress of the Straits between the rival aims of Germany and England, even in the very same way as through centuries of history she had balanced her diplomacy between the interests of Russia and England.<sup>68</sup>

With this aim in view German overtures, though regarded with high suspicion, were not all rejected. Thus in 1939 German and Dutch experts were called in to build the port and arsenal at Gölçuk in the Gulf of Ismit.<sup>69</sup> In diverse ways the Germans showed their ever increasing interest in Turkey as the springboard to the Middle East.

Germany's skilful Ambassador Von Papen was appointed, and presented his credentials in Ankara; an air Service between Turkey and Germany was inaugurated; Berlin radio began transmissions in Turkish.<sup>70</sup> All and everything was done by the Germans to bring Turkey within the German sphere of influence. The Turks however were in a mood far removed from that of 1914; and German efforts to influence Turkish policy in the critical months of 1939 proved fruitless.

## VI

### TURCO-FRENCH RELATIONS

(1933-1939)

Turkey's relations with France were once more to become focussed on the Syrian situation; but the early thirties witnessed a lull in the long controversy. The signal for the revival of the matter in an even more aggravated form was the signature of a Franco-Syrian « accord » in September, 1936. By this the Syrian nationalists considered that « They had secured the political union, within the framework of the state of Syria, of the whole of the territory hitherto under French Mandate outside the frontiers of the Greater Lebanon ».<sup>71</sup>

This attitude at once produced an outburst in the Turkish press, the Turks fearing for « the maintenance of the Turkish character of the population » of the Sanjak, which, in their opinion was threatened by the handing over of certain mandatory powers to an independent Syria. The Turkish government filed a claim by which, while recognizing France's mandatory rights in the disputed Sanjak, they claimed that these « could not form a constitutional right acquired for Syria which was about to receive its independence ». The Turks claimed that the future status of Alexandretta and Antioch was still a question of bilateral arrangement between the French and Turkish governments. Atatürk spoke of the issue when he opened the Turkish Parliament on November 1st, stating: « The important topic of the day which is absorbing the whole attention of the Turkish people, is the fate of the district of Alexandretta, Antioch and its dependencies, which in point of fact belongs to the purest Turkish element. We are obliged to take up this matter seriously and firmly. »<sup>72</sup>



The French view was that «By detaching from the Syrian state a sanjak which belongs to it... the French government would be, both in law and in fact, setting up a third state on the same footing as the first two. Such an action would be tantamount to the dismemberment of Syria—a contingency against which the Mandatory Power is explicitly responsible for safeguarding the Syrian state.»<sup>73</sup>

A state of tension was caused in the sanjak, and the political unrest amongst sympathizers of both factions brought about a certain amount of rioting and bloodshed from December, 1936, onwards. In this same month the dispute was referred to the League Council, which sent to the area impartial observers. Protracted negotiations took place between Dr. Rüstü Aras and members of the Quai d'Orsay which in January, 1937, resulted in a Turco-French agreement over the Sanjak.<sup>74</sup> The terms of this were that Alexandretta and Antioch were to form a separate political entity; but they were however to be linked with the State of Syria in a custom and monetary union. Furthermore the Syrian state was to be responsible for the foreign relations of the Sanjak; both Turkish and Arabic were given the rank of official languages. The news of this settlement was received with general rejoicing throughout Turkey; it also called for much praise from League members. In Syria however it occasioned strikes and protests.<sup>75</sup>

In the Summer of 1937 the President of the Syrian Republic and also the Minister of Foreign Affairs arrived in Ankara and talks took place at which a partial understanding appears to have been achieved, the French High Commissioner visiting the Sanjak in June and making speeches, urging the different factions to work together. The new constitution for the Sanjak was formulated and the machinery of autonomous government was put into operation. The details of an Election system in the Sanjak were worked out at Geneva; but Ankara sent a vigorous protest against these regulations, asserting that they would operate against the interests of the Turkish majority. The dispute over elections continued through the whole of the first part of 1938, and it was evident that the Turkish government was pursuing an all-out propaganda first to exploit the preoccupation of the French with the European crisis and secondly to use this factor as a lever to gaining their own way in the Sanjak.<sup>76</sup>

In June conversations between M. Bonnet and the Turkish Ambassador began in Paris. Martial law was declared in the region; and signs of exceptional concessions towards Ankara began

to appear. Many non-Turkish officials were replaced by Turks; the principle that Turkish troops should assist French troops in keeping order was agreed upon. The Turks—realising the opportunities—were now negotiating direct for a Turco-French friendship based on Turkish terms. Against a barrage of Press attacks from Ankara, the French government in Syria began to give way.

The Electoral Commission of the League had taken every possible measure to apply impartially the revised Electoral law but in June the Turkish permanent delegate to the League made a démarche against the continued existence in Syria of the Commission. This was successful in so far as the Commission voluntarily abandoned its duties, claiming that its situation was becoming impossible due to the partial attitude of the French authorities who were making «systematic arrests of the Alawi, Sunni Arab, and Greek Orthodox Communities».<sup>77</sup>

Step by step the Turks were getting their way. The commission left Alexandretta at the end of June; and the Turks and the French at once signed an agreement on garrisoning of the region by which they both took on equal responsibilities; but agreed to withdraw their national quotas after the period of emergency had passed, and to leave policing of the Sanjak to a locally-recruited force.

On the 4th of July a new Treaty of Friendship was signed between Turkey and France.<sup>78</sup> The contractants undertook «not to enter into an entente of a political or economic order directed against one of them» (Art. 1). In the event of attack from a third power both parties pledged absolute non-interference in the conflict (Art. 2). Clause 3 spoke in somewhat nebulous terms of joint steps that might be taken by the contracting powers to maintain general peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. A joint declaration took<sup>79</sup> place simultaneously, which stressed the intention of maintaining «between Turkey, Syria, and the Leban the relations of friendship and Good-neighbourhood established under the mandate régime by the Ankara convention of 30 May, 1926». This however was no longer possible as the power of Turkey was now spreading throughout the Sanjak; and as the French did nothing to allay the ever-increasing hold of Ankara over this region.

The New assembly opened in September, and its proceedings were conducted solely in Turkish. Speeches were made expressing the gratitude of members to the President and Government of the Turkish republic for the part they had played in securing autonomy for the sanjak. A Turkish name for the Sanjak, «Hatay»,

was officially adopted, and the Cabinet elected was exclusively Turkish.<sup>80</sup>

«The south-Eastward expansion of the German Reich and the Italian occupation of Albania had caused a further rise in the value of Turkish friendship to Western democracies.» As a consequence of this determining factor the final handing-over of the Hatay to Turkey was but a question of terms and time. In January 1939 the Hatay parliament adopted the Turkish civil and criminal codes; and Turkish officials were sent from Ankara to advise on fiscal matters.<sup>81</sup>

The final stage of the return of the Hatay was hastened on by the rumour that the Turkish army was preparing for an «Anschluss». As in the case of the Straits here too Turkish policy gained by appearing to be highly uncertain and temperamental. The actual cession was agreed upon between Saraçoglu and Massigli in June 1939. In return for the cession the Ankara government bound itself to respect the new frontier and to regard it as definitive (Art. 7); and it was pointed out that this was the first time Turkey had agreed to respect Syrian independence. Arts 2 and 3 were mollifying clauses which allowed citizens of the Hatay to opt for Syrian or for Lebanese nationality during the first six months of the agreement.

France was interested in localising the Turk-Arab conflict in Syria by ending the dispute with Ankara; she was even more anxious to put Franco-Turkish relations on the same harmonious footing as England had now achieved with the other country. The negotiations for this were taking place in Paris, and from that capital was announced a Franco-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Assistance in which the two countries spoke of their intention of negotiating a definitive and long-term mutual Assistance Pact. Furthermore in the event of any aggression in the Mediterranean they were to give mutual assistance to one another.<sup>82</sup>

The ground was thus prepared in Paris in the Summer for the fuller Tripartite agreement between Turkey, France, and England that was to ensue.

At the end of July the French flag was removed from the Hatay, and the region became the sixty-third Vilayet of the Turkish Republic. By sharp bargaining and persistent propaganda Turkey had finally arrived one pace nearer to her territorial aims as expressed in the national Pact. She had also acquired the port of Alexandretta, which was to be invaluable for her commercial relations in the Mediterranean. At the same time Syrian opinion

had become enraged both against the Turks and against the French mandatory power which had shown such small concern for the vital interests of a free Syria as to allow the cession of the Hatay. The Syrian nationalist leader declared the 23rd of June to be a national day of mourning; and the Syrian Chamber proclaimed the transference of territory to be illegal.<sup>83</sup>

During the period under review the repercussions of the Hatay dispute had made themselves felt in all France's relations with Turkey. Trade between the two countries had shrunk to the most slender proportions.<sup>84</sup> In general too the Turks for guidance in their industrial and economic development plans had turned more towards Germany, England, and the U. S. A. Paris was no longer the obvious training ground of the Turkish student who wished to study abroad, and the small place that France held in the life of the New republic was sometimes deplored by French writers. The exigencies of war were to create a closer understanding between the Turks and the French; for from the Turkish point of view the Hatay award had removed all obstacles to the attainment of that aim.

## VII

### TURCO-BRITISH RELATIONS

The previous period witnessed a «détente» in Anglo-Turkish relations that culminated in the signature of a Friendship agreement in 1930, which instrument was itself followed by commercial talks and by agreement on a number of trade matters. In spite of this understanding, trade relations failed to assume any great measure of importance during the early 30's, the trade balance continuing to be strongly unfavourable to Turkey and in particular England's share in the Turkish exports dwindling from 9 % (8.6 million L. T.) in 1933 to 5.4 % (6.4 million L. T.) in 1936.

The Italian threat made the Turks turn more positively towards Great Britain; the instance for a fuller Turco-English collaboration was however the entire sympathy with Turkish revisionist claims shown by the British government before and during the Montreux talks. There were vital differences between the Turkish and English theses. Great Britain however was prepared to waive a number of important claims in return for a full understanding with the Turks; her statesmen having a real fear that a dissatisfied Turkey might be driven into the political sphere



of Germany once more. Great Britain's need for Turkish support led to the acceptance of the Turkish draft as the basis of discussion. Britain—when the divergence of her aims from those of the Turks became clear upon the submission of the British draft—finally showed her Turkish support by agreeing to full Turkish remilitarization, and—after some discussion—to the total suspension of the International Commission<sup>85</sup>. The English and French surrender over this latter point—vital to the pride of the Turks—paved the way for a future full understanding between the three countries.

The Turkish Press, after the successful conclusion of the conference took on a markedly more Anglophile tone; an immediate effect of the improved relations was the giving of several important consignments featuring in the Turkish rearmament and industrialisation plan to British companies, the most notable being the assignment of refortification of the Straits to Messrs. Vickers. These actions not only proved diminished distrust of British intentions; but a preference on the part of the Turks for exposing their defence areas to British rather than to German eyes.

The Turks had shown their pro-British leanings in 1935 by the offer of refuge in Turkish harbours to the British Mediterranean Fleet. Similarly they were enthusiastic cooperators in the Nyon patrol. After Montreux there existed, as Dr. Rüstü Aras stated, a complete «identity of interests» between Turkey and England. Turkish overtures for cementing the existing friendship<sup>86</sup> began shortly after Montreux and the «almost effusive friendship» of Turkey was—according to Mr. Churchill—a slight source of embarrassment to the British Government in their negotiations with Italy. The Turks made an offer of Alliance to the Chamberlain government in 1937; the latter declined in the politest of possible terms stating that the time for Alliance did not yet seem to be opportune. British diplomacy was however very anxious not to repel Turkish advances and the possibilities of closer understanding were being fully explored by both governments.<sup>87</sup>

England was already beginning to reshape her polite but non-committal attitude of former years towards the Turks, especially in the field of commercial relations. There had always been difficulties barring any extensive trading between the two countries, but from 1935 onwards an attempt was made by both governments to diminish these: a clearing agreement was signed in September, 1936, with the express purpose of increasing the trade volume<sup>88</sup>; and the following year saw an exchange of notes upon

the possibilities of further increasing of inter-trade. This limited trade drive on the part of England was mainly political in aim, its object being to relieve the Turks from their growing dependence upon German economy.

Along with improved trade relations after Montreux, the deep-rooted anti-British feeling that still prevailed in many influential Turkish circles began to give way to more friendly feelings. An important stimulus was given to this new phase of Turco-English relations by the purely impromptu visit of King Edward to Istanbul in the Summer of 1936.<sup>89</sup> King Edward's visit was an entirely unexpected honour for the Turkish government; but in spite of this Atatürk received him with great courtesy, and the most cordial personal relations were established in the short course of his stay in Turkey. Anglo-Turkish friendship was further advanced by the cordial reception given to İsmet Pasha when he visited London for the Coronation in the Summer of 1937. Speaking of this visit İsmet Pasha stated:

«It is a pleasure for me to declare that our relations with Great Britain are based on friendship and real confidence. When I was in England I remarked sentiments of sincere friendship towards my country among the most authorized individuals of the English nation; and the most responsible statesmen have shown that they would be happy to see me carrying back with me to my country sentiments of the sincere and cordial friendship that England nourishes towards Turkey. Not only in official but also in private circles confidence and sympathy is manifested towards our country. We find England's conduct in pursuit of the cause of peace fully in conformity with our spirit. The sentiment of confidence between our two countries will be very useful for the developing of our reciprocal relations, and will be a precious factor tending towards the cause of international peace and towards an atmosphere of security.»<sup>90</sup>

In 1937 results of a deliberate Anglo-Turkish drive towards closer collaboration began to show themselves. While the English share in Turkish trade rose from 6 to 7 million L. T. imported into Turkey and from 6 to 9.7 million L. T. in acceptance of Turkish exports, the German share actually showed a fall-off, German imports from Turkey dropping from 60 thousand L. T. worth (51% of total) to 50 thousand L. T. worth (36.5% of total), though German exports to Turkey increased from 40 thousand L. T. to 48 thousand (this being a percentage decrease on the total from 45% down to 42%).

1938 saw the granting to the Turks of a British credit of

£ 16 million; but Germany offset this by a loan of 150 million Rm. This economic bargaining among the great powers for the favour of the Turks was the dominant political factor of the year, it representing the fullest realisation among the powers of Turkey's vital role to be played in the gathering storm. As stated elsewhere Turkey had already begun her policy of joint-friendship with England and Germany.<sup>91</sup> Having achieved a measure of balance in her trade and diplomatic relations between the proffered favours of the two great powers, she could afford to swing-back somewhat in 1938 to a semi-detached position.

After Munich English policy turned to favour definitely a firm Turkish alliance; in the Spring of 1939 Mr. Chamberlain announced in Parliament that negotiations had been carried on with the Turkish government, that an «identity of views» had been reached, and that a Mutual Assistance Pact was to be worked out in detail. This was followed a month later by the almost similarly worded Turco-French declaration of Mutual assistance.<sup>92</sup> Faced by the threat of aggression Turkey had definitely opted for full cooperation within the framework of a tripartite mutual aid agreement with France and Britain. The groundwork for this was achieved in the Spring and Summer of 1939; but it was not until after the failure of Saracoglu's mission to Moscow in September that the Turks were finally ready to bind themselves to the Western Alliance.

## VIII

### STRAITS POLICY

#### AND THE MONTREUX REVISION

Article 18 of Lausanne had seemed a safe form of guarantee to the Turks during the first ten years after the imposition of the new statute; but the decline in international life that set in during the thirties caused Turkey well-grounded fears as to her own safety. Treaties had been repudiated, undeclared wars waged; and both of these the League Council had proved unable to prevent. The Turks could therefore be excused for feeling sceptical about the real value of Article 18 of Lausanne.

In Turkey the demilitarization clauses had come in for a steadily increasing deluge of criticism from 1933 onwards. The Turkish Foreign Minister gave several warnings to the world that

his country regarded the clauses relating to demilitarization as being of a discriminatory nature, and he suggested revision of the Lausanne régime several times from May, 1933, onwards.<sup>93</sup>

From this year on indeed revision became the main concern of Turkish foreign policy. In April, 1936, Turkey formally requested the same to the Secretary General of the League.<sup>94</sup> This move was well-timed, for, after the previous Turkish démarches, it had been feared at Geneva that the Turks would march in on the zones and present the world with one more example of a «fait accompli».

Turkey's decision to proceed judicially was wise. Coming shortly after the Rhineland remilitarization and at the time when Italian aggression in Abyssinia was being perpetrated, the constitutional attitude of the Turkish government earned an immediate and favourable reply to the request from the great majority of Lausanne signatory powers, Italy being the notable exception.

The Conference powers met at Montreux on June 22nd, and on the following day the Turkish draft revision was submitted. This substituted the formula of «freedom of navigation» for absolute Turkish control of shipping, imposed severe restrictions on the entry of non-Black Sea warships into the Black Sea, abolished the International Commission and allowed full remilitarization. Article 9 of the Turkish draft provided also that in case of threat of war even, Turkey should have the same rights—with modifications—to close the straits as if she were a belligerent in time of war.<sup>95</sup>

The Turkish thesis while carrying very far the principle of full Turkish sovereignty also favoured greatly Russian interests in its new limitations upon outside warships entering the Black Sea; so much so that Russo-Turkish collaboration in the drafting has been suggested. The play of policies of the various countries represented at Montreux introduced a lot of minor themes into the large-scale plan<sup>96</sup> but in general as at the previous Straits Conference the main participants in the struggle were Turkey, Russia, and Great Britain.

The Turkish draft was accepted as the basis for discussion; but the British thesis submitted after an adjournment reiterated the decisive interest of the international community in free access into the Black Sea and called for the continuance of the International commission.<sup>97</sup>

Two months of discussion led to heated exchange between the British and Russian delegates. In view of the dangerous political outlook however a settlement was hastened on which in



its final form was a compromise between the Turkish and the English drafts.

The principle of freedom of navigation was maintained (Art. 2), though Turkey retained the right of sanitary control under certain clearly-imposed conditions (Art. 3). Merchant ships were allowed passage in war if Turkey was neutral, and if Turkey was belligerent they could pass if not belonging to enemy countries (Art. 5 and 6). War vessels were loosely classified (Art. 9-11) and lighter varieties were allowed to pass without special restrictions. The question of capital ships however enjoyed a full settlement (Art. 18) by which the aggregate maximum tonnage of all non-riparian powers was fixed at 30,000 tons with the proviso that any one non-riparian Power might not send more than two-thirds of the aggregate tonnage into the Black Sea.

As to passage of warships, Article 20 states concisely that: «In time of war Turkey being belligerent... the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish government.» Article 21 adds: «Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war she shall have the right to apply the provisions of Article 20.» Thus the important suggestion made in Art. 9 of the Turkish draft was here incorporated. The conditions for passage of aircraft over the straits were severely modified to Turkey's advantage (Art. 23). The International Commission's functions were handed over to the Turkish government which promised to supply statistics and information on passage of ships to the League (Art. 24).

The Convention was to be ratified as soon as possible (Art. 26) and should remain in force for twenty years though at the end of each five-year period any signatory should be entitled to initiate proposals for amendments (Art. 28 and 29).<sup>98</sup>

The Montreux settlement was a hasty political arrangement in which the peace-inclined signatories of Lausanne conceded many issues in order to win the friendship of Turkey as well as to placate Russian hostility. The general importance of its signature was obscured by the incidence of the simultaneous outbreak of the Spanish war; nevertheless the Pact was well received by the Press of most countries.

Germany and Italy were the two exceptions, and these two powers gave the new arrangement a very hostile reception. This attitude led to the Turkish government's coming out firmly and openly on the side of France and Great Britain.

News of the signature was received with jubilation everywhere throughout Turkey, and on the 20th of July, Turkish

troops reoccupied the demilitarised zones amidst scenes of great enthusiasm. The International Commission wound up its work, the treaty received ratification; and the re-establishment of Turkish control over the Black Sea Straits was complete.»<sup>99</sup>

Turkey had been willing to give her friendship in return for absolute control over the Straits area. With Montreux Turkey once again possessed the role of guardian of the ancient waterway, and with this an enormously increased international political importance especially in view of articles 20 and 21. The Turkish government was not slow in putting its new powers into force, announcing in February, 1927 a special increase of £5 million in army estimates, giving Brassert & Co., an English firm, a £3 million contract for building a steel works, and accepting the tender of an English firm for the refortification of the Straits.<sup>100</sup>

By patience and tact the Turkish diplomats had gained all their objectives; but in order to do so they had had to align their country fully with French and British interests. This had not failed to irritate on the one hand, Germany and Italy; and on the other hand Russia.

## IX

### TURCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

American relations with Turkey between the years 1933 and 1939 were on the whole cordial but distant. On suitable occasions friendly messages of goodwill were exchanged; thus on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish republic not only were these exchanged between Roosevelt and Ismet Pasha but also the Turco-American association in New York organized a banquet at which the Turkish Ambassador, Muhtar Bey presided. References to America in Turkish political speeches were brief but benign: some ripples of the old question of Christian propaganda were discernible, as when for example the Turkish authorities chose to close the elementary courses of two American schools in Scutari.<sup>101</sup> This was in 1933. In general however relations were without any friction.

The chief field of contact between the two nations was that of commerce. Turkish exports showed a steady rise during this period, from 10 million's worth L. T. to 19 million's worth L. T. in 1937. Second to Germany, America had become Turkey's best purchaser. The worth of Turkish imports from the States also

showed a most important rise, climbing from 2 million L. T. in 1933 to 17 million L. T. in 1937. During these years Turkish economy was expanding greatly, nevertheless this import increase reflected a jump from a 3.1 % share in the total Turkish imports in 1933 to a 15.3 % share in 1937. The most sensational leap in Turkish imports from the States was from 2 million L. T. in 1936 to 17 million in the next year, an appreciable but less considerable rise taking place in the Turkish exports to the States.<sup>102</sup> The reason for doubled Turkish imports after 1936 was the Turks' pressing need for munitions and arms as well as for extra stocks of petrol.<sup>103</sup>

The volume of U. S. A. shipping that passed through the Straits remained small and America took no direct part in the Montreux talks.<sup>104</sup> Few instruments were signed between the two countries; but in 1934 a Convention of Extradition was contracted.<sup>105</sup> Trade relations remained on a free basis; indeed after 1933 America was « the only country Turkey was trading with without a clearing agreement ».<sup>106</sup> The favourable balance of trade too was a great asset for Turkey for whom uncleared balances with a number of nations were a continual source of embarrassment to all parties.

Good relations with America were thus well worth retaining from the Turkish point of view. In 1937 « Tan » published an article by Sabiha Sertel describing the unflourishing condition of the Turkish community in America, most of whom—according to the writer—were working under bad conditions. Many of them, she stated, were forced to assume American citizenship in order to get work; and this precluded them from the possibility of returning to their homeland.<sup>107</sup> Generally however the press spoke approvingly of America and of Americans.

1939 saw the signature of a Commercial treaty in which the principal stipulations were: (1) « Most-favoured nation treatment shall be accorded by the government of each country to the commerce of the other » and (2) In awarding contracts for public works etc. « neither country shall discriminate against the nationals of the other country ».<sup>108</sup>

On the whole then, American affairs were becoming of increasing interest to the Turks as the 1930's progressed.

## CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Aras clearly outlined the general foreign policy of his country at Milan in 1937. The Turks sought firstly—in the Black Sea—collaboration and friendship with Russia; secondly—in the Mediterranean—a close understanding with Italy and Greece; thirdly, friendly collaboration with England; and lastly, respect towards the other powers.<sup>109</sup> This general policy of appeasement was pursued up to the time that Italian aggression began to take on the shape of a serious threat to peace in the Aegean and Balkans.

Turkey faced with a worsening international situation was forced to build up a more complex structure of protection. This depended upon bilateral agreements with the great powers and a simultaneous attempt to create areas of regional security linking the small powers together. At no time did the Turkish statesmen allow their championship of the Balkan and Saadabad Ententes to deter them from creating good relations with the two countries—Italy and Germany—that were hostile to regional blocks. The greatest need of the Turks during the thirties was to make their industrialisation project a success; and in this task the Germans were able to be of outstanding use.

The initial influence that Nazi Germany won in Turkey developed so briskly after Dr. Schacht's visit of 1934 that there was once danger of it becoming in time a stranglehold. But the historical precedent of 1914 was fresh in Turkish minds; and Turkish republican leaders were determined that the country should maintain an absolute independence in its foreign policy.

England and France feared a « coup » by the Turkish army in the Straits Area which would have placed the Turks outside the orbit of Covenant defenders; and which might have driven her into common cause with Italy and Germany. At all costs England wished to avoid the Turks being hustled into the same political combination as in 1914.

When the Turkish revisionist drive found a satisfactory culmination of all its aims in July, 1936, the result was a temporary split between Turkey and the important non-participants at Montreux, Italy and Germany.

The following years saw the Turks offsetting that by renewed friendship with these two important countries. Simultaneously



an attempt was made to secure the firmer friendship of England. After 1936, too, the Turks—doubtless encouraged by the Straits example—pushed energetically for a radical solution of the Alexandretta question. The price they offered to France for the cession of this territory was full cooperation in the Mediterranean area; and a firm adherence to the Anglo-French grouping.

Official Russian friendship had continued but on a diminishing basis. By keeping their foreign policy flexible, the Turks found themselves by 1938 balanced, though somewhat precariously, between the rival interests of Russia, Germany, and Great Britain. The diplomats could hardly have bettered their position; as they had shown considerable skill in exploiting Turkish tenure of the Straits, a strategic factor that might be expected to be of fundamental importance in the coming conflict.

Nevertheless their 1939 position was most perilous; and this was fully brought home to them by the shock of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement in Moscow. Faced by this new turn of events, one fraught with dangers for the Turks, the latter hastened to enter into full commitments with England and France.

## CHAPTER SIX

### THE WAR

#### I

### THE FIRST PHASE

(SEPT. 1939 TO SEPT. 1940)

Turkish policy for the first nine months of war was welded firmly to the security agreement arrived at with Great Britain and France on October 19th, 1939, M. Massigli, Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen, and Dr. Refik Saydam signing for France, England, and Turkey respectively. The terms of this were the following. Article 1: «In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European power in consequence of aggression by that power against Turkey, France and the United Kingdom will cooperate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in her power.»<sup>1</sup>

Article 2: «(i) In the event of an act of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and with the U. K., and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power. (ii) In the event of an act of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved, France and the U. K. will collaborate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in their power.» Article 3: «So long as the guarantees given by France and the U. K. to Greece and Roumania by their respective declarations of the 13th April, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power, in the event of France and the U. K. being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees.» Article 4 provided that «The H. C. P. will immediately consult together in the event of an aggression» which did not call articles 2 or 3 into operation. It further stated that «It is nevertheless agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey will observe at least a benevolent

neutrality towards France and the United Kingdom.» Article 6 stated the aim of the guarantee. «The present treaty is not directed against any country, but is designed to assure France, the U. K. and Turkey of mutual aid and assistance in resistance to aggression should the necessity arise.» The undertakings were to be equally binding as bilateral obligations between Turkey and each of the other signatories (Art. 7), and in the event of joint hostilities the signatories undertook not to «conclude an armistice or peace except by common agreement». The Pact was concluded for 15 years renewable by tacit consent for further periods of five years.

A most important reservation was made by Turkey in Protocol 2 appended to the Treaty. This ran as follows: «The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union.»

Along with the treaty of Mutual Assistance a special agreement was also signed<sup>2</sup>. This provided for a joint Anglo-French loan to the Turks of £ 25 million «destined to cover the supplies of war material» (Art. 1). A commission of «Qualified representatives of the three governments was to be formed to draw up the programmes of deliveries...» The commission shall have regard to the necessity of placing Turkey without delay in a position to offer effective resistance to an attack which might be directed against her European frontiers at short notice.» (Art. 2). Turkey was further to receive a separate loan of £15 million from the two European governments (Art. 4), amortisation of which loan being used by the French and British governments for the purchase of tobacco or other Turkish goods (Art. 4). Lastly France and England made available 1½ and 2 million sterling respectively for the transfer of outstanding Turkish debts into clearing accounts.

In spite of the warm press given to the signature of the agreement the Turks even at the outset of war did not pin all their hopes in an Allied victory; and the very earliest reactions of Turkish opinion after the outbreak of war showed a marked desire for continued neutrality. There were thus other opinions heard than those praising the security gained for Turkey by the Anglo-Turkish Alliance. «We are out of the war... and let us hope this war will not produce developments that will extend to this country», wrote one journalist. A Turkish general gave his views in the «Turkische Post» on the 15th of September: «No

points of difference exist with Germany». He declared that there were strong reasons for economic collaboration with Germany and also for friendship with that country based upon the remembrance of arms-fraternity in the 1914 to 1918 war. There were too signs of caution amongst sections of the press. «İkdam» attacked «Yeni Sabah» for being too outspokenly anti-German; and «Tan» the most pro-Allied of the newspapers stated that Turkey would not become involved except in the case of a threat to the Balkans or the Mediterranean zone.<sup>3</sup>

Towards the other member of the Axis, the Turkish press began to observe a less markedly hostile tone. During the Summer of 1939 «Yeni Sabah» and the official government organ, «Ulus», had occasioned much indignation in Italy by on several occasions launching detailed Turkish claims for the return of the Dodecanese Islands. Italy also had angered the Turks by lodging a formal protest to France against the cession of the Hatay to the Turks. However Mussolini's declaration of neutrality in September, and later the Italo-Greek agreement of the 2nd November, had a calming effect upon Turkish opinion. The Turks were particularly interested in Italy's Balkan policy; and while the Italians continued to speak of their pacific intentions in that region, the Turkish newspapers undertook measured praise of Italian neutrality assurances.

In no field of foreign affairs was Turkey's ardent desire for peace more clear than in the Balkan policy she adopted after the start of the war. «Tan» of the 28th November called for a bid to revive Balkan unity, and for the summoning of a Balkan conference in Ankara. «The events of the last months», the article claimed, «have shown the impotence of the Balkan Union: Roumania was in no position to resist German pressure; Greece and Jugoslavia were constrained to second Italian policy. Only the reinforcing of the Balkan Bloc with the active participation of Turkey would be able to give to a Bloc of 70 million the force to resist any sort of external imperialist aim and to safeguard peace in the Balkans.»

In January a series of articles appeared in the Turkish papers on the importance of Turco-Italian solidarity in maintaining a Balkan peace; but the Turks were not trusting too much to this hope. Greco-Turkish friendship continued firm; while Bulgaria showed a markedly greater desire to cooperate. In January 1940 Menemencioglu visited Sofia. The official communiqué stressed the good relations between the two countries; and Koseivanov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, confirmed that Bulgaria would



retain a strict neutrality which would not cause trouble to her Balkan neighbours.<sup>4</sup>

In February there was a reunion of the four signatories of the Balkan Pact; and a resolution passed moved that : (I) The common interests of the four states were in « maintaining, peace, order, and security in South-Eastern Europe » and; (II) A common policy of neutrality should be maintained in the present conflict.

Turkey's desire for non-belligerence was perfectly genuine and was to form the consistent point of her foreign policy throughout the war; nevertheless her anxiety to commit herself to all possible security arrangements can be best interpreted in the light of the alarm caused in Ankara by the Molotov-Ribbentrop understanding. A balance for Turkey between the opposed policies of the two mighty armed camps had been one of the salient Turkish aims. This was abruptly replaced by outward Russo-German unity of purpose, involving joint annexation of Poland. The Turks had good reason to fear Russo-German intentions in the Straits. On the 17th October Saracoglu left Moscow, and the Prime Minister, Refik Saydam, explained the break-down of the talks.<sup>5</sup> Firstly new Russian demands had been made which were irreconcilable with recent Anglo-French-Turkish agreements; secondly the Russian demands were not in line with the Turkish straits policy. Thirdly, Refik Saydam stated that his country was not prepared to enter into agreements on the Straits outside the framework of an international conference.

Turkey's refusal provoked immediate Russian hostility. On the 30th October Molotov made a speech upbraiding the Turks for preferring the Western Alliance to entering into a « Mutual Pact limited to the Black Sea and the Straits » with Russia; and stating : « In the present international situation it is essential for us to know the true face and policy of States whose relations are of serious importance to us. »<sup>6</sup>

It was clear that the traditional Russo-Turkish enmity, for long artificially screened, had been brought out into the open by the Moscow talks. Fear of Russia was henceforth to be an important motive in Turkish policy; and it was certainly the Turkish desire not to provoke her northern neighbour that caused the important Turkish reservation in protocol 2, of the Mutual Aid pact with the Western Allies. Ismet Pasha on November the 1st spoke of the recent Moscow talks and after confessing that they had not achieved the hoped-for results concluded notwithstanding that Turco-Russian friendship was « founded on solid bases ».

At first Turkey's relations with England and France continued on an ever-more cordial footing with the opposition circles maintaining a discreet silence. Various events tended to cement the Alliance. A terrible earthquake hit the Turks at Erzincan; England gave considerable material assistance, and sent out Sir Wyndham Deeds to express English regrets at the catastrophe. Turkish journalists payed a visit to the Maginot line; and were duly impressed by its impregnability. Hüseyin Cahid called it « This invincible and insuperable guarantee of Allied victory ». General Weygand visited Ankara in January, and a German paper complained, « They want to give to Turkey an auxiliary army such as General Weygand has already built up in Syria ». A further financial and commercial agreement was signed between the three countries on January 8th, 1940.<sup>7</sup> This specified : (I) a credit of £25 million from the U. K.; (II) An Anglo-French loan of £15 million; and (III) a loan of £12 million for liquidating the clearing debts still owed to U. K. exporters. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (U. K. C. C.) established branches in Turkey to regulate trade matters and to promote Anglo-Turkish trade. The U. K. C. C. indulged in a policy of pre-emptive buying, their main purchases being chrome, mohair, silk, olive-oil, flax, emery, skins, timber, dried fruit, and tobacco.<sup>8</sup>

In January there were continual staff talks between the Allied and Turkish military chiefs; steps too for passive defence were taken in Istanbul and Izmir. The National Assembly passed an emergency law for « National defence » subordinating national economy and internal order to the decrees of the government. All these steps led to great nervousness throughout the country and forebodings as to Turkey's entry into the war. In February high tension reached a peak; but the Prime Minister gave a sedative speech on the 29th, stating that Turkey would only enter the war if her « zone of security » was menaced and warning the people not to listen to propaganda from whatever quarter it came. This relieved the tension somewhat, but talks and defence measures went on through the spring with the war scare abating slightly.

The Turkish press was now firmly neutral; and an article in « Tan » of 17th March argued that at all costs Turkey must not be committed to a war on two fronts, and suggested that England and France were planning to send their fleets into the Black Sea and to attack Russia via Batum. An ex-deputy was prosecuted for violent polemics against the Alliance with England and France. In April Turkey's Ambassador in Berlin visited

Turkey, and told journalists that negotiations with Germany were beginning for a new commercial agreement based on a German credit for 30 million L.T. It was abundantly clear that Turkey was not going to be forced into the war unless she was attacked.<sup>9</sup>

The events of the Summer came to Turkey with a great shock. Germany's successes in the Low countries and in Norway were grave enough; but the French collapse in June took the Turks along with the rest of the world by surprise.

On the 8th of June President İnönü was in Thrace visiting troops. Recalled on the 11th after the news of the Italian declaration of war had reached him, a consultation of ministers was held on the 13th about which official secrecy was maintained. On the next day İsmet Pasha and Saraçoğlu received the French and English Ambassadors. The latter requested Turkey's entry into war in fulfilment of Article 2 of the Pact. The Turkish leaders stated that while Turkish policy towards her allies remained unchanged, Turkey would for the moment remain non-belligerent.<sup>10</sup>

A semi-official leader by «Aksam's» editor, Necmeddin Sadak, in the issue of the 17th elucidated Turkey's attitude. He made the following points: (1) Turkey remains faithful to the Anglo-French Treaty but; «what can we do when our geographical position is not the same as that of the great democracies?»; (2) The entry of Turkey into the war would not in fact help the Allies; instead it would only extend the theatre of war to the Balkans and the Near East. (3) Turkey's best policy is to preserve her resources for future use not only on her own behalf but also on behalf of her Allies.<sup>11</sup>

The march of events in June brought about a change of tone throughout the Press circles; a pessimistic cloud of belief in Allied defeat descending upon all the columnists, and leading them to reproach the Allies for their unpreparedness and tactical follies. «Yeni Sabah» alone kept up a pro-Allied tone until the 22nd of June. The French defeat and the English isolation brought about a wave of non-belligerence throughout the country. It was generally realised that the position was full of peril. A number of patriotic speeches were made, and the general tone of the people is well reflected by the utterance of Ceydet Kerim İnçelâli: «We shall pour out our blood only in case our country is attacked».<sup>12</sup> The uncertainty of the time led to an official announcement of the Prime Minister on the 26th June that «Turkey will conserve her present attitude of Non-belligerence». The way was now open for a new road of German diplomacy; and it was generally expected that the Turks would show a change

of face towards the Germans, an augury of this being the abrupt ceasing of criticism of the Germans from quarters which had hitherto been hostile. German pressure was however abruptly checked by an untoward incident.<sup>13</sup> The «Times» correspondent in Istanbul, Mavridi, learnt of meetings that had been taking place in June between Von Papen and Terentiyef—a representative of the Russian Embassy at Terabiye. He learnt too that after long discussions statements had been made to the German news agency and German journalists in Istanbul, while long telegrams had been dispatched to the German chancellery. Mavridi, anxious to learn the content of the talks, arranged through an unnamed neutral correspondent to meet an ex-acquaintance of his, Brell, the Chief of the German News Service and then on a visit to Istanbul. At the party Brell indiscreetly revealed vital information that he had imparted to a group of Axis reporters in the Istanbul Club some days previously. Mavridi claims to have heard the following declarations from Brell:

«Very soon important discussions between Germany and Russia are to take place. These will concern Turkey and specifically the Straits. Russia has a number of demands to make of Turkey... including a base in the Straits. Russia must be compensated, and will only be assuaged in this way. Turkey must not get alarmed over this, as Germany will support her (against Russia). But in order to assure this backing from Germany the Turks must make some concrete demonstrations of friendship and sympathy with Germany. This must begin with the weeding-out of Turkish ministers who are anti-German, starting with the Foreign Minister, Saraçoğlu.»<sup>14</sup>

Mavridi at once acted on this information by getting into touch with Necmeddin Sadak, editor of Aksam, and an influential spokesman of government policy. The affair was then telephoned to the Government in Ankara. Istanbul police Headquarters received prompt instructions to conduct a full enquiry, and—if the German, Brell, had spoken in this tone at the Istanbul club—he was to be arrested and deported within twenty-four hours. Brell persuaded the police that he had made the alleged declarations only in private; and the order for his immediate expulsion was annulled. Nevertheless a state of emergency was declared, and Ankara ordered partial mobilisation.

A few days later, on 12th July, Refik Saydam gave a speech to the National Assembly in which he attacked certain foreign journalists who were seeking to discredit the neutral attitude of Turkey. This reference was to German propaganda, which was



claiming that the Turks had made plans to assist the Allies in an attack on Batum. «Turkey», said the Prime Minister, «will remain faithful to her commitments made to England. Turkey will not bow herself before threat and insult. Turkey», he added, «Kemalist Turkey, is not the Ottoman society of Viziers and Grand Viziers; no longer can ministers be dismissed or promoted at the express desire of foreign governments. Let this be clearly understood everywhere.»<sup>15</sup>

The firm attitude of the Prime Minister somewhat surprised the British Foreign Office who were mortally afraid that the Turks would desert altogether the British Alliance. As the first year of war drew to a close it became clear that the Turks, though disillusioned by Allied military inefficiency, were not prepared in any sense to capitulate to the Axis demands. They maintained their attempts to bolster up Balkan unity until the surrender of Roumania in the autumn. Turkey's two main props, the Anglo-Franco-Alliance, and the Balkan Entente were by September, 1940, both partially dissolved. The autumn of 1940 thus found Turkey in a most critical and exposed position, and subject to an ever-increasing volume of Axis diplomatic pressure.

## II

## PHASE 2

1940 (AUTUMN) TO 1941 (AUTUMN)

The second year of the war was for Turkey a twofold problem, one of maintaining both her neutrality and her full independence of action. The German «Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro's» documents, which had purported to throw discredit upon Turkey's attitude towards Russia, undoubtedly had very grave consequences. After Refik Saydam's indignant speech of July 12th the Turkish newspapers published a number of letters from Massigli to Saracoglu containing a categorical denial of an Anglo-Franco-Turkish plan to attack Batum.<sup>16</sup> Massigli admitted that the Allies had taken precautions for the eventuality of a «defensive war» against Russia in the Caucasus sector; but the German propaganda documents had substituted the word «offensive» for «defensive» thereby turning natural precautions on behalf of the Turks and their allies into a sinister plot against the territorial integrity of Russia. England found it suitable to issue a denial of the whole scheme, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Butler, on the 11th of June disclaiming in the House of Commons any designs upon Caucasus oil; while repeating the fact that England did not wish to see the vital oil supplies from that region going to strengthen the striking power of the German armies; but repudiating strongly the German charge that England had tried to involve Turkey in a war on that front.<sup>17</sup> Notwithstanding these denials Turco-Russian relations were substantially damaged by the false charges of the German white book.

Molotov, speaking on the 1st of August said, «No substantial change has taken place in our relations with Turkey. Nevertheless I must remark that the documents published recently in the German White Book have thrown a special light on some aspects of hidden activity within Turkey.»<sup>18</sup> On the 9th of November, Ali Haydar Aktay, Turkish ambassador in Russia, was to speak of «normally friendly relations with Russia»; but this in no sense represented the actual state of feeling between the neighbouring countries. In fact suspicion had given way to apprehension.

The Turkish press though it had certainly retreated from its previous, strongly anti-Axis tone proved by and large somewhat unwilling to recant towards the victorious Germans and maintained still a somewhat cold attitude towards them during the late Summer and Autumn. There were exceptions to this mode, «Cumhuriyet» publishing occasional faint praise of German strength; and General Erkip, a leading Germanophile, speaking frequently in «Son Posta» of the precariousness of the British Military position, of the value of the Italian conquests in British Somaliland, and of the improvised nature of the British Army. «Tan» welcomed the return of Germany to a share in Turkish commerce, Zekeriya Sertel stating that the new commercial agreement regulated the (previous) abnormality of the situation, but warning: «Turkey must guard against the German tendency to consider the economy of the Balkan countries and of Turkey as integral to German economy. Turkey», he declared, «wishes to defend her own commercial independence along with her political independence».

Throughout September the press was severely critical of Rumania's weakening diplomacy and of King Carol's mistakes. The Italian attack on Greece at the end of the next month further heightened the tension in Turkey; as the Turks had consistently hoped if not expected Italian neutrality. Turkey's continued non-belligerence was forthwith announced by the Foreign Minister. A black-out was imposed in the principal towns; and a temporary

state of siege was declared in Thrace, the Istanbul Vilayet, and in Izmit (the naval base).<sup>19</sup>

Turkey's attitude towards the extended area of hostilities between Italy and Greece was closely appraised by the Axis powers, and Turkey's non-entry into the war was taken to be a very good sign.<sup>20</sup> The Italian declaration of war against France and Britain had failed to bring in the Turks in the Summer. The further aggression against an ex-Ally in the Balkans now failed to persuade the Turks to change their neutral stance. The Allies and friends of Turkey were bound to remark that—allowing for all extenuating circumstances—the Turks had not been found ready to honour either their aid obligations to England or to Greece. Solemn commitments made in both the Anglo-Franco-Turkish and the Balkan Pacts were being overlooked.

From the German point of view then the moment was ripe for full account to be taken of Turkey's attitude and for a reshaping of Turco-Axis relations.

On the 4th November, a meeting took place at Schonhof<sup>21</sup> at which Ribbentrop, Von Papen, and Ciano were present. At this Ribbentrop exposed his plans for firstly an agreement with Russia that would include a joint Straits agreement, the conditions of which were to be made acceptable to the Turks; and secondly, for a strong attempt to sever Turkey's alliance with England and to bind her to close political collaboration with the Axis. « Von Papen—who was present at Schonhof—assured Ribbentrop that the detachment of Turkey from England is a possibility. Furthermore the recent attitude assumed by Turkey when confronted by the Greco-Italian struggle proves that Turkey's links with the Allies are becoming steadily less firm. » The Turks were to be made satisfied with these arrangements by a slight frontier rectification in Thrace, at the expense of Bulgaria. Bulgaria in turn was to be compensated at the expense of Greece by the granting to her of an outlet to the Aegean.

Some ten days later important discussions between Ribbentrop and Molotov began in Berlin at which the question of the Straits was soon raised as a major Russo-German interest.<sup>22</sup> On the 13th Ribbentrop declared: « Germany, Italy, and Japan were agreed that it was in their common interest to release Turkey from her previous ties and to win her progressively to a political collaboration with them. Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union would accord to the Soviet Union the unrestricted right of passage through the Straits for her warships at any time; whereas all the other powers (except the Black Sea countries but including Ger-

many and Italy) would renounce in principle the right of passage through the Straits for their warships. Transit of merchant ships would of course have to remain free in principle. » Ribbentrop concluded: « The German government would welcome it if the Soviet Union were prepared for such collaboration with Italy, Japan, and Germany ». Molotov was evasive but not displeased with these offers at the Straits so favourable to Russian interests; but it was evident that the Germans were offering concessions to Russian interests there in return for unlimited German influence in the Balkans. It was decided that the question of a Straits agreement should be left for clarification in the near future to the German Ambassador in Moscow, Schulenberg and to the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin.

A draft arrangement for the Straits and for a joint policy towards Turkey was forthwith prepared; and its terms were fitted in as a secret protocol in to the proposed Quadrupartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan on the one side, and the Soviet Union on the other.<sup>23</sup> In this protocol Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agreed; (1) to detach Turkey from her existing international commitments and progressively to win her over to political collaboration with themselves; (2) « To conclude at a given time a joint agreement with Turkey, wherein the Three Powers would recognize the extent of Turkey's possessions »; (3) To work in common towards the replacement of the Montreux Straits Convention... by another Convention ». In this last the shipping clauses were to be regulated in Russia's exclusive favour as previously indicated by Ribbentrop to Ciano.

On the 26th November, Schulenberg wired to the German Foreign Ministry<sup>24</sup>: « The Soviet Government is prepared to accept the draft of the Four Power Pact... subject to the following conditions. » These were: (i) German troops were to be withdrawn from Finland; (ii) « The security of the Soviet Union in the Straits » was to be assured « by the conclusion of a mutual assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U. S. S. R. within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease »; (3) « The Area South of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf » was to be recognized « as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union ». In respect of the second condition it was further proposed by Molotov that: « the draft of the protocol... with respect to Turkey should be amended



so as to guarantee a base for light naval and land forces of the U. S. S. R. on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease, including,—in case Turkey declares herself willing to join the Four Power Pact—a guarantee of the independence and of the territory of Turkey by the three countries named ».

Further « This protocol should provide that in case Turkey refuses to join, the Four Powers, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree to work out and to carry through the required military and diplomatic measures ».

Evidently these Russian demands were too excessive to interest the Germans; and in particular the Germans could not afford to concede that Bulgaria lay within the Soviet zone of influence. Hitler, disillusioned with the prospects of an understanding with the Soviets, now began to plan his operation « Barbarossa » for an attack « to crush Russia in a quick campaign even before the conclusion of the war against England ».

The extent to which the Turkish government may have remained in the dark as to the plans being hatched against its territory is a subject for conjecture. Certainly it had received warning of what to expect through the Brel affair. The Turks must have realised too that Russo-German understanding could only be achieved at their own peril. One may therefore surmise that the Turks had a fairly shrewd idea of the nature if not of the exact content of the talks between Molotov and Ribbentrop.

Strong German troop movements were taking place in Rumania and on Jan 7th, 1941, Ribbentrop wrote to Von Papen assuring him that these were only preparatory measures for the forthcoming ejection of the English from Greece, and that they « were not against any Balkan country, including Turkey ». By the middle of the month Russo-German relations were markedly deteriorating. On the 17th Molotov launched a serious complaint: « According to all reports available here », he said, « German troops in great numbers are concentrated in Rumania and are ready to march into Bulgaria with the aim of occupying Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits. There is no doubt that England will try to forestall the operations of the German troops, to occupy the Straits, to open military operations against Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, and to turn Bulgaria into a theatre of war... The Soviet government... would consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the U. S. S. R. »<sup>26</sup>

Ribbentrop's reply to this on the 21st contained the following points. (1) « The Reich government has not received any reports

that England contemplates occupying the Straits; nor does the Reich government believe that Turkey will permit English military forces to enter her territory. » (2) « Germany does not intend to occupy the Straits. She will respect the territory under Turkish sovereignty unless Turkey on her part commits a hostile act against German troops. » (3) The Reich government... has an understanding of the Soviet interest in the Straits question and will withdraw her troops and is prepared to endorse a revision of the Montreux Convention at the right time. Germany... is not politically interested in the Straits question and will withdraw her troops from there after having carried out her operations in the Balkans. »<sup>26</sup>

The rapid worsening of relations with Russia during January led the Germans to formulate a new attitude towards the Turks. On the 19th of the month Ribbentrop told Ciano that the Turks were not to be considered any danger to German expansion in the Balkans. « He (Ribbentrop) does not believe that Turkey can act on a military plane. Her armament situation is too slight for this. On the other hand it would suffice for the Axis to say one little word to Moscow in order to have Turkey wiped off the geographical map. » Hitler too shared the views on Turkey of his foreign minister and he felt no qualms as to Turkish opposition in the Balkans.<sup>27</sup>

The new German policy towards the Turks emerged in the shape of a « peace offensive ». Early in March Hitler sent friendly messages to İnönü, to which the latter gave cordial answer. Goebbels spoke of the friendly feelings nourished by the Germans towards her Ex-ally; while « Dienst aus Deutschland » spoke of Turkey's non-belligerence as being « vigilant and irreproachably correct ». <sup>28</sup>

The month before Sir John Dill had been in Ankara for conversations with the Turkish military leaders and the ensuing communiqué had described « a full agreement on the situation as it touches both countries ». Germany's March feelers towards the Turkish camp were interpreted by the world press simply as a counter-balance to English diplomatic moves; but in reality this German approach had a larger and more concrete aim, that of substituting a German Alliance for a British Alliance.

The extent to which this was thought possible in Germany varied according to the individual views and beliefs of the main personalities concerned with German foreign policy. Hitler thought the Turks quite unreliable as is seen by his scathing criticism of the Turco-German alliance of 1914.<sup>29</sup> Ribbentrop

thought them a vital factor in the German «drang nach Osten»; but felt that they could best be forced into the German camp by a subtle blend of bribery and intimidation. Von Papen—for a variety of reasons—softened down the policy of his home government towards the Turks and repeatedly cautioned Ribbentrop against the taking of extreme measures which would lead Turkey to enter the war on England's side. German policy was thus a great deal more pliable and cautious than it might have been had some other German Ambassador held the Ankara post.

At the end of March Hitler already showed his doubts as to the friendship offensive he had himself launched upon the Turks. Talking to Ciano, he stated: «The adhesion of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact has already had profound repercussions in Turkish circles; but this cannot suffice to create the illusion that Turkey will easily modify her present attitude.» The Turkish links with England were still very strong. Notwithstanding the Führer proposed with extreme prudence to attempt a direct initiative to attract Turkey within the Axis orbit, or at any rate to estrange her from England. He concluded nevertheless that: «It is outside the realm of doubt that any action whatever directed against Turkey would provoke the military reaction of the Ankara government.»<sup>30</sup>

Hitler was well pleased with Turkey's attitude of non-belligerence towards the German attack upon Greece. In April he was toying with the idea of Turkey's providing an alternative route for the Axis through to Egypt. «One must exclude the possibility of pushing through this operation with force», he said to Ciano, «Apart from the resistance of the Turks, which would be considerable, the distances would render perilous and risky any military operation. It would also appear difficult to attract Turkey into the Axis orbit by diplomatic means, at any rate within a short space of time. Difficult, because there are active cliques there most hostile to the Axis who at the time of the war with Yugoslavia meditated a «coup d'Etat» in order to attack Germany; difficult, because one cannot visualize what would be the political reward to be offered to Turkey.»<sup>31</sup>

Hitler gave as his opinion that the Turks would be pleased with the offer of Syria, but opined that this would raise an infinite series of complications in the Arab world.

On the 2nd of May Ali Raschid's rebellion broke out in Irak. This was aimed directly against English control in that country and had been instigated and financed by German military and civilian agents. Turkey's attitude was of pressing importance to

the Germans, and Ribbentrop instructed his Ambassador to try and force on Turkish acquiescence with Axis plans in return for certain promises. On the 14th May Papen was closeted for one hour with the President, and reported to the German chancellery that Turkey was ready to renew 'the old friendly relations with Germany'. Speaking of the contradictions arising from the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, İnönü is reported to have said: «With such allround goodwill a formula can certainly be arrived at». Talks for an alliance between Papen and Saragölu were to begin at once. Concluding his secret report on the interview, Papen said: «The transit of war material towards Irak can... be considered as guaranteed».<sup>32</sup>

Papen's true reasons for this deduction so very favourable to German interests are not at all clear. He must well have known the propensity of the Turkish statesmen for promising in the vaguest terms concessions far greater than they were actually willing to carry out. Papen can hardly have seriously supposed that an hour's talk with the President would inevitably result in very tangible concessions to Germany, concessions too which would have most seriously disrupted Turco-British relations.

Ribbentrop immediately took up Papen's optimistic account of the latter's interview with İnönü and on the 17th sent Papen formal instructions for the form in which he was to endeavour to secure a Turkish treaty. First, there was to be a Treaty of Friendship which was to be represented to the Turks as a German guarantee for the Turks against Russian designs. Simultaneously with the official treaty, another secret agreement was to be signed by which Germany was to have the right of transit without limits of arms, materials of war, and of a «certain contingent of armed forces under a disguised form». As inducement a rectification of the Bulgarian frontier in Thrace and also «one or other of the Aegean Isles» were to be offered.<sup>33</sup>

Two days later Ribbentrop had already been persuaded by Papen to modify somewhat the terms after the other had wired that these were quite impossible to arrange with the Turkish government. Ribbentrop nevertheless continued to insist on a secret clause allowing the immediate dispatch of arms and men across Turkey to Irak. Ribbentrop foresaw that in the near future Germany would want to use Turkish railways on a large scale for dispatch of arms not only to Irak but also to Iran and Afghanistan.

It very soon became evident that the Turks were not willing to be drawn hastily into an alliance. They were not willing to let either German arms or German soldiers in disguise through

their territory; nor were they in a position to refuse a German Alliance. Already on the 7th of May the ancient enemy of the Turks, Lloyd George, had raised his voice in the House of Commons against the Turkish decision to let German troop ships through the Straits in order to occupy the Greek islands. In reply Churchill had stated « Turkey has not a right to stop these ships »; and had referred the elder statesman to a more careful perusal of the clauses of Montreux.<sup>34</sup> This passage of disguised troop ships had stirred Allied opinion against Turkey: the Turks were therefore doubly anxious that they should not be held responsible for enlarging the scope of Ali Raschid's rebellion. They therefore deliberately protracted the negotiations for the treaty, haggling over the wording of the clauses until the fate of Ali Raschid's rebellion was no longer a doubtful issue. On the 2nd of June Ribbentrop remarked bitterly to Ciano: « Von Papen insisted that he could obtain the free transit of arms and forces as well as of men (through Turkey) from the Turkish government; but all this was an illusion on the part of the Ambassador. In reality the Turkish attitude is still reserved and in some respects ambiguous. »<sup>35</sup> By the 9th of June Ribbentrop was growing thoroughly impatient: « The position of the Turks which is illuminated by their attitude is so reserved that the Treaty if it is made conformable to the Turkish draft will be readily emptied of all content by the Turkish press commentators. I must add that—taking into account the present political situation—Turkey's interest in the present conclusion of the treaty is far greater than ours. For this reason the Turkish government would do well to make up its mind definitely and as soon as possible as to whether or not it will accept the treaty proposed by us. »<sup>36</sup>

The Pact was at last ready but not before Ribbentrop had lodged further complaints as to the Turkish attitude. Ribbentrop well understood that the Turks might wish to avoid an open rupture with England; but he did not consider it necessary that the British government should be kept informed of the Turco-German negotiations. On the 13th the Anatolian Agency published a 'démenti' sent from Berlin, stating that whereas foreign journalists had been spreading the rumour that Germany had demanded the passage of troops across Turkish territory, no such request had ever been made. « Such a possibility », said the German agency, « is simply fantastic. Germany has always held for Turkey a particular sympathy stronger than that for any other neutral State. »<sup>37</sup>

The Pact was signed on the 18th, and was a short document

of three clauses; nor was there a secret agreement signed simultaneously as Ribbentrop had wished. Article 1 states: « Germany and Turkey agree to respect reciprocally the integrity and sanctity of the territory of their respective States and not to take any measures that directly or indirectly could be turned against the other Contracting Party. » In Article 2: « Germany and Turkey agree to establish contact in the future over all problems that touch their mutual interests in order to arrive at an understanding over such matters. » Article 3 provided for immediate ratifications. A simultaneous declaration was made that joint consultations for an Economic agreement would be entered into.<sup>38</sup>

There was the expected exchange of congratulatory messages between Hitler and İnönü, Ribbentrop and Saraçoglu. The foreign Minister declared in Ankara: « On the 4th May Hitler gave a speech in the Reichstag about Turkey. He praised our great nationalists and especially our great leader, Atatürk... Hitler knowing well that he was appealing both to our hearts and to our spirits succeeded in kindling the flames of enthusiasm not only amongst Turkish youth but throughout the whole nation. » Von Papen told the Anatolian Agency: « There have been misunderstandings between our two countries due to the political objective of settling a new order of everlasting peace in Europe. This Pact will restore—in the place of our temporarily-disturbed relations—the traditionally sincere and friendly ties that have united our two countries for centuries past. »<sup>39</sup>

Italy attempted to follow suit. On the 18th Ciano saw the Turkish Ambassador and proposed to him a similar Alliance. « We might even go further than the Germans », he said. « for the interests of Italy and Turkey are more closely knit. »<sup>40</sup> The ambassador did not reply, and nothing came of the suggestion; though in July Mussolini spoke to the « camera » in a very friendly tone, stating that « Italy intends to conduct towards the Turks a policy of comprehension and collaboration based on the 1928 accord. »

The Turkish official text<sup>41</sup> is accompanied by a long commentary which acts as an apology for the Treaty. There are three oft-recurring theses; (i) Turco-German comradeship of arms in the first World War; (ii) « The British were kept fully informed of our talks with the Germans »; and (iii) The clauses of the Pact are « all intended to promote peaceful ends ». The commentator states further: German friendship has greatly influenced Turkish culture and Turkish commerce. The present economic crisis due to the war that is now spreading all over the globe, has



of late begun to make its effects felt in Turkey. We have no doubts that the Turco-German pact will assist in the rebalancing and redevelopment of disorganized Turkish trade to a very appreciable extent.)

Four days later the German attack on Russia began; and it was not unnaturally supposed that the Turk's signature of the 18th and the German offensive of the 22nd were not isolated facts. Simultaneously with the new offensive Hitler disclosed the substance of Molotov's suggestions for the Straits in the conversations of the previous November.<sup>42</sup>

The Turks immediately declared their neutrality in the Russo-German conflict. The revelations nevertheless had a very adverse effect upon public opinion. The Prime Minister mentioned these claims upon Turkish soil in a speech on 3rd July, and said: « They have made a profound sensation throughout Turkey ».<sup>43</sup>

German propaganda had certainly timed its Straits revelations well and it was with profound relief that the Turks learnt of the German onslaught on Russia. Nevertheless the German leaders were still very doubtful about the Turkish attitude. Mussolini told Hitler on the 25th of June that: « Turkey continues to follow an oscillating policy between the Axis and England that must be attentively watched. » Hitler agreed with the Duce, but held that Turkey might still be won over with promises of frontier rectifications.<sup>44</sup>

The Turco-German Pact got a mixed reception in the world capitals. The American and Japanese papers merely noted its signature; the English and Russian papers labelled it an Anti-Russian move, while the Axis papers of course showed great pleasure.

Its signature however had rather a bewildering effect upon the English public to whom it appeared that Turkey was swiftly absconding in to the other camp. The matter came up in a debate in the House on July 24th, when Lord Winterton voiced general public opinion by saying that it was high time for the Anglo-Turkish position to be clarified. He said that though he felt a great admiration for the Turks, a race that had overcome enormous difficulties, the time had now passed when such an important and honourable race as the Turks could retain their present (neutral) position. They must finally declare to which faction they belonged. « What an absurd opinion », Mr. Churchill briefly replied. Lord Winterton went on to say that the Turks had just signed a Pact with England's greatest enemy, and « how can she be at the same time the friend of two enemies ? ». Mr. Churchill

then replied: « It is unsuitable to continue in this way a discussion about the general interests (of another country). We must not seek to predict the line of policy of countries undergoing grave difficulties, who do not and who do not wish to clarify their own positions. » On the same day Eden reassured the House. « In this new war », he said, « Turkey has declared her neutrality. Since the Mutual Aid Pact we signed with Turkey in October, 1939, our relations have continued to be on a very special footing. Turkey is our friend and ally. As we were fully informed of the course of negotiations between the Turkish and German governments, the agreement comes to us as no surprise at all. »<sup>45</sup>

England had thus come to give a tacit consent to Turkey's understanding with the Germans; indeed she was hardly in a position to do anything else without running the risk of driving Turkey into the enemy camp. The revived Turco-German relations were expressed mainly in trade. Already by May, 1941, Germany had returned to her original place as foremost importer of Turkish goods. Commercial talks went on during the Summer; a trade mission headed by Dr. Claudius came to Ankara in September, and an agreement was signed the following month by which Germany was to hasten on previously agreed-upon despatches of war material on receipt of which the Turks were to dispatch much-needed consignments of chrome as well as fats, provisions, cotton, tobacco, and olive oil.<sup>46</sup> The Germans undertook all transport themselves at their own expense. This last concession was of great importance for the Turks, as, in their trade dealings with England, transport had formed one of the major difficulties to be overcome.

The trade agreement led to strong rumours of further agreements to follow and the spreading of reports that Germany was putting strong pressure on the Turks. On the 8th October a joint Turco-German declaration was made denying this report, and at the same time refuting the suggestion of the Allied press that the Germans were massing troops on the Bulgarian frontier with a view to attacking Turkey.<sup>47</sup>

The end of the second phase of war found the Turks balanced — rather less hazardously than in 1940 — between the warring factions. The defeat of Greece, the overthrow of Bulgaria and Roumania, the Axis successes in the desert; these had all made some agreement with Germany vitally necessary. Turkey had no wish to suffer the heroic misery of the Greek people. Her will to fight was intact but only in dire extremity and in order to resist attack.

Her leaders had taken the only step possible to promote her chances of neutrality by electing to enter into cautious agreement with the Germans. The motive of national safety was seconded by the need of the German market. So cautious however had Turkey's turn towards the Axis been that the Allies, instead of despairing of the Turkish Alliance, were inclined to redouble their efforts to keep Turkey at least in a state of 'benevolent neutrality' towards them.

The German attack on Russia introduced new elements into the war. Before those new developments the Turks retired into an ever firmer neutral position from which to watch the tide of events.

### III

#### PHASE 3

1942 (AUTUMN) TO 1945 (JUNE)

The rapid and sensational victories of the Germans in Russia forced the Turks to foresee the possibility of a total Russian collapse. In October General Ali Fuat from the Turkish General Staff visited the German front lines in Russia. While he was in Germany he had an interview with Hitler and returned to report to his military colleagues that the fall of Russia appeared to be imminent.<sup>48</sup>

Such an eventuality would have put Turco-German relations upon an entirely different footing. Turkey would have been flanked by the German army not only in Bulgaria and Greece but in the Caucasus in which circumstances some more stable 'modus vivendi' would have had to be found in order to assure the Turks of their territorial integrity.

As early as the beginning of August preliminary hints were dropped by Turkish statesmen in Berlin to the effect that an independent Turco-Mongol state could well be formed in the Caucasus. On the 5th of August Von Papen sent his government a memorandum explaining the complexities of the situation and listing important Turkish personalities who might be useful to Germany in the event of the Pan-Turanian revival taking on any serious importance in the future. On the same day Gerede saw Weiszaecker in Berlin and hinted to him that Baku was a town where the language was Turco-Mongol; and that the Turkish government was interested in the political future of these Turco-Mongols.

Papen proposed to his government the formation of puppet governments in the Crimea, the 'gauleiters' of which would be Tartars.<sup>49</sup> This, he claimed, would sensibly affect Turkish policy toward the Germans. Papen was anxious to coordinate all the assorted cliques inside Turkey with which he might maintain useful contacts, and amongst these figured the remnants of the old «Islam ordu» (The army of Islam), which had been the generating force of the Pan-Islamic sentiment in the days of the Sultanate. Von Papen however from the tone of his dispatches seems to have regarded these 'old guard' as rather a rabble in whose aspirations and influence little trust could be placed.<sup>50</sup> His aim was to gain backing for his scheme in the very highest Turkish government quarters.

In the army—a force as potent in Turkish as in German affairs—he could count on one staunchly pro-German propagandist, General Erkilet, who would clearly seem to have been in German pay, and who was on terms of the closest friendship and collaboration with the German agent, Hentig. The generals Ali Fuat, Asim Gündüz, and Chief of General staff, Fevzi Cakmak, also appear to have been «personally interested in the highest degree by the question», though they were not permitted to back it officially.<sup>51</sup>

In November, 1941, two Crimean Turks were sent off by Erkilet to Germany «charged to aid the Germans in the Crimea and at the same time to serve the cause of the Turco-Mongols of the Crimea». In December the Germans were pleased with the progress of propaganda made by General Erkilet, tolerated by the government and destined to awake an interest amongst the peoples of Turco-Mongol origin. Wehrmann wrote enthusiastically «This shows in what direction the Turkish government is inclined or in what direction it may allow itself to be inclined». He adds: «Participation in the war against Russia... would be very popular in the army and in many sections of the population».

In spite of this optimism on the part of the German Foreign office, Turkish overtures had only been thrown out to cover the eventuality, seen as a probability by General Ali Fuat, of the German army sweeping forward from the Crimea to the shores of the Caspian and southwards down to the Caucasus. The slowing-up of the offensive caused Turkish politicians to retire once more into most cautious statements about the Russian war.

There were furthermore numerous other factors that were swaying the minds of Turkish leaders at the beginning of the year 1942. Of these we find an excellent summary in Von Papen's

« Tour of the Political Horizon », a lengthy despatch dated 5th, January, 1942.

« The enlargement of the theatre of operations », he reported, « both due to the explosion of the Americo-Japanese conflict and due to the declaration of war against the Axis powers by the United States, has provoked here an immediate sentiment of profound deception. As I have told you on many occasions the Turkish government had hopes of a compromise between the British Empire and the Axis countries, a compromise which according to them was still possible as America had not decisively passed to the adverse side. Now all these possibilities are closed up. As a result of these developments, Turkey reiterates and repeats her unchanged desire to keep out of hostilities and to refuse to let herself be drawn into the struggle for any interests which do not directly concern Turkey. »

The entente between the Anglo-American and the Russian blocs has given a new turn to Turkish opinion, he states. Turkey's real interests are linked up with the outcome of the Russo-German war. « The fact that England, as is clear, has decided to establish in Europe a New Order with the aid of Bolshevik Russia appears a considerable blow. It is impossible to imagine that a civilised State like England, which more than any other Continental State, ought to employ all its forces to fight for the maintenance of principles established through thousands of years, can take these plans seriously. This declaration of England is considered as a measure of propaganda in the aim of sustaining by every means Soviet Russia's resistance.

According to Turkish opinion only America amongst the participants of the Anglo-American bloc would appear to be invincible. The Axis Countries would as a consequence have been able to turn the issues of war to their sole advantage in inflicting a defeat upon the British Empire. Such a total defeat does not coincide with Turkey's interests... for the interest of Turkey is in the maintenance of an equilibrium of forces in the Mediterranean and not in the total predominance of Italy, which would be the possible consequence of a complete victory of the Axis.

Another possibility would be the complete victory of the Anglo-American bloc with the aid of Soviet Russia. According to Turkish opinion this would signify the total collapse of Europe; neither England nor the U.S.A. would be in a position to stop the territorial expansion of the Russians or to preserve from Bolshevism an Europe that was starving, impoverished, and exhausted by war. »

The writer deduced from these observations that Turkey's main interest was still in seeing the war end in some sort of compromise; but again he gave his government the warning that any « attempt to force the Turks to declare their exact position prematurely would inevitably cause Turkey to pass to the enemy allegiance ». <sup>52</sup>

In a recent interview with İnönü the latter had frequently declared that Turkey was closely interested in the total destruction of the Russian colossus and had pointed out to the German Ambassador that Turkish neutrality was more advantageous to the Axis than to the Allies. If Turkey was England's ally, the British fleet would be sustaining the Russian flank in the Black Sea and a convenient way for the defence of the Caucasus would have been found.

Papen's conclusions were hardly optimistic for the Germans. « The faith of the Turkish Government in the victory of German arms is not extinguished. But it is feared that if the conflict be prolonged, a great weakening and exhaustion of strength will take place, which will render the final result doubtful... »

« The modification of Turkish foreign policy towards the advantage of one or other party will be the consequence of the ulterior development of the military situation. » <sup>53</sup>

Several events in the new year tended to incline Turkey more towards the German Alliance. Firstly there was the marked success of Axis arms, the victories of Rommel in Africa and of the Japanese in the Far East. These had a disastrous effect upon the prestige of British arms. Secondly there was extreme Turkish alarm at the Moscow conversations and great nervousness as to what the Russians and English might have discussed in relation to Turkish affairs.

Knatchbull-Hugessen, who had himself attended the Moscow talks, attempted to counteract Turkish fears by a declaration to the Ankara Press that Turkey would have nothing to fear from a victory of Great Britain and of her Allies. This attitude was further confirmed by the reports to his government of the Turkish ambassador in Moscow. Early in February however Turkish fears were revived by the wording of one of Sir Stafford Cripps' speeches in which he called on England to maintain strict and close collaboration with Russia. A third factor to damage Russian and indirectly Anglo-American prestige in Ankara was the bomb outrage of 24th February in which a second attempt was made to kill Von Papen. The subsequent political rumours were somewhat diluted by the findings of the trial, which established the



complicity of a group of Bolsheviks from Uskup in Jugoslavia, several of whom had recently assumed Turkish nationality. Though Russian plotting was clearly established as the motive, and though one of the principal witnesses stated that the chief aim of the assassination was to have caused a diplomatic incident between Turkey and Germany, yet in the prevailing anti-Russian mood of the Turks, the Allies of the Soviets were also held to be clearly inculpated. In February too sinkings of unarmed Turkish merchant ships and barges began in the Black Sea<sup>54</sup>. The Turkish censored press announced these as coming from unknown quarters; but there was no doubt that the aggressors were Russian.

The prevailing anti-Allied mood of the Turks led to initiatives from the Foreign Minister, Menemencioglu, to improve and to 'enlarge the scope' of Turco-German relations, «without in this way complicating the relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union, and without rendering her relations with the Allies more precarious».<sup>55</sup>

Menemencioglu spoke to Von Papen in a somewhat deprecating way of «Lease-and-Lend», which Allied system had lately been applied in Turkey's favour. In December 1941, America had lodged a complaint against Britain's dispatch of Lease-and-Lend material to the Turks and receipt of food etcetera in return. In the New Year Washington changed its tone and announced that the Turks were eligible to receive aid under this scheme.

The Turkish Foreign Minister complained to Papen that the efficacy of Lease-and-Lend supplies depended on rapid transport, and that the Allies' transport arrangements were in a parlous condition. Because of this state of affairs, the Foreign Minister proposed to Papen the renewal of the Funk credit agreement, which had not been ratified and therefore not carried into effect. This credit amount would be used by the Turkish government for the import of war material from Germany. Papen replied that «the transport of war goods would have to be compensated by some political equivalent» on the part of the Turks.<sup>56</sup>

This initiative on the part of the Turkish foreign ministry did not prosper. A memorandum from Will to Ribbentrop of 17th March makes it perfectly clear that the Germans had no intentions of hurrying up the dispatch of important war material to Turkey. By the Claudius contract of 9th October, 1941, Germany had undertaken to supply 20 cannon and 100,000 shells. Will admits that Krupps was originally instructed to delay deliveries of these until after 15th January, 1943; but stated that on Von Papen's urgent request for dispatch, «there was no need to hold up» the

same any longer. The German High Command took a different view and cancelled its delivery.<sup>57</sup>

In spring the renewed German offensive led to the renewal of the Pan-Turanian scheme on a more realistic footing. In May General Mursel-Baku informed Papen on behalf of General Fevzi Cakmak that there were a great number of Circassian and Azerbaijan officers in the Turkish army, and that should operations develop favourably for the Germans, the Turkish army would give these officers leave.<sup>58</sup> In March Russia had occupied Azerbaijan and her troops had advanced further to occupy parts of Northern Persia, which event had increased the Turkish interest in German schemes for the conquest of these areas.

The Summer months saw the Turks anxiously watching the war situation, and taking all possible precautions to meet the possibility of a total Russian overthrow. This preoccupation took the form of close talks with the Germans over plans for the future government of the Crimea and Caucasus regions. Throughout the Summer Papen was in constant communication with Menemencioglu, the new Foreign Minister, and with Saraçoglu, now President of the Council. These two did their best to give the German Ambassador the firm impression that Turkey's neutrality was still only a temporary phase, and that a German victory over Russia would produce an entirely new situation. A Turkish agent in Germany, Dr. Garun, went much further and, claiming to be the mouthpiece of General Fevzi Cakmak, stated that the latter believed that «Turkish entry into the war was only a question of time, and would take place when the Turkish Army had sufficient armaments». This agent gave high hopes of the Pan-Turanian movement, and said that it had already assumed an important role in Turkey.<sup>59</sup>

Undoubtedly German hopes were being most extravagantly fed. By August it had become clear that Turco-German collaboration in the Crimea was impossible. In the first place Rosenberg had made fixed plans for governing the Crimea solely through the agency of a German commissariat.<sup>60</sup> Few emigré agents were used at all; with the result that a number of these Crimean Turks insisted on returning to Turkey where they spread disquieting stories of German rule. The scheme was misfiring badly, and the Turks were again taking up a very cautious attitude. The returning emigrés made matters worse by insisting that the Germans had no intentions of giving autonomy to countries with a Turco-Mongol minority; but that they only wanted to create states under the police control of Germany.<sup>61</sup>

Turkish relations with the Allies during the Summer continued to be impaired by the strongly pro-Russian tone of the Anglo-American Press. The wave of enthusiasm felt by the Western countries for the heroic resistance of the Russians had caused a counter-wave of fear of Anglo-American intentions throughout the Turkish people. Statements made in the democratic press were seized upon and their import magnified to gigantic proportions. An American statement that Russia would have full liberty of passage in the Straits was interpreted as meaning a secret agreement to supplant Montreux. In September the publication by an American Professor of Geography of a map of post-war Europe that excluded Turkish Thrace was taken up with extreme acrimony by the entire Turkish press.<sup>62</sup> If the Allied cause had become somewhat unpopular with the Turks through the temporary fusing of Anglo-American and Russian interests, yet Allied propaganda lost no chance of pointing out to the Turks that Russia was so far weakened that she represented no threat to Turkey, whereas victorious German armies on both of Turkey's northern fronts would represent a very real threat of partial encirclement.

The Turks fully realized the danger of a total German victory. Von Papen himself was able to ascertain this from the attitude of Menemencioglu.<sup>63</sup> The reinforcement of the Allied positions and the halting of the German armies at Stalingrad put an effective end to the abortive Pan-Turanian scheme. On September 12th, Ribbentrop sent Von Papen instructions to drop the whole scheme, he personally declaring himself completely disillusioned by the continued negative attitude of the Turks.<sup>64</sup> On the 9th Zeiler, the German Consul-General in Istanbul, complained of increased American pressure on the Turks, and suggested that the Turks «had been leading us by the nose... and they are now making advances to our enemies in the hope of obtaining a maximum of war materials».<sup>65</sup>

The fortunes of war changed in September 1942 with the check of the German armies at Stalingrad and the decisive defeat of Rommel at El-Alamein. From 1939 up to this time Turkish policy, though consistently neutral, had followed regular pendular movements to and away from one Alliance to the other side. After three years of war the impetus of the pendulum stroke had considerably weakened. Turkey was settling down to a grim and unwavering policy of non-belligerence.

## PHASE 4

SEPTEMBER, 1942 TO AUGUST, 1944

After El-Alamein and Stalingrad strict neutrality was very much the order of the day in Turkey; and to preserve this attitude the Turks had adopted certain drastic measures considerably affecting and inconveniencing the life of the community at large.

In the first place the Turks maintained partially mobilised an army of nearly one million men which proved an ever-increasing strain on the national budget. This expenditure had to be met by measures which in their turn led to an expansion of the note issue. Military secrecy was strengthened by continuance of 'the state of emergency' order in Thrace and the screening off of large portions of the country into military areas.

A strict censorship had been imposed on the Press; and as the war continued Turkish comment on world affairs grew more and more colourless and truly neutral, most papers confining themselves in the way of war news to retailing the communiqués from the rival belligerents. This censorship of news did not prevent the Turkish authorities from authorizing a certain amount of propaganda being undertaken by both the Allies and the Axis. The International Fair of Izmir became during the war years a keen field of competition between the two war factions to display to the Turks the high standards of production efficiency still existing in spite of the war. «Signal» for the Axis and «Réalité» and «Cephe» for the Allies were sold in the towns and gave a partisan approach to the war to Turkish readers. A semi-official body of lecturers and teachers, the «British Council», was allowed to begin work in a number of Turkish towns from 1941 onwards, though its personnel were obliged to work under the surveillance of the Turkish Ministry of Education and to carry out their working programmes mainly in the Turkish Halkevi's (People's houses).<sup>66</sup>

One main prop of Turkey's neutrality was undoubtedly her unpreparedness for a modern war. Both factions shrunk from the responsibility of incurring responsibility for an ally which would be difficult to feed and through whose country it would be enormously difficult to send munitions and men in haste. This realisation began to weigh more and more with the general staffs as they gave consideration to the reports of their military per-

sonnel serving in Turkey.<sup>67</sup> 1943 saw the intensification of the supply rivalry between the Axis and the Anglo-American Bloc. The German delay in sending the war supplies agreed upon in the Claudius and other contracts played to a certain extent into Allied hands, as it allowed the Middle-East command to divert large stocks of war material for despatch to the Turkish supply centres. The reason behind the German delay had obviously been the thought that Turkey was not a vital enough factor to justify the sidetracking of war material needed on other fronts.<sup>68</sup>

From 1942 onwards however the Middle East Command set about the job of reequipping and modernising the Turkish Army and Air Force. In attempting to effect this the Middle-East supply centre had at their disposal only second-best and often antiquated war equipment. The material handed over to the Turks was generally the material that was not wanted on any active fronts. In spite of this the Turks were glad to take what they could get, making frequent protest to the British Military authorities as to the inadequate steps being taken to turn Turkey into an effective ally. Lease-and-Lend to Turkey was not wholly an abortive programme, for it involved a considerable strengthening of the Turkish Air Units; the building of a series of new aerodromes vital to future Turkish strategy both in defence and offence; and the construction of a number of good roads where simple tracks only had existed before.<sup>69</sup> The new armour being sent into the country involved the dispatch of British experts to collaborate with the Turkish military. The opinion of these was unanimously that Turkey was in no state of preparation to fight a modern war. The full collaboration between the Allied instructors and the Turkish forces was often most difficult to achieve. Although the Germans complained of the close collaboration of the Turks with the British military,<sup>70</sup> this was hardly the case. Firstly the Turkish army was used to German methods, and many of its senior officers were frankly and openly anti-British, this rendering the carrying-out of training schemes most awkward. Secondly the attitude of the British personnel was not always above reproach; many individual instructors having been used to service conditions in Egypt where the locals were generally treated by the English troops with scant ceremony. These factors tended to produce a good deal of friction and even to isolated incidents.<sup>71</sup>

The Middle Eastern command was not supplying the Turks with arms without an ulterior objective, this being according to Churchill's plan an invasion of the Balkans via Turkish Thrace.

The logical prelude to this method of invading Europe was a wresting from German hands of the Dodecanese and Aegean Islands. The Summer of 1943 brought to most Turks a conviction that their country was shortly going to be forced to commit itself to participation in the Allied cause. Lease-and-Lend was pouring into the country at an ever-increasing pace. In June the Turkish Prime Minister once more reiterated Turkey's neutrality; but this was generally feared dubious after Churchill's visit to Adana. Churchill had come to see İnönü and Menemencioglu to put over personally the English plan for the invasion of Europe, and to represent the part that Turkey was to play. Churchill's personal prestige was enormously high in Turkey, and the January visit had created a wave of interest and sympathy towards England similar to that expressed in October 1939 by the ultra-enthusiastic Press of Istanbul and Ankara. There had been nevertheless no sign of a radical change of Turkish foreign policy.<sup>72</sup>

It seems that Turkey promised a radical change of policy in the event of the Allies clearing the Axis out of the Aegean. The Turks however were still unwilling to commit themselves to the Allied cause, arguing firstly that they had no interest in an attack on Bulgaria with whom their relations were non-committally friendly; and secondly that the country was still unprepared for war.<sup>73</sup> The Turks had all the year been coming in for increasingly stiff criticism from the Allies for the chrome supplies with which they were furnishing Germany. The Turkish journalists launched a vigorous apology for their government's policy, reasoning somewhat obtusely that since they were receiving arms in return the transaction was by and large in the Allies' favour; and rather more logically that the Allies had not wanted to buy the total chrome output at Turkish prices so that the Turkish government was acting fairly in disposing of the remainder to the Germans. During 1943 Turkey supplied the German High Command with 46,000 tons of Chrome, an amount considerably below that fixed upon, but considerable enough for the Russians still to charge the Turks with conducting a neutral policy that was favouring the Germans.

In actual fact this neutrality was being stretched very far towards tacit acquiescence with Allied plans. Allied contact with the Islands was maintained from bases in the Izmir region, and the Turkish government allowed the British secret service to go its own way provided that the Turkish government's position was in no way compromised.

The operations launched by the Middle-Eastern command in



early November were obviously intended to finally lever the Turks into the war. The facilities which the British military had already received led their leaders to count on tacit Turkish support including the vital use of Turkish airfields. A plan had been prepared by which the R. A. F. were to fly planes to take over certain strip-airfields strategically placed for an attack on the Islands. The Plan was never brought into operation due to the Turkish leaders' insistence that Turkey was still not ready for war, that granting of aerodrome facilities to the Allies would be unneutral and would provoke German reprisals including the severe bombing of the civilian population.

Lack of air support caused the Eastern Command to lose the whole campaign. This would have been mitigated by the capture of the aerodrome on Rhodes. It would also have been avoided by the use of Turkish soil; though the official British excuse for failure was the surrender of the Italian garrisons to the Germans.<sup>74</sup>

The failure of the operation was a local fiasco for the Allies, and turned back the Turks to neutrality just at a time when they really seemed prepared to take the plunge in favour of the Allies. Official recriminations were for the time avoided, and İnönü and Menemçioğlu were cordially invited down to Cairo to confer with the Allied leaders. Long talks took place, Turkish neutrality was finally agreed upon; this representing not so much a triumph of Turkish immobility as a victory for the American grand strategy over the British conception.

This, according to an American source, was «Winston's last effort to force an allied attack from the south, from the Mediterranean».<sup>75</sup> If it was, the Foreign Office still did not abandon the project of an Allied attack through Thrace.

One of the difficulties of the Western Allies at the Cairo conference was to reconcile the hostile points of view of Russia and Turkey. Stalin insisted that if Turkey was not to be forced into the war, no more supplies should henceforth be sent. To this the Anglo-Americans agreed in principle. After the conference a guarded joint communiqué was issued stressing the unity of views and announcing Turkey's non-entry. This was greeted with considerable enthusiasm by the Turks, and in Ankara it was felt that once again İnönü had won his way.

From the Turkish point of view there was little to choose between the Axis and the Western Allies knit closely to a Russian programme. The Turkish people were genuinely neutral in the conflict and a forced entry into the war would have been un-

popular throughout all classes.<sup>76</sup> After Cairo there were rumours of a forthcoming Turco-Russian understanding; but hostility was too intense to allow the fruition of any such project. There was also a rumour that Turkey was trying to persuade the Bulgarians to break with the Axis and to make a separate peace with the Allies.<sup>77</sup>

Extreme caution had got Turkey past the hazards of the year 1943 but new dangers were looming ahead. The Turks had refrained from severe anti-Russian expressions; and they even took certain steps to mollify Russian antagonism, the chief of which was to hold a trial of prominent Pan-Turanians in Ankara, which dragged on through the Summer months of 1944. The Turkish government had never publicly associated itself with the aims of the movement; it was therefore easy for it to discredit such an ideal. It was however obvious to all in Ankara that the real ring-leaders of the movement were being screened, whilst their less-influential collaborators received very light sentences; the High Court treating them more as misguided patriots than as dangerous criminals.<sup>78</sup>

Though at Cairo the end of Lease-and-Lend to Turkey had been agreed upon, deliveries did not actually cease until March when the Allies announced that they were discontinuing these due to Turkey's failure to fulfil the military terms of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish agreement. The Turks promptly replied to this stating that the failure of Britain to send 500 tanks and 300 planes that were promised had alone been the motive of Turkey's non-entry. At the same time Menemçioğlu told the Press that Turkey would preserve her alliance with Britain, and the Cairo newspapers stated that Turkey was quite willing to declare war if given «large volumes of war material».<sup>79</sup>

The Turkish appetite for arms and more arms was proving insatiable and a mood of impatience swept over the Allies. The Turks at this juncture were in mortal danger of being too obtuse and of losing the friendship of Britain which—based though it was on selfish interests—was more sincere than any link attaching the Turks to any other powerful nation. Palliatives were badly needed. The actual date on which Lend-Lease deliveries were scheduled to end was April 1st. On April 9th Mr. Hall followed up this Allied move by calling on the neutral countries to stop trading with Germany. On the 20th Saracoglu announced that Turkey would stop deliveries of chrome to Germany and made the remarkable statement that; «according to our Pact with Great Britain we are not neutrals. It is therefore necessary for us to

consider the Allies' note as being not to a neutral, but to an Ally of the British and the Allies». <sup>80</sup>

There was clearly disagreement among the Turkish statesmen as to how far the Allies might need soothing. Menemencioglu confined himself to the vaguest remarks about collaboration with the Allies. It was felt that some more clear reconciliation with England was desirable. The Allied press had shown satisfaction over the Turkish cessation of chrome deliveries; in June however a further irritation arose when England complained about the passage through the Straits of German warships. Bevin was later to admit that Turkey had fulfilled her role at the Straits perfectly well; but to assert that she had chosen to interpret the shipping clauses of Montreux in a way different from that of the Foreign Office. <sup>81</sup> Annex II of Montreux had been unpardonably vague about the distinction between war and peace-vessels, and the Turks had deemed it wisest to interpret these clauses in their most liberal sense. <sup>82</sup>

Menemencioglu was accused of being too pro-German not only by the Allied Press but also by influential Turks. On June 15th he resigned and Saraçoglu became once again Foreign Minister.

The opening of the second front was watched with feverish excitement by the Turks. Its gradual but steady success resolved all doubts of an Allied victory. There was again talk of a front in Thrace. In July the Russians sunk more Turkish merchant shipping in the Black Sea and all mercantile services had to be suspended. On August the Ist Turkish ships in Bulgarian and Roumanian ports were ordered home, and on the next day Turkey severed diplomatic relations with the Axis. Emergency measures were taken to meet the possibility of Axis Air attacks; though as the Germans were fast evacuating the Islands and Greece the danger of reprisals was slight. Other measures were taken to please the Allies such as the suppression of «Türkische Post», an Axis-supported newspaper, and the freeing of Von Papen's assailants who had been sentenced to life imprisonment. <sup>83</sup>

The last Winter of the war was passed in the full expectation that Spring would bring a compromise between the Anglo-Americans and the Germans. The piece-meal caving in of the Balkan countries before Russia filled Turkey with dire foreboding which was only slightly alleviated by the Allied reoccupation of Greece. The forthcoming annihilation of Germany was looked on with regret. Despairing German propaganda calling on the civilised world to unite against the menace of Bolshevism sounded

to Turkish ears as the plain warning of truth. The Russian danger, of which the Foreign Office had always been aware through the opinions of their experts, had now been overruled by their mightier Allies. This danger had been the most clear political reality for the Turks since October 1939. It was therefore hard for the Turks now to believe that the Anglo-American policy could not include a dictated peace to a Germany which should nevertheless be allowed to save her honour and to hold her Eastern frontier intact against the Russian hordes. Von Rundstedt's offensive gave rise to hopes of such a culmination to the war.

In Spring, Turkey along with other neutrals was unceremoniously jostled into the war, the decision having been taken at Yalta. The Turks took their entry in a wry humour, publishing the full communiqué and explaining minutely why it was necessary for Turkey formally to declare war against the Axis, so that the Turks should be able to play a constructive part in the peace.

A sneaking sympathy for the German army that the combined forces of America, Russia, and Great Britain were finding it so hard to defeat had expressed itself in August 1944 when crowds had come to Sirkeci station to bid goodbye to the German colony. This sentiment had grown stronger by the Spring of 1945 when it was becoming clear to the Turks that the Western Allies had made no clear plans for stopping the Russian advance.

Turkey's belated entry into war came as a complete anticlimax. The possible front in Bulgaria had already capitulated. The Allied victory of D Day was received with hardly any rejoicing, the Turkish people seeming to realise that in spite of the dangers almost miraculously surmounted, the position of Turkey was still perilous. The real issue, that of Russia, remained looming darkly through the mists of the future.

## V TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE-EASTERN COUNTRIES (1939-1945)

Turkish neutrality was of supreme importance to the other Middle-Eastern states. As gateway to the Middle-East the other states followed the fluctuation of her foreign policy with great

concern, realising that the spreading of the war area to Turkey would not only tend to involve the whole geographical area of the Middle-East in the world struggle, but would allow foreign propagandists to revive the ancient feuds between differing sects and states.

Axis propaganda from the outset aimed at fostering the old issues that had long prevented mutual friendly relations; thus Ankara was informed that a German victory would mean the return of Mosul, and simultaneously Baghdad was told that Germany would give full protection against the 'expansionist' aims of the Turks.<sup>84</sup> This German attempt to set the Middle-Eastern races once again at each other's throats was highly displeasing to Turkey who, while not placing much faith in Middle-Eastern Unity after the example of the disintegration of the Balkan Bloc, nevertheless aimed at the maintenance of good relations between the Middle-Eastern nations as far as the uncertainty of war conditions would allow.

The collapse of France and the querulous position existing thereafter in Syria brought the war to Turkey's southern border. On the 18th of June the Turkish Cabinet held a secret discussion upon the Syrian situation, but no communiqué was published. A policy of extreme caution was adopted and on the confused situation in Syria the Turks declined to comment. Iran expressed her satisfaction with the Turkish declaration of neutrality in regard to the Syrian problem.

After the fall of France, with the Axis practically in control in Syria, and with Axis propaganda and influence steadily increasing in the other Middle-Eastern countries, Turkey was in severe danger of being entirely encircled by Axis-controlled countries.

Irak however was still mainly under British influence, and for the Turks a direct result of the Syrian débacle was the great increase of rail traffic on the Haydarpasha-Baghdad line, Turkey having now to rely on most of her oil supply from this quarter.<sup>85</sup>

After the fall of France direct pressure was brought on Turkey to allow the passage of men and munitions through her territory. Turkey's consistent refusal to allow this was certainly a severe check for German influence in the Middle-East, and conversely a major defence of Allied interests. The Turkish government was well-informed of the activities of German agents in Iran and Iraq.<sup>86</sup>

The crisis came in the spring of 1941 when Hitler along with his campaign to win Turkish friendship also discussed the possi-

bilities of an attack through Turkey as another road to the Suez Canal. The project was rejected as being too arduous and involving too long distances. Ali Raschid's rebellion in Iraq brought the question of Turkish cooperation to a head. The obvious means of supplying the rebels was through Turkey. In spite of Von Papen's optimism nothing in the way of transit permission was forthcoming, and the Axis had missed a golden opportunity through Turkish procrastination. Undoubtedly the Turks ran great risks in refusing the German's demands; moreover their Press declared itself in very cold terms against the Iraq rebels. The firm attitude of the Turks in May, softened externally as it was by offers of a Pact with Germany, localized the nature of the Iraq rebellion and prevented Ali Raschid and his German collaborators from getting the assistance they needed for success.

The Saadabad Treaty caused some measure of joint-action amongst its signatories, periodical conferences of representatives continuing to take place during the war years. The invasion of Iran in early 1942, legalised as it was by a Russo-Anglo-Persian agreement, caused most cautious comment. The Saadabad signatories duly conferred upon the situation; but no decisions were announced. Posthumously when the war was safely ended the Turks were to declare themselves in the strongest terms outraged by the cynical imperialist policy put on foot by England and Russia in their neighbour's territory.<sup>87</sup> At the time however the Turkish press kept a dark silence on the subject; though it was known that the Turkish government was highly alarmed at the Russian march into Azerbaijan and Northern Persia.

After 1942 Turkey's contacts with her neighbours were largely limited to the basis of trade. Commercial relations with Palestine took on a mounting importance; with Egypt too the Turkish government attempted to promote a more lively exchange of commodities. Turkish exporters were paid a 40% premium for goods exported to that country, the nature of the exchange being chiefly from Turkey to Egypt fruit of all kinds, salted fish, olive oil, and charcoal. Egypt sent in return cotton thread, skins, hemp, jute, and coffee. The 1941 campaign in Syria had entirely disrupted Turkish trade with and through Syria; after the Syrian settlement however an even flow of trade took place, the Turks exporting a number of cattle. The main Turkish channel of commercial exchange was through Basra, the extent to which this could be increased being however severely limited by the inadequacy of the Middle-Eastern railway systems and the general shortage of rolling-stock. Trade with India also assumed some



importance, and the Turks sent a trade mission to that country in 1941.<sup>88</sup>

If generally speaking relations between Turkey and her neighbours showed, with the exception of trade, a marked tendency to fall off from the close cordiality and cooperation of 1936 to 1939 this was only natural in view of the secondary importance of these relations to the countries concerned. Subject to the direct or indirect pressure of rival imperialist policies, in which their national survival again became the principal object to secure, it was understandable that the Middle-Eastern countries should revert to the semi-isolation of a previous era under the constant threat of war.

## VI

## CONCLUSIONS

The luckiest of all the neutrals, Turkey wound her way through a series of almost continuous crises and periods of tension to a belated and purely formal declaration of war on Germany and Japan in the Spring of 1945. The sometimes bewildering changes of front and view that Turkish statesmen indulged in led outside observers to condone Turkey's policy as hesitating and vacillating. The attitude of the Turks towards the belligerents underwent certain clearly-definable phases; in the first—between October 1939 and June 1940—the young national state put itself openly at the disposition of England and France on the express understanding that these two countries would between them equip their Ally with modern armour, and render her in every way serviceable for the rigorous demands of modern warfare. The inability of the western Allies to help the Turks materially led to a gradual spirit of disillusionment towards the former. Disenchantment changed to disavowal after the fall of France. The Turks, interested mainly in their own salvation, were then willing to be wooed away from the English alliance.

They were not—however—willing to be ordered away; and in this respect German diplomacy blundered strangely. German attempts to force the pace and to apply direct pressure on Turkey were useless. After June 1940 the diplomatic initiative in Turkey passed into the hands of the Axis; but their politicians handled affairs clumsily, and not until the Summer of 1941 were the Germans able to draw the Turks into any series of written

commitments. By this time England had had time to check pro-German tendencies in Irak and Syria; the opportunity for widespread defection against the Allies had been allowed to lapse.

In that second phase from July, 1940, to September, 1941, the Germans were curiously unsuccessful in their dealings with Turkey. Attempting a blend of blandishment and blackmail they were yet unable to bring over Turkey into anything more tangible than a non-aggression Pact and a commercial agreement, the clauses of which were heavily in Turkey's favour.

The third phase—roughly from late 1941 to late 1942—saw Turkey delicately poised between the two counteracting alliances. The Turks repeatedly emphasised that in their opinion the Anglo-Franco-Turkish 1939 treaty was still valid; though in reality they had not stood by its clauses over both of the Italian attacks on France and on Greece. Nevertheless, the treaty was still operative. At the same time Turkey had taken on a pledge of non-aggression towards Germany.

The failure of the Germans to take Stalingrad led to a further retreat of Turkish policy. The Russians were thenceforth to be more feared than the Germans. The Turks retired into an unshakeable neutrality, their journalists hiding the aims of their government behind reams of aimless verbiage. The thrust-back of the Russian sledgehammer struck a chill into Turkish hearts; a revived Russia being their last desire. In spite of the neutrality of their press it became clear that an Allied victory—if it meant also a Russian victory—would be highly unpopular. Nevertheless the logic of events drove the Turks steadily if unwillingly into the Allied camp; though the British attempt to draw the Turks into war in 1943 was manifestly unsuccessful. Her final entry along with other neutrals who wished to secure a place in the United Nations was agreed upon at the Teheran conference, nevertheless the date and occasion not being clearly specified, the Turks were so successful in postponing the evil day that their rupture of relations with the Axis in August, 1944, brought no reprisals, and their declaration of war in the following spring brought no obligations upon their armies. The bloodless and battleless war that they had fought appealed to the somewhat sardonic vein of humour which the Turks possess. All the belligerents had worked to involve the Turkish army in the forefront of the fray and to draw the Turks into the general morass of warfare, but in vain.

In opposing this tendency the Turks had demonstrated one fundamental desire, that of neutrality. This idea had been a constant factor over-ruling all other considerations. The ideologies

of the West were unreal conceptions for a small state striving to consolidate its own limited aims. The structure of the Turkish state—in spite of its Westernization—had retained sufficient elements of autocracy for a large portion of the educated classes to feel sympathy for the efficiency and realism of the Third Reich; whereas, on the other hand, the political aspirations of more idealistic politicians leaned entirely towards the models of Western Europe. The Turkish intelligentsia was therefore fairly evenly split between sympathisers of the Allied and of the Axis cause. A slight preponderance of pro-Allied feeling that existed in 1939 and 1940 was counterbalanced by the unpopular Alliance that the Anglo-Americans made with Russia.

The ideals of Turkish foreign policy, expressed in the form of collective security for small nations, withered away before the impact of mightier forces. The Balkan and Saadabad Pacts when put to the test proved cardboard protection to the East-European and Middle-Eastern states. The Turkish statesmen were thrown back upon their own resourcefulness; and upon the determination to resist of the people.

Undoubtedly the sense of national unity and the consistently strong morale of the Turks contributed as leading factors to their salvation from the stern ordeal of invasion. Otherwise without strong leaders and cool heads the Turks could hardly have avoided embroilment during the course of these five critical years.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### POST-WAR POLICY

1945 (JUNE) TO 1948

#### I

### TURKEY'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT

The end of the war brought to Turkey little but the voicing of severe discontent which had hitherto been obliged to remain silent. Press censorship was abolished, and the leading journalists proceeded to level severe accusations against their colleagues for the political views that they had expressed during the conflict. Many voices were raised against the autocratic sway of the People's Party and against the impossibility of expressing criticism of the existing régime in a legal form. Demands were formulated that Turkey should show herself before the world as in fact being a democracy. The war, it was generally agreed, had forced the Turks to delay their march towards progress and enlightenment; it was now time for long over-due constitutional reforms. This was the gist of popular opinion as expressed throughout the newspapers during the Summer of 1945. The two main reforms sought for were the legalisation of an opposition party and the Passing of a new Election Bill which should allow full and unrestricted equality in the elections to the opposition party. Without these two innovations Turkey could not claim to place herself amongst progressive and democratic countries. Moreover without bridging the gulf between an autocratic and a democratic régime, the Turks could not expect to play their part in the new commonwealth of nations mapped out in the Atlantic Charter. Such were the views of Turkey's leading journalists and politicians, many members of the People's Party also joining in the general hue-and-cry for radical constitutional changes.

Much of the popular discontent with the People's party resulted from its total inability to check the upward spiral of the cost-of-living. This had begun to rise in 1940 due to the

severance of Turkey's normal trade contacts with Germany, Austria, and the Axis-controlled countries. Through the vicissitudes of war the Turkish people had been ever and again promised relief from the mounting burdens of increased taxes and costs. These promises had been palpably unrealisable. The cost of living had risen with a depressing steadiness until in 1945 it stood at between 400-600 % of pre-war rates.

Salaried workers had been offered no rises or allowances; and extreme hardship had thereby been caused to these classes, the results of this being visible in general mal-nutrition throughout many stratas of society. Cases of tuberculosis had enormously increased in number in the towns; and serious outbreaks of other diseases originating mainly from poverty and poor living conditions had taken place during the war years. The existing poor relief and charity organisations had proved to be on a totally inadequate scale to cope with the widespread conditions of poverty. Fortunately the peasantry had escaped the deprivations of the war years; and the villagers had even been able to make great profits from selling their produce at enormously high prices in the urban markets. In the towns there was much discontent with the People's Party and a fairly widespread belief that any change which might lead to a breaking-up of the Black market and a cleaning-up of monopoly racketeering would be in the common interest.

The dissatisfaction was thus both of a constitutional and of an economic kind: it was too in part psychological. For four years the public had been exposed to the more or less constant threat of warfare. The general focus of attention had been upon the war situation; and criticism of the home-régime had been tempered by the conviction that the government was steering the safest course through the dangers. The relaxation of external danger now brought the Turks to a full realisation of their unfortunate economic plight.

Added to these internal difficulties was the coolness felt by Turkey's potential allies towards that small and now unprotected country. There was a general feeling that Turkey had escaped the horrors of warfare only by playing a somewhat too dexterous role. Turkey had not fulfilled her military obligations towards Great Britain and Greece; it now appeared problematic as to whether the former would come to the support of Turkey in the event of the Eastern power being involved in a conflict with Russia.

The danger of war with Russia was in every Turk's mind; whereas the Western Allies had not yet sensed the real danger

from that quarter. Thus the Autumn and winter of 1945 found the Turks in a position both exposed and dangerously isolated.

The mood of national nervousness was well exemplified by Ismet Pasha's speech on the opening of the National Assembly. He devoted this to a lengthy and extremely well-reasoned defence of the Turkish attitude step-by-step throughout the changing phases of the late war. The President made the following points:

(i) Turkey had throughout the war been absolutely faithful to her commitments to Great Britain, but in Syria she had been obliged to reserve an attitude of complete neutrality in a dispute that concerned her co-Allies, England and France. (ii) Turkey had had to accept the German Pact in 1941 as a « means of passing through critical times ». (iii) Turkish troop concentrations along the Black Sea coasts had been designed to repulse possible German attacks, and had never been aimed against Russia. (iv) The eventual entry of the Turks into the war had taken place at the express request of the Allies; and the move must therefore have held some importance for the Allies. (v) The Turks had consistently proved correct guardians of the Straits; and had faithfully observed the clauses of the Montreux international agreement.<sup>1</sup>

This defensive speech concluded with the warning that, « we shall not give up any Turkish territory or territorial rights. We shall live and die as honourable men. »

The advance of the Russian armies deep into Europe, and especially the presence of Red divisions in Bulgaria had given rise to general rumours of the renewal of Russian claims to certain areas in Eastern Turkey, and of revived Russian ambitions at the Straits. It will be recalled that in 1939 Molotov had denied that his country had asked for the restoration of Kars and Ardahan. Persistent rumours were now circulating that along with a radical revision of Montreux in the Russian favour, the Soviet Union had determined to pursue other territorial demands. The probability of such a turn of events was increased by the consistently unfriendly tone towards the Turks adopted by Moscow Radio, and by the Russian satellite broadcasting stations.

At Potsdam the Big Four had agreed in principle upon a revision of the Montreux agreement.<sup>2</sup> In November the U.S.A. sent a friendly note to Turkey inviting the latter to take part in a proposed international conference for the purpose of a Straits Revision agreement. On December 6th Turkey accepted this proposal; but in the meantime an internal incident had taken place in Istanbul which had brought the late Russo-Turkish hostility to a head.



The Communist Party in Turkey had been banned ever since the earliest days of the Republic; this had not prevented the existence of underground pro-Russian groups. During the Summer of 1945 «Tan» had begun to publish a number of articles slightly leftist in tone and highly critical of the Ankara régime. In the prevailing mood of nervousness, these attacks upon the government were denounced by the party organs as veiled Communist propaganda. On December the 4th a riot of University students was planned during which the printing presses of «Tan» and «Yeni Dünya» besides a number of shops which sold Russian books were wrecked. The police made no serious effort to interfere with the spoliation of the rioters; on the other hand a cordon of police was formed round the Russian Embassy and Consulate to prevent any damage to official Soviet property. The riot was so arranged that no Russian property was damaged, or Russian subject maltreated or even inconvenienced. Furthermore no direct references against Russia were made during the course of the riot, which later turned into a manifestation of patriotic solidarity when the students rounded off activities by placing a wreath before the statue of Atatürk.<sup>3</sup> The Turkish public was delighted with this mode of dealing with hostile propaganda; the day after the trial the owners of «Tan», Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, were arrested and charged with libellous articles against the government. During the trial it became clear from insinuations of the prosecuting counsel that these two well-known journalists were also strongly suspected of having received funds for their propaganda work from abroad.<sup>4</sup>

The riot led to indignant protests from Moscow to which the Turks replied that the affair had possessed a purely internal significance. On the day after the riot the Minister of National Defence had declared that the offenders against public order would be severely punished. This declaration had however been somewhat spoilt by the simultaneous publication of the opinions of various deputies that the newspaper proprietors had only received their just due.

The riot was a carefully planned political gesture, one of reckless defiance towards the Russians. On the very day that it took place Celal Bayer, an ex-Prime Minister and a highly-esteemed political personage, was conferring with the president in Ankara with a view to the establishment of a respectable opposition party.<sup>5</sup>

The day following the social upheavals Turkey replied to the American note, accepting the formula of Straits Revision as long

as this was to take place at an international conference. A few days later Ankara announced the formation of an opposition Democratic party; nevertheless the tone of criticism had been considerably quietened down by the drastic treatment meted out to the supposedly pro-Russian sections of the Press.

Russian retaliation took the form of tangible territorial claims. On the 20th the Moscow newspapers printed an extract from a Tiflis newspaper, claiming Ardahan, Artvin, Trabzon, and Gümüşhane. Simultaneous claims to territory were launched by émigré Armenian associations, who revived the 1918 aspirations to a greater Armenia. A démarche was made by the Russian embassy in Istanbul informing all Armenians in Turkey that they could be repatriated to Russian Armenia. A group of about five hundred actually inscribed with the Russian Embassy, thus causing a wave of indignation in Turkey, firstly against the Armenian colony, and secondly against the Russians. The position of the Armenian community was severely compromised by this foreign interference; and prominent Armenians hastened to make public declarations which should clarify the situation. The following is typical of a number of «démenti» that were published in January, 1946.<sup>6</sup>

«Since the inauguration of the Turkish Republican Régime and the coming of Atatürk every Turkish Armenian has been able to enjoy the same rights as a Turkish citizen. He has enjoyed the full security and liberty accorded to the citizens of democratic régimes, and thereby has benefitted from far greater liberty than that accorded to the Armenians of Erivan.»<sup>7</sup>

The start of 1946 was very black for the Turks. The Transcaucasian Soviet Republics were encouraged by the Soviets to stake every conceivable demand for areas of Eastern Turkey. The Turkish Press at first launched into an indignant denial of these claims, January being a most nervous month. On the 22nd Saracoglu was obliged to declare: «Even deprived of foreign aid, Turkey will not hesitate to fight».<sup>8</sup> The Press calmed down as the wave of claims grew ever more fantastic ridiculing instead the so-called Russian war of nerves.

April brought the American battleship «Missouri» on an official visit to Istanbul. The great warmth of the reception given to the ship and to the crew was mainly due to the acute sense of national peril that had invaded all classes of Turkish society since the end of Germany's resistance.

Admiral Hewitt paid a visit to Ankara and conveyed a message to the President of American goodwill. The actual details of their conversation remain unpublished, and it is uncertain to what

extent the Turkish President was made to believe in the backing of the Americans in case of a military emergency. The visit of the United States naval squadron—normal as had been courtesy visits to Istanbul before the war—was the first that had taken place since the Allied victory.<sup>9</sup> It was a much-needed reminder to the Turks that though England was « hors de combat » due to her home internal difficulties, help against aggression was possible from another quarter.

An immediate result of the new and important trend in Turco-American relations was the granting of a 500 million dollar credit repayable in twenty years. This did a lot to restore general confidence in Ankara where the programme of one of the new parties of opposition that had been allowed to spring up—the « Milli Kalkinma » (National Reform)—had included an axing of nine-tenths of the standing army so as to reduce the crushing army budget.<sup>10</sup> American financial support lent an entirely different face to the situation. Discreet references had more than once been made as to the necessity of the Turk's establishing a compromise with Moscow unless they were able to find Western support. This—in view of America's and Britain's continued and growing difficulties with the Russians—now appeared to be if not directly forthcoming at any rate just round the corner.

In the same month, May, it was announced that seven aerodromes were to be built in the country by American technicians; it was also announced by Congress that a 4½ Million Dollar payment would—on a cash basis—be acceptable as full payment for Turkey's Lease-and-Lend material. This generous action brought forth a remark by a leading financier, Nurullah Sumer that « The interest of the American business and financial world towards our country is steadily growing ».<sup>11</sup>

In spite of this tendency for the U. S. A. to play an increasing part in Turkish affairs, no agreement of any sort between the two countries had been announced; while Great Britain for her part had made it definitely known that she was no longer in a position to give further financial or military backing. Throughout the world press a general account was taken of the tight and exposed strategic position in which the Turks had been placed by the forward thrust of Red arms. The inability of the People's Party leaders to arrest the upward trend of costs also called forth gloomy prognostications. The general conclusion was that the Turks must find some way of both defending themselves from foreign pressure and at the same time of cutting down their military budgets. « The policy of armed neutrality has spared the Turks the ravages

of war, but it will deprive them of the advantages of victory », concluded one writer.<sup>12</sup>

Turkey's economic problems were firstly the high prices which were crippling her export chances, and secondly the lack of dollars and sterling for exchange. Her regular market, Germany, was completely debarred to her; little success was achieved in efforts to increase the commercial relations with the Soviet-controlled countries. With one or two countries Turkish merchants were able to increase appreciably the trade flow, notably with Palestine, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia, but the extent of these improvements did little to fill the vital gap caused to Turkish commerce by the eclipse of Germany and Austria. The English press now and again talked of increasing trade with the Turks; but the practical difficulties in intertrade continued to prevent any such development.

The supplanting of England's prominent position in Turkey was reflected not only in the frequent references to the U. S. A. in political declarations but also in the trade statistics. Prior to 1945 Turkey had imported very little from America though she had been coming to rely more and more upon U. S. A. markets for the placing of her raw materials. In 1945 and thereafter trade both ways began to receive an increasing importance and in this year America supplanted Great Britain as Turkey's best customer.<sup>13</sup>

The economic crisis through which Turkey was passing tended to emphasise the political struggle which was being waged throughout the year. The opposition, consisting of the « Democratic Party » and the « National reform » party had been legalised in the early new year, and had launched forth on election programmes. In pursuit of their aims these two opposition parties constantly came up against regulations incompatible with freedom of speech and freedom of election. The first round of contest with the long established People's Party saw an opposition victory by which the People's party conceded to change the election law.

In Spring municipal elections were held and the Democrats gained a number of seats though mainly in the towns. In June amidst mounting excitement Ismet Inönü went on an election-creeper tour throughout the country prior to the all-important Legislative elections. Visiting the East he gave speeches at Kars and Erzerum urging on the people a proper respect for the twin principles of freedom of speech and of national integrity. « The future and the life of the nation », he stated at Kars, « are intimately bound up with every morsel of our territory ».<sup>14</sup>

National integrity and national honour were the platform



slogans that gave the People's Party success along with a calculated system of intimidation in the villages of Anatolia where the whole village was often coerced into voting in the same way. A significant result was the high number of seats that the Democrats won in Istanbul and Izmir.

The Soviet Union had probably hoped to gain much benefit from the political dissension within Turkey, though the opposition parties had from the first made it clear that absolute unanimity existed with the Ankara régime over foreign policy. Nevertheless the return to power of the People's Party and the formation of a right-wing reactionary cabinet under the leadership of Recep Peker caused them to renew the 'war of nerves'.

Russia abruptly took up the Straits question with Turkey in a note of August 7th, which denounced the Montreux Treaty as having been violated and made redundant by the Turks in the course of the war. Some such action had been expected since Russia's failure to renew the agreement in July. The Russians advanced specific dates and details of German and Italian ships that had, according to them, passed through the Straits during the war in contravention to the clauses of Montreux.

Because of these alleged violations by the Turks they proposed a new Régime for the Straits based upon the following points: (i) freedom of passage through the Straits for merchant ships of all nations at all times; (ii) the establishment of a new convention to be worked out by Black Sea powers only acting in concert; (iii) A joint Turco-Russian system of defence at the Straits.<sup>15</sup>

To this note the Americans were the first to reply. They submitted that the future of the Straits was an international question in which all countries were vitally interested; the Straits régime could only be revised at an international gathering. They denied the validity of any bilateral agreements or other restricted understandings over this waterway, their note being entirely in accordance with Truman's declaration on international waterways made after Potsdam. The American emphasis on the international character of the Straits received general endorsement from the Western press.<sup>16</sup>

On August the 22nd the Turks replied to the Russian note. They gave firstly specific answers against the charges of certain illegal passages of Axis shipping through the Straits. While they admitted that some of the ships that the Axis had passed through as merchant ships had indeed been put to belligerent use by Germany and Italy; yet they claimed that this camouflaging of peace ships was made palpably easy by the vague definitions given

as to what constituted ships of war in the Montreux agreement. Turkey, as guardian of the straits, had no powers to stop the passage of merchant vessels in war time. She therefore claimed that the Axis ships had obtained transit permission on false pretences. On representations being made to the Turkish government by Great Britain further camouflaged passage of the Straits by warships had, the Turks claimed, been prevented.

Bevin fully supported the Turkish claim to have upheld the clauses of Montreux. «The British government», stated the English Foreign Minister, «although it had some difference of opinion with the Turkish government about the interpretation of the Convention held that on the whole its (Montreux's) terms had been conscientiously observed.»<sup>17</sup>

As was to be expected Turkey rejected the idea of both a Black Sea convention limited to Black-Sea powers only, and also refused the proposed Turco-Soviet system of joint defence. The exchange of notes between Russia and Turkey continued, the Russians enumerating further cases of supposed violation of the Convention and the Turks replying in ever-increasing detail to each separate charge.<sup>18</sup>

The fundamental difference of opinion between the Great Powers over the future of the Straits had however clearly emerged in the first exchange of notes. The Russians referring back to Article V of the Turco-Russian Pact of 1921 under the guise of the doctrine, 'The Black Sea for the Black Sea powers', were aiming at a 'mare clausum', the entrance of which would be jealously guarded by a Black Sea Confederation of States.

In this same confederation the Turks would have but one vote; as a consequence their pro-Western views would be in a continual minority, and sooner or later their will would be bent to the total dependence on Moscow as that of the other Black Sea satellites.

The international view as voiced by America and seconded by Great Britain was for the continuance of a special régime at the Straits to be agreed upon by the signatories of Montreux. One point of unanimity existed between the two theses, a revision of the Montreux convention was necessary. It was further understood that any new régime would include the principle of freedom of passage of merchant ships both in peace and war. Apart from these two points the rival theses were completely opposed.

During August the open attempt of the Russians to force Turkey within her own diplomatic sphere of influence caused widespread fears as to a renewal of the ancient conflict at the



Straits with America facing up to play the role formerly adopted by Great Britain. The weak position of Turkey was everywhere commented upon. To take one sample from a number of articles on Turkey's weakness that appeared in August and September; the «Journal de Genève» of August the 16th contained an article by M. Stelling-Michaud which sought to analyse the infirmities of the position. The writer attributed Turkey's existing difficulties firstly to a Russian preponderance in the Balkans, secondly to the presence of the Red army in Bulgaria; thirdly to the penetration of Russian troops into Azerbaijan; fourthly he spoke of the dangers of autonomist and revisionist movements in Anatolia.<sup>19</sup> The first three of these were obvious dangers to the strategic position of the Turks. The fourth was hardly such a danger as the outside world seemed to suppose. From 1942 the Turkish army had engaged in sporadic frays with certain mountainous Kurdish tribes who were supposed to be receiving assistance from the Russians. These Kurds however engaged in nothing more than petty banditry and were at no period of the war or post-war the slightest measure of concern to the central government. As for the Armenians, Russian propaganda had achieved little success. The Turks had granted Exit visas to those members of the community that wished to return to Russia, and the government had stated expressly that all Armenians were free to leave; nevertheless the vast majority had chosen to stay in Turkey rather than to settle in Armenia.

Unquestionably Turkey's general position was extremely bad; and the Turks were obliged to make appeals to the Western powers for material help. In answer to the Russian claim for bases on the Straits, the Americans strengthened their Mediterranean fleet. The new Army chief, General Salih Omurtak, declared: «Our strengthened army is ready to do its duty with honour»; and the Prime Minister decided that: «Demobilisation would be dangerous until the present critical conditions shall be modified».<sup>20</sup>

The instantaneous reaction of world opinion against the Russian claims, and in particular the general solidarity of views as to the Straits expressed by America, England, and Turkey led the Russians to drop further direct methods of intimidation towards Turkey. In August and early September they had launched abusive attacks on the Turks, and had published secret documents from the German archives implicating important Turkish leaders in the late Pan-Turanian project. In the late autumn the tone and volume of these attacks died down. Nevertheless the situation in Turkey remained uncertain and anxious.

## AMERICAN AID

Western writers had frequently alluded to Turkey as 'the backbone of the Middle-East', and Mr. Bevin had referred to that country in such terms in one of his speeches, while Turkish journalists had also adopted the phrase.<sup>21</sup>

In March 1947 there came the sudden action of President Truman launching a large-scale appeal for help to Greece and Turkey. This took the world by surprise but it was in fact the logical outcome of recent diplomacy. The British government had informed Washington and Ankara that owing to its own difficulties no further economic aid could be expected. The Turks had addressed a direct appeal to the U. S. A. for help.

President Truman put the case simply before Congress: «The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of congress. The foreign policy and the national security of the country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation which I wish to present to you concerns Greece and Turkey...<sup>22</sup> The circumstances in which Turkey finds herself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece, and during the war the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless Turkey still needs our aid.

Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernisation necessary for the maintenance of her national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East... As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance she needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. The President then warned Congress of the inevitable results to be expected if help was refused to these two countries.

«If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbour, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.»

He therefore asked Congress for an aid grant of 400 million dollars for assistance to the two, over a period ending on June 30, 1948. Congress was further asked to «authorize the detail

of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey at the request of those countries; to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished». Authorization was also wanted for the «instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel».

In conclusion President Truman reminded Congress that the sum under consideration represented 'little more than one tenth of one percent' of the 341 thousand million dollars spent by the U.S.A. government during the second World War.

Acting Secretary Acheson made a very similar declaration before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 20th; but in several respects he was more explicit about the position of the Turks as seen by Washington.

Speaking of the Turkish economic crisis he said, «Today the Turkish economy is no longer able to carry the full load required for its national defence and at the same time proceed with that economic development which is necessary to keep the country in a sound condition. With some help from the United States and further assistance which Turkey may be able to negotiate with United Nations financial organs, Turkey should be in a position to continue the development of her own resources and increase her productivity, while at the same time maintaining her national defences at a level necessary to protect her freedom and independence.»<sup>23</sup>

Acheson made it clear that the Greek and Turkish governments had made repeated requests for American assistance on their own initiative and that therefore the proposed American aid could not justly be interpreted as in any respect interference. He moreover emphasised that the U.S.A. would be following her own policy in Greece and the Middle East and would not be «assuming British obligations or underwriting British policy there or elsewhere». Aid was not to be continued longer than it was «needed or wanted by those countries».

A number of questions about the Aid programme were put by members of the Senate committee on Foreign Relations, the nature of these revealing a certain reluctance amongst senators for responsibilities to be undertaken by Washington unless these were fundamentally inescapable. The following points emerged from these discussions: (I) America was not to send troops to Turkey; instead only a small military mission charged with instruction of the Turks and supervision of new equipment was to be dispatched. (II) The emergency could not be met by the

United Nations as this organisation would in any case, 'have eventually to turn primarily to the United States for funds and supplies and technical assistance'. (III) Great Britain could not be persuaded to continue aid to the Turks even if she were subsidised in the task by the U.S.A. (IV) No immediate extension of aid to the Middle-Eastern states was as yet projected, but future appeals to the U.S.A. would be considered on their own merits, every case being judged separately. (V) None of the £ 100 million dollars scheduled for Turkey was to be used for 'Normal civilian purposes', it was all 'to be expended for purposes which will contribute to the security of Turkey'.<sup>24</sup>

The Aid programme found its way through congress, and the granting of the proposed sums undoubtedly had an immediate stabilising effect upon the two countries. However whereas in Greece the funds had to be used for staunching the wounds of civil war and for repairing the damage of the World War, in Turkey the 100 million dollars aid could be used for prevention of evils rather than for their cure: it was thus immediately and remarkably effective. The strain was taken off the national budget; the nation breathed freely again.

One result of American support was to increase the intensity of local politics. The Ankara régime, now assured that its army bills would be paid by Washington, felt thankful for deliverance from the fears of a general national bankruptcy; while the opposition felt that as Democrats their cause would prosper because of Turkey's reliance upon the United States.

The Prime Minister, Recep Peker, considered himself strong enough to attempt to suppress the opposition. In spite of devaluation and American military aid, the administration of which he was the head, had failed entirely to alleviate the economic distress prevailing throughout the towns. Slight salary-scale rises for civil servants had done little or nothing to improve the situation of this hard-hit class, whose relative importance in Turkish society was very great in a country containing such a small upper strata of intellectuals.

Peker failed to oust the Democrats in the autumn; and as a consequence his government fell due to a sharp split in the ranks of the People's Party itself. Hasan Saka was entrusted with the formation of a cabinet, and a general reshuffle occurred in the People's Party hierarchy. The Democrat Party meanwhile had suffered from dissensions within its own ranks. Celal Bayar, an able speaker, having been unable to contain dissentient voices within his own ranks, had begun to lose some of his early support.

ters; nevertheless « Vatan » served a useful purpose in focussing criticism upon the People's Party, for whom a too-long period of unchallenged domination over the countries's affairs, had led to serious corruption and abuse of power. In this way opposition served a useful function.

The external effect of Washington's initiative was the clear alignment of the Turks on the side of the Western powers. In the spring of 1948 the conclusion of a military Pact between Russia and Finland led some observers to suppose that a similar arrangement might be imposed by the Soviet on her southern neighbour.<sup>25</sup> It was suggested that it would be simple for the Turks and Russians to revive the 1921 friendship pact denounced in 1946. The Turks however showed no such inclinations. The new foreign Minister, Necmeddin Sadak, made it abundantly clear that Turkey's foreign policy remained unchanged, with a dependence on twin lines of support, American machines and material, and English friendship. The decreasing power of Great Britain in Middle Eastern affairs had since 1946 come to be generally deplored by the Turks, demonstrating how far Turkish conceptions had moved from those held at the Lausanne treaty. In the eclipse of Great Britain's power America now became the chief friend and support of the Turkish people.

American goods were being imported in increasing quantities, American officers were entertained, and were allowed to see something of the interior of Anatolia. More to the point even Turkish officers were dispatched to train in larger and larger batches to the U.S.A. The Turks, who had survived a French, a German, and finally an English period of influence now cheerfully embarked upon a further 'flirtation', 1947 and 1948 witnessing steady deliveries of tanks, planes, and heavy machinery.

The first report on Aid to Turkey was issued in February 1948. Of the 100 million dollars, nearly half had gone direct to army expenditure; the Air Force had received 27 million, the Navy 14½ million; while of the remaining 10 million half had been expended on a Road construction programme and half on development of factories.<sup>26</sup>

The report showed controlled optimism and envisaged further grants. « If Turkey can both resist foreign domination and also achieve the other aims of the aid programme, the dollars given by America will have been well spent. »<sup>27</sup>

The Turks backed by an army with the newest equipment were once again supremely confident of meeting the Russian menace. One writer in January, 1948, felt it necessary to warn

the Turks that 'It's a long way to Texas'.<sup>28</sup> He complained that American aid was going to the Turkish army's head, and that young officers were talking of « a future in which they can defend their country with fleets of bombing planes, able to leave air fields in Eastern Turkey to strike South Russian industrial centres ». In February the Turks, impatient with the protracted absence of a Russian ambassador in Ankara, replied in kind by withdrawing theirs from Moscow.

This action showed Turkey's determination to world opinion which had hitherto been somewhat sceptical as to the ability of that country to escape from an ignominious compromise with Russia. It placed Turkey firmly on the side of the West. American armed might was in the background, but the Turks believed in the capacity of their own forces to hold up the Russian armies for a very long time. The role of « Backbone of the Middle East » had been accepted in exchange for American subsidisation; the continuation of this role was therefore dependent upon the continuation of the aid.

« Alliance with Great Britain and close friendship and collaboration with the United States are keynotes of Turkish policy. »<sup>29</sup> This is the existing attitude of the Turks as repeated on numerous occasions. This attitude is the firm basis for existing policy towards all other states; but an overall dependence on the U.S.A. has had important effects upon the Turkish attitude towards her neighbours. In present circumstances the idea of a Balkan Bloc in which Turkey would again play a leading role is obviously impractical. The Saadabad experiment moreover can hardly be held to have been a great success. It is therefore perhaps natural that the Turkish attitude towards her neighbours has become since 1946 rather non-committal and even according to her critics isolationist. There has been no decrease of friendly exchanges of view and compliment between Turkey and her neighbours; only Turkish statesmen have shown small interest in the idea of any closer collaboration between the Middle-Eastern states.

As regards Palestine in particular the Turks have retained the strictest silence. Whilst individually the Turks undoubtedly sympathize with the Arabs, it is against Turkish interests to oppose the will of the U.S.A. in that troubled land. Moreover trade connections are assuming a growing importance between Turkey and Palestine.

American Aid to Turkey has not been without its critics. Many of these have raised their voice in Turkish newspapers. The Turkish Assembly was forced to approve the American Aid



agreements in executive session which prevented the exact terms being known. Yeni Sabah thereupon accused the U.S.A. of imposing terms which «infringed upon Turkish sovereignty and encroached upon Turkey's financial and judicial independence».<sup>30</sup> A later article attacked the government for conducting secret negotiations leading to «economic and commercial encirclement of Turkey». It blamed the U.S.A. for imposing «harsh and tragic terms» upon the Turks. The editor as usual got into trouble and equally normal a temporary suspension of «Yeni Sabah» was ordered by the government. The Turkish press also showed a sensitivity to not infrequent criticisms of Turkish life and politics that appeared in American periodicals.<sup>31</sup> However such paper incidents were rare reactions against the rather monotonous eulogy of everything American that was the daily reading fare of the Turkish public.

In spite of the undoubted success of American aid and the additional voting of funds in 1948 for a period to expire in 1950; in spite too of the fact that the Turks have actually already received material that cost the U.S. about one billion dollars and that has been rated down as surplus stuff at 10 cents to the dollar,<sup>32</sup> yet still there are grave doubts in Turkish minds as to the exact role of Turkey in a western defence scheme. The Turks are naturally reluctant to visualize the martyrdom of invasion unless there is virtual certainty of powerful Allies coming swiftly to their assistance. The strategic exposedness of the country is fully recognized by the high command and it is highly unlikely that the Turks—in the event of a Russian attack from Bulgaria—would even attempt anything more serious than a delaying action in Thrace. Istanbul would thus have to be abandoned to the enemy in the first few weeks of war. The Eastern front is relatively safe. The new American armour has facilitated the Turkish army's job in this area. A further vital factor in Anatolia has been the wide-scale construction of main arterial roads in an area hitherto crossed by stony tortuous tracks. Even heavy Russian forces would have the utmost difficulty in establishing a break-through in the mountain passes along the Georgian and Armenian frontiers.

The Americans would appear clearly to wish to use the Turkish army as a delaying force in the event of war. They see the Turks as effectively blocking the Russian road to Middle Eastern oil fields and to the Suez Canal.<sup>33</sup> The Turks can hardly be content with this role unless it includes plans for the definite and successful defence of the major part of Anatolia.

The problem has thus been posed of Turkey's real place in the Western military plan. The spring of 1948 witnessed Greco-Turk talks as to the possibility of a military Alliance to which it was guessed Italy might be asked to join.<sup>34</sup> This would have caused a return to the 1928 diplomacy of those three powers who had in that year created a system of regional security in the Eastern Mediterranean. The spring talks between Sadak and Soupholis were not conclusive as the Turks had no interest in binding themselves to a country still in the grip of civil war. In the autumn too Turkish statesmen took part in discussions in Paris with the statesmen of eleven other countries concerning a «Middle East Bloc» project. Such a regional group if it ever achieves formation would still represent no security guarantee for the Turks as all the potential participants are in a far weaker military condition than that of the Turks themselves.<sup>35</sup>

Throughout 1948 Turkish opinion rested content with the welcome feeling of security brought by American aid. Now however there are signs of real discontent with events and of sharper criticism of Necmeddin Sadak's policy. The signature of the Atlantic Pact followed by the inclusion of Italy into its framework seems to the suspicious Turkish mind to preclude an abandonment of the defence of Turkish soil. Necmeddin Sadak has explained to his critics that Washington and London have informed him that the Pact will be limited geographically to Atlantic countries.<sup>36</sup>

This announcement caused general dismay. One well-known writer, Peyami Safa, has even taken the Allies attitude as a pretext for suggesting an immediate loosening of present ties and a speedy arrangement with Russia. «We have been excluded», argues the writer, «from the Charter of European solidarity. Thus has our freedom of action been restored to us; and this is an important fact which in the case of a general conflagration might well avert the conflict from Turkish soil. According to the new strategic conceptions of the Allies, is Turkey now held to be less exposed to danger than Norway? We are now free agents in our foreign policy, and a measure of understanding on the part of our neighbours would give to this policy even more suppleness. We may suppose that any new enemy would manifest the same respect as did the Nazis towards our army and would leave us alone.»<sup>37</sup>

This article was all the more surprising in that it appeared in «Ulus», the official party organ. It raised a general outcry against the writer, and the editor of «Ulus» was obliged to point out that the article had expressed simply a personal view and

not that of official circles. A periodical scare in the Turkish press has in the past brought useful results; and it would here appear most plausible that this provoking article was nothing if not deliberate policy to remind the Allies that Ankara and the Turkish nation must be courteously handled.

The definite objective of Turkey is to secure adherence to the Pact, the foreign minister having recently declared his opinion firmly in favour of Turkey's entry. General Smuts has paved the way by speaking strongly in favour of Turkish inclusion. « We Turks », said the Foreign Minister a short time ago. « possess no mania for pacts; but we do firmly believe that in order to safeguard peace we must be allowed to participate in the system of western defence. We nevertheless thank the United States for their military aid. »<sup>38</sup>

The adherence of Turkey and Greece to the Atlantic Pact now appears to be a question of time, a fear of openly provoking Russia to military retaliation perhaps retarding Allied action. Certainly Italian adherence has broken down the 'Atlantic nations only' basis of the Pact; and the claims of Turkey and Greece to inclusion are certainly as valid if not more so than those of Italy. The urgent necessity of bringing the Greeks and Turks into the defence system would appear all the greater since an effective Turco-Greek military alliance is hardly feasible at present, and since a « Middle-East bloc would be merely a paper arrangement between mutually weak small states. »

The Turks have won increased security since the perilous period of 1945 and 1946 when they stood alone against a barrage of Russian threats. They possess now a modernised army, and the financial backing of the U.S.A. By diligent diplomacy it should be possible for them to secure a firmer guarantee of Turkish soil by inclusion in the European defence system.

### III

## TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

(1945 JUNE TO 1948)

Two reasons, the first that of preserving the peace, the second that of finding markets, have caused the Turks to adopt a friendly attitude towards all countries in general. In the first year after the war this resulted in a fair amount of diplomatic activity on

the part of Turkish diplomats as well as on the part of important visitors to the country.

In March 1946 Nuri Said Pasha visited the Turkish capital to sign a treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood between Irak and Turkey. Separate protocols signed simultaneously provided for : (i) joint regulation of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates; (ii) a postal, telegraphic, and Telephone agreement; (iii) an economic agreement providing for effective measures to promote intertrade.<sup>39</sup> The signature was followed up two months later by an official visit to Turkey of the Young Feisal the Second. In spite of similar friendly moves by Ankara towards the Middle-Eastern countries, no serious scheme for Middle-Eastern intensive cooperation has been put forward. The Turks, while they have been careful to express suitable sympathy for Arab aspirations and while they have several times sent observers to sessions of the Arab league, have nevertheless made it clear to world opinion that they are in no way connected with that community. This has needed emphasis all the more as the world press has several times suggested some sort of close collaboration between Turkish and Arab League policy.<sup>40</sup>

The main reason for Turkish isolationism in Middle-Eastern affairs has been a reluctance to fish in the troubled waters of Palestine. Turkey voted against Palestine partition; but she was not willing to take further steps on behalf of the Arab cause for fear of antagonizing American opinion and thereby nipping military aid in the bud.<sup>41</sup> Extreme reticence has marked the Turkish attitude to the Jewish question, the issue being further complicated by the fact that in Turkey there still exists a small Jewish minority.

The Turks were thus not too pleased to be selected as one of the members of the 'conciliation commission' for Palestine in December 1948. Their subsequent attitude towards the problem has been to ignore it, though it cannot be supposed that their leaders view with equanimity the establishment of a virile state actively cooperating with Russia and situated midway between the Turkish straits and the Suez Canal.<sup>42</sup>

In the Balkans, Turkey's relations with both Greece and Yugoslavia have been on a good footing, and trade agreements have led to an increasingly brisk commercial exchange. The Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara gave a very friendly speech in May, 1946, stressing the solidarity of view of the Balkan countries as if no war had intervened to tear the project into pieces.<sup>43</sup> A revived Balkan Bloc had been a good deal discussed in the Turkish



press before the full implications of the Soviet-controlled Balkans had been realised. Turkey—as a neutral—had maintained touch with the Balkan countries throughout the war years up to 1944, and up to that time the conception of a revived Balkan Bloc had seemed quite feasible as a post-war aim.

The Soviet-controlled countries in 1946 passed to a full scale attack upon the Turks, Sofia radio and press being used to second the opinions of Moscow. Russian claims on the Straits and on Kars and Ardahan were emitted from the Bulgarian capital. In November, 1947 Dr. Rolarov, the Bulgarian President, spoke so abusively about Turkey and the Turks that headlines in the Turkish press were provoked by the incident. «The Bulgars are trying to provoke a war», stated 'Vatan'; «The valets attack their ex-masters», said 'Tanin'; «Low attacks from an official but vulgar mouth», declared 'Yeni Sabah'.

These press polemics have been followed by a long series of border incidents, the most serious of which was the shooting down of two Turkish fighters which were attempting to land on a Bulgarian airfield after having lost their way in poor visibility. This incident, followed by a number of bandit raids over the border, has stirred up the traditional animosity between Turk and Bulgar which pre-war efforts had done so much to assuage. This is of course the Russian aim; since Bulgaria is the natural springboard for a shock attack upon Istanbul and the Straits. The Thracian frontier, a screened military area, is however too well organized for the Bulgarians to create similar confusion to that caused in the mountains of Greece. Turkish retaliation for Bulgar unpleasantnesses has been to provide an asylum for political refugees fleeing from the other country; thus from time to time Bulgar planes touch down at Turkish airports or refugees arrive in other ways.

Turkey's relations with Greece have continued to be good, though there has been no return to the cordial cooperation of the 1940's. Neither party is very interested in the establishment of a common front unless it should be part of a wider framework of security. Statesmen of both countries are realistic enough to see that in the event of a Russian aggression neither party would be in a position to render effective aid to the other or to send troops to safeguard the territory of the other.

In April, 1948 M. Sophoulis declared «We are menaced by the same dangers. Our discussions will show us if we can organize a common policy to combat them.»<sup>44</sup> The results presumably proved the contrary. Both countries are weak, both rely upon

the full aid of America. Moreover the Greeks may justifiably feel somewhat disillusioned with the prospect of Turkish aid. One Greek writer has stated: «In case of a new conflict Turkey will not bring any aid to Greece whatever agreements she has signed... Unless she is attacked by Russia, Turkey will remain neutral in spite of the subsidies received and the engagements she may have been able to sign with America. On this occasion, too, Turkey is arming so as not to have to go to war.»<sup>45</sup>

Turco-Greek unity has therefore been able to make no advance since both countries are primarily concerned with restoring some measure of internal well-being to their respective economies; both too in foreign policy wish to evade awkward commitments. In spite of this Turco-Greek friendship remains on the surface a constant feature of the foreign policy of the two countries.

The quest for foreign markets has led the Turks to make energetic attempts to resume trade relations with Germany and Italy. Negotiations in the French, American, and British zones of Germany for a tobacco agreement with the Germans were protracted by the refusal of permits. This irritated the Turkish press so much that they accused the Americans of refusing to let Turkish tobacco be sold in Germany in rivalry to Virginian.<sup>46</sup> Permission was finally given, and in December, 1948 a Turco-Trizone Pact for £ 18.7 millions of exchange was signed. By this Germany was to import tobacco, raw cotton, oil seeds and to export machinery, textiles, electrical apparatus, and locomotives.<sup>47</sup> A similar agreement had previously been signed with Italy for an exchange of £ 15.4 millions worth of goods.

Turkey's return to a share of Trade with these countries is an essential factor in her recovery programme. Trade agreements have already been signed with Czechoslovakia, Finland and Jugoslavia, and a further Pact is being negotiated with Hungary.<sup>48</sup>

While then—for a variety of reasons—Turkey's main concern in present foreign policy is to follow carefully the path trod by Washington,<sup>49</sup> yet still she does not neglect any opportunities of developing friendly relations with any nation well-disposed towards her.



## CHAPTER EIGHT

## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

If the Turkish nation has been able to achieve a series of solid successes in the field of foreign policy, this has been largely due to safe emergence in 1923 as a simple geographical unit, unencumbered by the responsibilities of Empire or of Moslem leadership. The generation of a truly national spirit was perhaps the single way in which a new Turkey could have arisen from the ruins of her Empire. The decline of the Ottomans was given a period by the first world war, the determination shown by the victor not only to do away with the Ottoman Empire but also to partition most of Turkey proper, doing much to cause the explosion of national feelings that took the British so completely by surprise in 1920; and which changed the future of the Middle-East. Hellenic dreams of an Aegean Empire were rudely shattered, and the Turkish army, though still ill-equipped by modern standards and though exhausted by eight years of more or less continuous struggle, became again a powerful factor in Middle-Eastern strategy. The birth of the new Turkish state had indeed been so violent and sudden that Britain and France found themselves anxious to placate what was to them an unknown quantity.

Though it freed the Turks of all outside commitments, the revolution, as controlled by the firm hand of Mustapha Kemal, did not blot out the old social framework of the Ottomans; the army was left in undisputed charge after the military victory, two soldiers, Kemal and İnönü, stepping overnight from military to civilian leadership. The revolution did not, as in Russia, bring an entirely new class to the head of affairs; since in the new regime pashas still formed the upper administration, their position secure as a result of hundreds of years of tradition and further strengthened by the prestige gained in the war against the Greeks. It is true that the urgent demands of modernisation quickly made way for a middle-class, which immediately in commerce and in professional life began to play an important role; but the real power remained in the hands of a military autocracy that gave the necessary stability to Mustapha Kemal when he began to encounter widespread criticism during the first decade of the

Republic. The success of the revolution can only be appraised in terms of the essential backing given continuously by this favoured élite.

When world attention was focussed mainly on internal reform in the country, it was scarcely observed that the Turks were developing an equally novel if less spectacular programme of foreign policy, one of reconciliation and of active cooperation with the ex-subject states.

The importance attached to foreign policy by the State was early shown by the setting-up in Ankara of the «Siyasal bilgiler Okulu (School of Political Science)» in which training courses were begun for diplomats. The success of this scheme has been demonstrated by the skill and «savoir faire» displayed by these Turkish diplomats not only in their official relations with other countries but also at International Conferences. The Turks have besides been fortunate in the services of able Foreign Ministers. In this branch they seem to have achieved an unbroken line of successes from Bekir Sami who smoothed the way to the hard-won triumph of 1922 to Necmeddin Sadak who is pushing his country's claims in 1949 with a nice blend of decorum and insistence.

The stages run through in the short history of the Turkish republic have already been described in full detail. In the first decade the Turks were very much on the defensive. They had contracted an alliance with Russia which they knew full well might in course of time prove dangerous. The Mosul affair saw a reaffirmation of Turco-Russian friendship, but the interests of the Turks were already turning westwards. The Russian Pact had been a contract with the devil, the bonds of which the Turks were pleased to loosen gradually from 1926 onwards. The threat of fuller cooperation with Russia had proved sufficient to alarm the Western countries, and this continual retrogressive possibility was henceforth to form a useful threat for the Turks with which to assail the West.

1928 marked an agreement with Italy; after which year cautiously but with gathering momentum the Turkish foreign ministry came to terms with European countries. England was still regarded dubiously but she was necessary to the Turks as a distant friend, so that from 1929 onwards relations steadily improved.

The guiding principle of Turkey's policy has been the pull-back to the Straits. The Lausanne Convention had aimed at settling international rivalry in that area by means of a fair set

of shipping rules and an international commission to enforce them. The Turks however were determined to be masters at the Straits, realising full well that their international importance chiefly hinged on that. Their pursuance of this aim with the outcry that was raised throughout Turkey during the early 30's at the injustice of Lausanne and at the supposed blow to national prestige contained in the clauses of that Convention, gave fictitious moral backing to a purely selfish and national self-realisation.

If 1923 saw Turkey's return to the world map, 1936 saw her return to a position of real power. Once again, as in Ottoman times, she was made the guardian of the Straits. She could balance her own diplomacy between the conflicting desires of the hostile camps that were then rearming and planning for a second world conflict. Alongside this shrewd understanding of her place in power politics existed something far more original and entirely devoid of cynicism, a genuine desire for world peace and for the liquidation of ancient feuds. The Turkish position in the Balkan conferences was always forward and progressive; she showed far less sensitivity over outstanding points of difference than did her co-partners. The same streak of idealism pervaded the attempts of Turkey to form a Middle-Eastern bloc. It can hardly be supposed that with their long experience of Middle-Eastern problems, the Turks placed much faith in active cooperation of the Saadabad powers; nevertheless they were firm exponents of the conception.

It might be argued that Turkish diplomacy up to the outbreak of a second world war was not active enough, that—given her leading position in this backward part of the world—the Turks blessed by internal stability, an expanding economy, comparative wealth, and comparative prosperity, could have given the Middle-Eastern countries a more active lead in cooperation. But this was hardly possible. Border disputes were not settled till the 30's and the Hatay question dragged on till 1939. Turkey's attitude moreover was primarily selfish and realistic in essence, to secure her national boundaries and to neutralise all her ex-enemies. Considering therefore her own needs, the zeal and enthusiasm shown by the Turks for the principle of collective security both in the Balkans and the Middle East stands entirely to her credit. The most remarkable example of her sincerity is the Turco-Greek reconciliation, which in the restricted theatre of the Aegean was something of a revolution in itself.

There were thus the two streams of political thought, the purely practical, represented in the «return to the Straits» policy,

one in which the Turkish statesmen exploited the difficulties of England and France to obtain an entirely favourable revision at Montreux; and secondly, the idealistic concept of collective security.

The difficulty of fairly judging Turkish policy since 1939 lies in the fact that the Turks have since that date been fully drawn into the conflicting currents of world politics. Consequently the former stream, the practical and opportunist, has always been uppermost. Skill and luck kept Turkey at peace; but it should be recalled that in 1940 Menemçioğlu was still busily at work in the Balkans attempting to bolster up the crumbling unity of the Balkan Pact powers. It was only with reluctance that the Turks abandoned their ideological front.

If, since 1939, the Turks have been obliged to scrap their ideals and to pursue a steadfast policy of self-interest, involving considerable duplicity and ambiguity of purpose, the reason—national survival—has been clear and commendable enough. Had Turkey honoured her Treaty obligations and had she entered the war on the Allied side in 1940 it is obvious that she would have suffered a swift and crushing defeat at German hands, that another route to the Suez Canal and India would have been opened up to the Axis, and that the Allied cause would have been in dire peril. There was moreover public opinion to be consulted. Whatever advantages the Turkish republic had gained for its citizens had been gained by preserving the peace. Atatürk himself in a famous speech after the Greek victory had told his soldiers that henceforth victories would not be won by the bayonet but in industrial and commercial enterprise. Public opinion was dead against entry into world conflict unless Turkey was actually attacked. So that participation on either side would have been an extremely unpopular move.

Post-war policy has necessarily been purely defensive. Under constant threat from Russia, the Turks have sought and found American support. Since 1947 equilibrium has been once again established at the Straits; and Turkey has been content to play a quiescent role. The situation is still fraught with danger. The Straits are almost within range of Bulgarian guns; the Russians are eager to push on to the promised goal, Istanbul in the event of war being practically indefensible. Yet, however precariously, the Turks have been able to maintain their full sovereign independence and to preserve their ancient claim to the world's attention by control over the vital waterway.

The wheel of fortune has turned full swing; and the present

situation is a fit subject for gentle irony. In a short span of years the 'Sick Man of Europe' has become the 'Backbone of the Middle East'; the 'Terrible Turk', the 'sentinel of democracy'.

*Geneva, May, 1949.*

## NOTES

### INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER ONE

1. *Ziya Gokalp*, Young Turk Writer, reformer, and poet: Author of the oft-quoted lines :  
« Vatan ne Türkiyedir Türklere, ne Türkistan,  
Vatan büyük ve muebbed bir ülkedir, Turan. »  
(Our country is not Turkey for the Turks, nor Turkistan,  
Our country is one great, one everlasting land, Turan.)
2. *Churchill*, « The World Crisis (1911-1914) », pp. 479-480; also « *Türk Tarih* », Vol. III, p. 305, Devlet Matbaası-Istanbul, 1933.
3. *Siebert* and *Schreiner*, « Entente Diplomacy and the World », New-York, 1921, No. 443, pp. 382-383; also « Die Grosse Politik », XXX, Nos 10987 to 10998. — Also *Harry Howard*, « The Partition of Turkey », p. 21 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1931).
4. *Harry Howard*, op. cit., p. 24.
5. *Cemal Pasha*, « Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman », 1913-1919, New-York, Doran, 1922.
6. *Churchill*, op. cit., p. 485.
7. *Cemal Pasha*, op. cit., pp. 101-110.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
9. *General Kannengiesser*, « Gallipoli ».
10. *J. Polonsky*, « Documents diplomatiques secrets russes (1914-17) », Paris-Payot, 1928, p. 74-76; *Prof. M. Pokrovsky*, « Drei Konferenzen » (zur Vorgeschichte des Kriegs), Herausgegeben vom der Redaktion Russische Korrespondenz, Berlin, 1920, Nos. 20, 2L, 23.
11. *F. Stieve*, « Das Rüssische Orangebuch über den Kriegausgebruch mit der Türkei », Berlin, 1926; No. 42, p. 82; also No. 43, p. 84.
12. *F. Stieve*, op. cit., No. 54, pp. 97-98, and Nos. 55-57, pp. 99-101; *Howard*, op. cit., p. 105.
13. *Halide Edib*, « Turkey faces West », p. 138; *Cemal Pasha*, op. cit., p. 115; *Ahmed Emin*, « Turkey in the World War » (New Haven Yale, 1930), pp. 69-73.
14. *Polonsky*, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
15. *Muhlmann*, « Deutschland und die Türkei », 1913-1914, Nos. 9-10, pp. 101-102.
16. *Ahmed Emin*, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
17. *General Kannengiesser*, op. cit., p. 33; Turkish newspaper, « *Tanin* » of 30th and 21st October, 1914; « *Ikdam* », Turkish newspaper, editions of October 30th, 31st, and November 1st.
18. Resolution put before and adopted by Ankara Tribunal of Independence (1926)—see *Ahmed Emin*, op. cit., p. 75; also *Howard*, op. cit., p. 114. The Kaiser had urged an immediate action but Enver Pasha's orders were necessary in order to put Souchon in motion.
19. *Cemal Pasha*, op. cit., p. 97.
20. *Ahmed Emin*, op. cit., p. 74. Rifat Pasha was then Ambassador in Paris.
21. *Cemal Pasha*, op. cit., p. 110.
22. *Liman von Sanders*, « Fünf Jahre im Türkei », *General Kannengiesser*, op. cit., « *Türk Tarih* », Vol. III; « *Büyük Gazinin Hatıra Sayifeleri* », *Falih Rifki Atay* and *Mahmut Soydam*; « *Anafartalar Kahramanı Mustafa Kemal ile mulakat* », *Rushen Esref Unaydin* (1930); *W. Vogtinsky*, « La Démocratie Georgienne », Paris, 1921, p. 151 and 166-170.
23. « *Türk Tarih* », Vol. III, p. 308-309.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
26. *Livre Rouge Turc*, Constantinople, 1925, *Ahmed Ihsan & Co.*, Nos. 4-8, pp. 9-15, also Nos. 9, pp. 13-22. The British excuse remained that of maintenance of order.
27. *Howard*, op. cit., p. 227; and original text in « *Responsabilité des jeunes Turcs* » (Mémoire sur les revendications des Kurds), Memo. No. 339, Feb. 6th, 1919, Mandates V, Documents 337, 339, pp. 134-142.
28. *Ibid.*



29. Mandates XVI (League of Nations Publications), pp. 475-479; also *Paillares*, op. cit., pp. 42-46.
30. *Paillares*, op. cit., p. 46.
31. Moreover the Soviets by laying down arms had put an end to all agreements concluded between Russia and the Western Powers as Allies in the war.
32. « Observations générales présentées par la délégation ottomane à la Conférence de la Paix », July 8, 1920.
33. Full text of the Sèvres Treaty can be found in: Treaty Series, No. 11 (1920), Cmd. 964. For Turkish view of Sèvres Treaty consult: « Turk Tarih », Vol. IV, pp. 62-65; *Ali Fuad*, op. cit.; *Cemil Bilsel*, « Dunya Barış Buhranında Bogazlar » in « Revue de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université d'Istanbul », 1939; *Sami Kabbara*, « Le régime des Détroits avant et depuis le Traité de Lausanne », Lyon, 1929.
34. This attitude on the part of the Entente is very understandable. Turkey was an enemy state which had chosen the side of the Central Powers.

## INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER TWO

1. Turkish Ordeal, *Halide Edib*, op. cit., chapter one.
2. « Turk Tarih », Vol. IV, pp. 8-11.
3. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
4. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
5. Ibid., p. 33.
6. Ibid., p. 8.
7. *Paillares*, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
8. « Turk Tarih », Vol. IV, pp. 35-39; *Howard*, op. cit., p. 254.
9. « Turk Tarih », Vol. IV, pp. 37-39.
10. Ibid., pp. 41-43.
11. « Die Auswärtige Politik der Türkei », 1923-1940, Hans. W. Hartmann, Zürich, 1941; Gebr. Leeman & Co., See p. 5.
12. *Mears*, « Modern Turkey », Macmillan Co., New-York, 1924, p. 629.
13. « Turk Tarih », p. 60.
14. Ibid., p. 59.
15. Ibid., p. 59.
16. *Mears*, op. cit., p. 643.
17. See full text of Moscow Pact, in *Mears*, op. cit., pp. 645-647. For Turkish opinion thereof, see « Turk Tarih », pp. 61 and 101-102. The Moscow Pact contained lurking dangers for the future of Turkey as later developments have shown.
18. « Turk Tarih », p. 59.
19. *Howard*, op. cit., p. 264; *Ronaldshay*, « The Life of Lord Curzon », Vol. III, p. 278, New York, 1928.
20. *Howard*, op. cit., p. 259; « Turk Tarih », p. 60.
21. *Mears*, op. cit., p. 644; *Howard*, op. cit., p. 260.
22. « Turk Tarih », p. 104.
23. *Mears*, op. cit., p. 651, for full text, also « Turk Tarih », p. 104.
24. *Howard*, op. cit., p. 261; for details of correspondence see « Turkey », No. 2, 1921-Commons Debates, No. 1556.
25. *Howard*, op. cit., pp. 261-262; and detailed correspondence in « Turkey », No. 1, 1922-Commons Debates, No. 1570.
26. *Mears*, op. cit., p. 648.
27. « Turk Tarih », pp. 107-109, for suggestions in full; *Howard*, op. cit., p. 266.
28. « Turk Tarih », pp. 106-107.
29. Ibid., pp. 110-118.
30. *Mears*, op. cit., p. 658.

## INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER THREE

1. This settlement is discussed in Part I, Chapter IV, Section I of the present work.
2. « Turk Tarih », Vol. IV, pp. 125-131.
3. Ibid., p. 123.
4. Ibid., p. 126.
5. Documents Diplomatiques: « Conférence de Lausanne », 2<sup>e</sup> Série, I, pp. 137-138; also Cmd. 1814, « Turkey », No. 1 (1923), pp. 461-464.

6. Documents Diplomatiques, op. cit., 2<sup>e</sup> Série.
7. Livre Rouge Turquie: « La Question de Mossoul », p. 116. Exposé of Ismet Pasha on 23.1.1923.
8. Cmd. 1814, op. cit., pp. 352-362.
9. « The Standard Oil Company » (1870-1925) by G. Damougeot & Perron.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Cmd. 1814, op. cit., pp. 206-210.
14. Documents Diplomatiques, 2<sup>e</sup> Série, I, pp. 40-41, 5051.
15. Cmd. 1814, op. cit., pp. 543-598.
16. Ibid., pp. 611-612.
17. Ibid., pp. 611-612.
18. « New York Times », Jan. 28, 1923.
19. Cmd. 1814, pp. 839-840.
20. Cmd. 1814, p. 127; Documents Diplomatiques, op. cit., for Turkish Case.
21. Cmd. 1814, op. cit., pp. 128-131.
22. Ibid., pp. 131-132.
23. See Text of Sèvres Treaty (loc. cit.).
24. Cmd. 1814, pp. 243-250.
25. Ibid., pp. 156-159.
26. See Text of Lausanne Treaty in « Great Britain Treaty », Series No. 16 (1923), Cmd. 1929.
27. See Straits Convention, Ibid.

## CHAPTER FOUR

1. « Türk Tarih », 4th Vol, pp. 1-21, op. cit.
2. The « Evkaf » is the Ministry of Religious Propaganda.
3. During the early years after 1923 the Kurds were more restless outside the Turkish borders than inside.
4. This gloomy fate was not infrequently forecast for the Turks by the foreign newspapers, and especially by the Greek Press. The Greeks felt that it would be impossible for the Turks to organize their own economy without Greek assistance.
5. Cited in *Frangulis*, « La Grèce et la crise mondiale », Vol. II, p. 581, Paris, 1926; see also, « Documents diplomatiques, Conférence de Lausanne », Tome I, p. 500.
6. For the impression caused on world opinion see *Frangulis*, op. cit., pp. 577-580. See also p. 566 for an account of Venizelos's deliberately tardy intervention over the executions.
7. Cmd. 1814, op. cit., pp. 21-33.
8. Ibid., p. 838.
9. *Frangulis*, op. cit., p. 582.
10. Ibid., p. 582.
11. For protocol signed between Greece and Turkey, see « Recueil », 2<sup>e</sup> série, pp. 137-138.
12. See the present chapter, section vi, on « Turco-Balkan relations ».
13. Cmd. 1814, pp. 113-117.
14. Ismet Pasha's words. Cmd. 1814, pp. 206-207.
15. Ismet Pasha was not at first prepared to allow the Greek community to stay in Constantinople; but he gave way on the issue in return for the reciprocal right of the Moslem community to stay in Thrace.
16. « The Exchange of Minorities » (Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey) by *Stephen P. Ladas*, Macmillan & Co., New York, 1932, p. 478.
17. *Drion*, « Histoire de la Diplomatie de la Grèce ».
18. S. I. A., 1930, pp. 159-168.
19. See Chapter IV, Section V, below on Turco-Italian relations.
20. S. I. A., 1930, pp. 159-160.
21. Ibid., pp. 159-160.
22. Ibid., p. 161.
23. Ibid., p. 163.
24. Ibid. For text see « Messenger d'Athènes », 31st October, 1930.
25. Introduction chapter III, sections II and IV.

25. For correspondence between Adnan Bey, Delegate of Foreign Affairs at Constantinople with Mr. Henderson, the British Representative see « La Question de Mossoul » (30th Oct. 1918-March, 1925), Constantinople, Ahmed Ihsan & Cie, 1925, pp. 139-145, Nos. 95-101. For the British attitude towards Suleymaniye, see S.I.A. 1926 where the British troubles with the rebellious Sheyh Mahmud are described in detail. The Sheyh was a Kurdish leader who in 1913 had gained favour with the British only to rebel against them in May, 1919. The strife between the Assyrians and the Iraqi are also dealt with in detail in these pages.
26. Ibid., loc. cit.
27. Ibid., loc. cit.
28. Op. cit., pp. 177-201, for full report on the proces-verbal of the Constantinople conference.
29. Ibid., No. 137, pp. 180-181.
30. Ibid., loc. cit.
31. Op. cit., p. 182.
32. Op. cit., p. 183.
33. Op. cit., p. 186.
34. Op. cit., p. 189.
35. Op. cit., p. 187.
36. Op. cit., p. 196.
37. Op. cit., p. 198.
38. Op. cit., p. 200.
39. « La Question de Mossoul », op. cit., pp. 201-249, for the 30th Session of the League Council before which the British and Turkish memorandums were submitted.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. But Turkey had previously declared her willingness to refer the dispute to League arbitration.
42. « La Question de Mossoul », op. cit., p. 269, No. 149.
43. Loc. cit., Nos. 152-167, pp. 297-310.
44. Cmd. 1814, pp. 837-841.
45. « Times » of March 8, 1923.
46. « Recueil », IV<sup>e</sup> Vol., pp. 26-33.
47. Op. cit., pp. 73-74.
48. « Aksam » of 17 and 18 Dec., 1923.
49. Howard, op. cit., p. 338. This is dealt with in detail in Chapter IV below, Section III.
50. Cmd. 1814, pp. 22-28.
51. Ibid., pp. 34-38.
52. Howard, op. cit., p. 344.
53. Ibid.
54. See Introductory Chapter II.
55. S.I.A. for 1925.
56. French Government's report on « Conditions in Syria and the Lebanon » (1922-1923).
57. Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, p. 360.
58. Op. cit., p. 440; also « Le Temps », Jan. 14 and 29, 1926, and of April 25, 1926; also S.I.A., 1925, p. 459; « Oriente Moderno », VI, 2, p. 91; of 1925.
59. French Government Report (1923-24), pp. 13-14; « Le Temps » of 16th and 19th March and 27th April, 1924.
60. S.I.A. for 1925, p. 460.
61. For official French text see the « Journal Officiel » of 27 Aug. 1926, pp. 9706 and seq.
62. This is very similar to the non-aggression pledge and the Turco-Russian « accord » of 17 Dec., 1925.
63. « Journal Officiel », op. cit., loc. cit.
64. Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission.
65. S.I.A., 1925, p. 463. The agreement was ratified by the Grand National Assembly in June, 1926.
66. S.I.A., 1928, pp. 333-336.
67. Ibid.
68. French government's « Report on the situation in Syria and the Lebanon » for the year 1929, p. 11; for Text of Agreement see « L'Europe Nouvelle » of 24th Aug., 1929, and « Oriente Moderno », Vol. IX, No. 8 (Aug. 1929), pp. 353-360.

69. S.I.A. for 1930, Part III, Section V, pp. 314-316.
70. Ibid.
71. Fr. Govt. Rpt., 1929, op. cit.
72. Ibid.
73. This 2.4 % represents 35,783,000 roubles worth of goods.
74. See previous allusion to the Moscow Pact in Chapter II of Introductory.
75. Violet Conolly, « Soviet Economic Policy in the East », Vol. I, p. 36.
76. Conolly, op. cit., p. 36.
77. Op. cit., p. 37.
78. Text in « Times » of 29th Dec., 1925, + in European Ec. + Pol. Survey (No. 8, Dec. 21, 1925), p. 7.
79. Halide Edib, « The Turkish Ordeal ».
80. Text in « La Législation turque », « Recueil des lois turques », Istanbul, 1929.
81. Op. cit., loc. cit.
82. Ibid.
83. « La Vie Economique des Soviets », April, 1927, p. 2.
84. « Annuaire statistique turque » (Istatistik Yilligi), see Vols. for 1930 and 1933.
85. Conolly, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
86. Ischboldin, Boris, « Die Russische Handelspolitik », 1932, p. 181.
87. Conolly, op. cit., p. 44.
88. Op. cit., p. 43.
89. « Cümhuriyet », 13 Feb., 1931.
90. « Izvestiya », see Conolly, op. cit., p. 47.
91. See « Export and Import Tables » in Appendix to present volume.
92. Conolly, op. cit., p. 38.
93. Op. cit., p. 50.
94. Ibid.
95. Halide Edib, op. cit., Chapter IV.
96. See Mears, op. cit., for Text.
97. See Chapter II of Introductory; Count Sforza, « Makers of Modern Europe », Chapter XXXIV, for full account of Italian policy towards the new Turkey.
98. Annuaire Statistique for 1927.
99. The nationalisation of the Mining Industries can best be studied in the works of Orhan Conker and Nacil Sükün. (See Bibliography.)
100. The Italian contribution to the new Turkey is most striking in the field of architecture, a visit to Ankara or Smyrna revealing to the foreign eye the number of government buildings constructed in modern Italian styles.
101. S.I.A. for 1925, Vol. I, p. 526-527.
102. The words of Ismet Pasha himself: see Documents on International affairs for 1929, p. 220.
103. For text see Documents on International Affairs (Henceforth referred to as D.I.A.) for 1929, pp. 122-124.
104. S.I.A. for 1928, Vol. I, p. 160.
105. S.I.A. for 1928, loc. cit.
106. D.I.A. for 1928, pp. 142-143.
107. D.I.A., 1928, p. 220.
108. Ibid., p. 221.
109. For English translation of text see D.I.A. for 1930; also « Oriente Moderno », Vol. X, No. 9 (Sept. 1930), pp. 421-427.
110. S.I.A. 1930, p. 166.
111. This is Professor Toynbee's opinion in S.I.A. for 1930, p. 150.
112. See below, Section V, Chapter IV.
113. See appendix for Expt. and Impt. Tables.
114. See Section I, Chapter IV.
115. « Eastern Europe between the Wars » (1918-1941), by Hugh Seton-Watson, p. 115.
116. S.I.A. for 1934, p. 508-511, for résumé of the early conferences.
117. Op. cit., p. 510.
118. For a full account of the steps leading up to the abolition of the Caliphate and of the effects of this upon world opinion, see S.I.A. for 1925, Part I, pp. 1-81.
119. Op. cit., p. 62, and « Oriente Moderno », IV, Section IV, 1924, p. 220.



120. « If the Moslems have made demonstrations of friendship towards us Turks, the true explanation of this is not that the Caliphate was in our hands but that we were known to be strong. » — Statement of Ismet Pasha as reported in « Oriente Moderno », IV, Section III, 1924, p. 174; see also view of « Aksam » of 14th March, 1924 (Reproduced in « Oriente Moderno », IV, 4, pp. 242-244).
121. See Introductory, chapter II.
122. Little publicity is given in the Turkish Press to the various Turkish missions that work in Afghanistan.
123. S. I. A. for 1925, p. 537.
124. Ibid.
125. Op. cit., pp. 538-539; see also « Oriente Moderno », I, pp. 548, 615, and 754, II, pp. 115, 243-244, and 425.
126. This treaty was to last for five years and thereafter for successive 5 year periods unless denounced, see S. I. A. for 1925, pp. 546. For text, « Oriente Moderno », Vol. VI, 5, pp. 252-255.
127. S. I. A. for 1928, p. 373.
128. S. I. A. for 1934, p. 221.
129. Op. cit., p. 186. Texts in « British Government Report for Irak » (1930). Appendices C, D, & E.
130. S. I. A. for 1925, pp. 320-324.
131. Count Sforza, op. cit., loc. cit.
132. S. I. A. for 1925, p. 81.
133. Op. cit., pp. 81-90, for the Congress proceedings.
134. Op. cit., p. 85.
135. S. I. A. for 1934, pp. 216-221.
136. Persia joined the League as one of the original members in 1920.
137. « Turco-American Treaty » in Current History XIX, No. 1, Oct., 1923, pp. 160-161.
138. See « Foreign Relations of the United States », Vol. III, 1927, pp. 765-812.
139. Current History XX, No. 5, Aug., 1924.
140. « Foreign Relations of the U. S. », op. cit., p. 767.
141. Op. cit., loc. cit.
142. See Impt. & Expt. Tables (Appendix).
143. Ditto.
144. See Introductory Chapter III, Section on « The Straits ».
145. See Faruk Berkol, « Les portes orientales de la Méditerranée »; also, Cemal Bilsel, « Universite Konferanslari ».
146. « Commission des Détroits », Reports for 1926 and 1927, for the correspondence that took place between the Turkish government and the Commission; also Howard, op. cit., p. 343.
147. Bruel, « International Straits », Chapter on « The Turkish Straits », Section 36 on « Right of Passage ».
148. S. I. A. for 1934, p. 216.

## CHAPTER FIVE

1. T. I. Geshkoff, « Balkan Union », N. Y., 1940, p. 209.
2. S. I. A. for 1934, p. 619.
3. D. I. A. for 1933, pp. 407-408.
4. S. I. A. for 1934, loc. cit.
5. S. I. A. for 1934, p. 518, note 1.
6. Op. cit., p. 524; also Seton-Watson, « Eastern Europe between the Wars », p. 378.
7. S. I. A. for 1934, p. 518.
8. Op. cit., p. 535.
9. Op. cit., p. 529; also Geshkoff, op. cit., pp. 300-310, for full Text of Balkan Pact.
10. S. I. A. for 1936, p. 535; Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 373-375.
11. S. I. A. for 1936, p. 537.
12. Geshkoff, op. cit., p. 228.
13. S. I. A. for 1936, pp. 537-538.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. D. I. A. for 1937, pp. 408-410.

17. D. I. A. for 1937, pp. 408-410.
18. S. I. A. for 1936, pp. 793-801.
19. Ibid.
20. O. M., 1937, p. 213.
21. Loc. cit., p. 153.
22. Loc. cit., p. 89.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 90.
25. Speech made at Aleppo on 21 June, 1937, reported in loc. cit., pp. 91-92.
26. S. I. A. for 1936, p. 802, note 2.
27. Ibid., pp. 803-805.
28. Ibid., p. 803.
29. « Times » of July 10th for signature.
30. « Times » of July 13th.
31. An instance of the suppression of communist propaganda by the dropping of leaflets is reported in O. M. for 1933, p. 29. This was not by any means an isolated example.
32. Trotsky is reported to have made this statement in a speech, see Howard, op. cit.
33. For the proposed Euxine Pact see section I of the present chapter.
34. S. I. A. for 1936, pp. 623-624.
35. Russian annoyance became quite patent in the spring of 1937 when not only did an article in « Izvestiya » of 12th April publish a strongly hostile article; but also the Russian ambassador was withdrawn from Ankara. See O. M. for 1937, pp. 225-226, and « Times » of 28.4.1937.
36. D. I. A. for 1937, pp. 423-425.
37. Ibid.
38. The Saracoglu-Molotov talks of 1939 were for long unknown factors and have given ground to many rumours. In 1946 the Turkish government partially disclosed the substance of these talks in a letter on the question of revision of the Montreux Pact. See Harry Howard, « The question of the Turkish straits », pp. 13-21.
39. O. M. for 1933, p. 291.
40. For full speech see O. M., 1934, p. 150.
41. Ibid., p. 151-154.
42. Ibid., p. 154.
43. O. M., 1935, p. 449.
44. For the course of the debate see O. M. for 1935, pp. 624-625.
45. Ibid.
46. See Appendix.
47. S. I. A. for 1936, pp.
48. Op. cit., pp.
49. Ibid.
50. The guess at the ground covered between Dr. Aras and Ciano is more or less wholly corroborated in Ciano, « Storia d'Europa » (1936-1942), pp. 144-147.
51. S. I. A. for 1936, ibid.
52. This was only partially successful: See Appendix.
53. G. Ciano, « Journal » (1939-40), p. 29.
54. Ibid., p. 88.
55. See Appendix.
56. O. M., 1934, p. 580.
57. O. M., 1935, p. 71.
58. See Appendix.
59. S. I. A., 1934; Barbara Ward, « Turkey », 1942, Oxford University Press, p. 92.
60. S. I. A., 1936.
61. « Times » of 16.11.1936.
62. O. M., 1936, p. 672; also « Turkische Post », of 1 Nov., 1936.
63. S. I. A., 1936.
64. Ibid.
65. Paul Ernst.
66. O. M. for 1938, pp. 549 and 605.
67. Ibid., p. 424.
68. These views are expressed in an article in « Al-Maquattan » of 19.7.1938, reported in O. M., 1938, p. 423.



69. O. M. for 1939, p. 315.
70. Ibid.
71. S. I. A. for 1936, p. 770.
72. Ibid., p. 772.
73. Ibid., p. 773.
74. Ibid., p. 778.
75. Ibid., p. 779.
76. S. I. A., 1938.
77. S. I. A. for 1938.
78. D. I. A., 1937, p. 515 for text.
79. Op. cit., p. 516.
80. S. I. A., 1938.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. See Appendix.
85. See section 8 on « Straits ».
86. Churchill, « The Gathering Storm ».
87. Ibid.
88. British govt. Reports on overseas trade-Conditions in Turkey. See reports for the years 1937, 37, 38, and 39; also D. I. A., 1937, pp. 408-409.
89. Hitherto England had still been considered as a traditional enemy. This visit brought about a psychological change in the mental attitude of the Turkish people towards England. A visit from the English king was looked upon as a great compliment particularly as English writers had constantly labelled Ataturk as a dictator, and had often spoken deprecatingly of a man who was regarded by his contemporaries in Turkey until the day of his death with admiration bordering upon worship. King Edward's visit, coming as it did just after the Montreux settlement, carried the Anglo-Turkish understanding established at the conference table onto a warmer and more personal plane.
90. D. I. A., 1937, p. 410.
91. See section V of present chapter.
93. S. I. A., 1936, pp. 600-603.
94. Ibid.
95. For full text of Turkish draft see « Actes de la Conférence de Montreux », Paris, 1936, Annex I, pp. 285-287; also S. I. A., op. cit., pp. 614-617.
96. These minor themes are discussed in section I of the present chapter.
97. « Actes de la conférence », op. cit., Annex II, pp. 287-298; also S. I. A. for 1938, pp. 628-635.
98. A useful summary of the principal clauses of the final draft is given in Shotwell, « Turkey at the Straits », pp. 124-128. For full text see « Actes de la conférence », op. cit.
99. S. I. A., 1936, p. 645.
100. Ibid.
101. O. M., 1933, p. 27.
102. See Appendix.
103. One led to the other. Increasing armour and armament demanded more petrol; besides which the industrialisation plan called for a steadily-increasing annual import of petrol and its derivatives.
104. O. M., 1934, p. 207.
105. O. M., 1934, p. 206.
106. Barbara Ward, op. cit., p. 92.
107. O. M., 1937; article in « Tan » of 3.10.1937.
108. Harry Howard, « The problem of the Turkish straits », U.S. Dept of state publications, Near Eastern Series, Nos. 5 and 9.
109. In his talk with Ciano. See Ciano, « Storia d'Europa », op. cit., pp. 144-146.

## CHAPTER SIX

1. See text in Cmd. 6165, Treaty Series No. 4 (1940), H. M. Stationery office; also H. Tahsin, « Le Pacte Tripartite Anglo-Franco-Turc », Paris, 1940, for text and criticism of clauses.
2. Cmd. 6165, op. cit.
3. O. M., for Oct. and Nov., 1939.

4. O. M., 1940, p. 53.
5. O. M., 1939, Nov. Issue.
6. Ibid.
7. Cmd. 6165, op. cit.
8. Report on Economic conditions in Turkey, H. M. S. O., 1945.
9. O. M., 1940, pp. 192, 234.
10. Ibid., pp. 328-329.
11. Ibid.
12. Full speech in « Ankara » of 4th July, 1940; also O. M., 1940, pp. 328-329.
13. The whole incident is related in an article of « Aksam » of May 13th, 1948. This is as far as I know the only source for the story; but since the « Aksam » newspaper is owned by the present Foreign Minister, Necmeddin Sadak, it is reasonable to believe the account quite authentic.
14. Ibid.
15. O. M., 1940.
16. O. M., 1940, pp. 393-395; also « Tan » of 6.7.1940.
17. Ibid., p. 396.
18. Ibid.
19. Loc. cit., p. 582.
20. Ciano, « Storia d'Europa », pp. 610-611.
21. Ibid.
22. « Nazi-Soviet Relations (1939-1941) », Sonntag & Biddel, pp. 246-272.
23. Ibid., p. 257.
24. Ibid., pp. 258-259.
25. Ibid., p. 262.
26. Ciano, op. cit., p. 627.
27. Ibid., p. 629.
28. O. M., 1941, pp. 168, 237.
29. Adolf Hitler, « Mein Kampf ».
30. Ciano, op. cit., pp. 647.
31. . . . ., p. 650.
32. « Documents Secrets du Ministère des Affaires étrangères d'Allemagne » (Published by the Russian Foreign Ministry), Editions Paul Dupont, Paris, 1941-43.
33. Ibid.
34. O. M., 1941, pp. 279-280.
35. Ciano, op. cit., p. 661.
36. « Documents Secrets » (Henceforth referred to as D.S.), Doc. No. 9.
37. O. M., 1941, p. 347.
38. Turkish text and commentaries in « Turk-Alman Pakti », 1941, Istanbul (in Turkish); Italian translation in O. M., 1941, pp. 340-341; see also pp. 346-349 for commentaries.
39. « Turk-Alman Pakti », op. cit.; also O. M., 1941, for July.
40. Ciano, « Journal intime », 1941-1943.
41. Ibid.
42. O. M., 1941, p. 351.
43. Ibid.
44. Ciano, op. cit.
45. « Turk-Alman Pakti », op. cit.
46. O. M., 1941, pp. 404, 557.
47. Ibid., p. 556.
48. D. S., No. 12.
49. The Tartars are of a similar central-Asian origin to that of the Turks. They are moreover looked upon by the modern Turks as being proper Turks.
50. D. S.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. O. M., 1942, p. 94, for Von Papen plot and Russian sinkings.
55. D. S., p. 64.
56. Ibid.
57. Op. cit., p. 71, No. 21.
58. Op. cit., Nos. 22, 25.
59. D. S.
60. D. S.

61. D. S.
62. O. M., 1942, p. 458.
63. D. S., pp. 85, 87.
64. D. S.
65. D. S.
66. The British Council disclaimed the propaganda nature of its activities; but in view of the fact that it began work in Turkey in 1940; greatly expanded during the ensuing war years; and then radically reduced its staff at the end of hostilities, The Turks may be forgiven for some lack of credulity as to the truly cultural aims of that organization.
67. Allied instructors (both British and American) almost invariably sent in reports of this nature.
68. This delay in deliveries of war materials was often referred to by Menemcioglu as the reason for Turkey's not assisting the Germans more extensively.
69. No official report on the work of the construction party would appear to have been published as yet. The writer here expresses his personal observations as he was an eye-witness of certain aspects of its work.
70. D. S.
71. In addition to this several Turkish officers (senior and junior) returned from training courses in Egypt complaining of the discourtesy of the British military authorities there.
72. Both the Turkish and English Press gave headlines to Churchill's visit to Turkey. For Churchill's intentions in regard to Turkish participation, see «The White House Papers of Harry Hopkins», Vol. II, pp. 680, 774 ff., 786 ff.
73. During the Aegean operations the Turkish planes were in «dispersed order» around the air-fields, a state of preparedness for immediate action having been ordered.
74. See British Admiralty report of 12th October, 1948, in which Vice-Admiral Willis, Commander-in-Chief Levant, says: «We failed because we were unable to establish airfields in the area of operations». See also «Continental Daily Mail», of Oct. 13th, 1948.
75. Elliot Roosevelt, «As he saw it», p. 206.
76. The Turkish newspapers published the neutrality communiqué with headlines and allround satisfaction was expressed with the decision.
77. In November there had been high tension on the Turco-Bulgar frontier, the Bulgars appearing to be very nervous about the possible Turkish and Allied attack. The culmination of this was the explosion of a vital bridge on the 30th which effectively severed communication between the two countries.
78. Certain sessions of the court were held in secret.
79. Current History, see «Chronology» in March issue, 1944.
80. American Survey of Foreign Affairs, 1944.
81. Howard, «The problem of the Turkish Straits», op. cit., pp. 36-51.
82. Ibid.
83. C. H., 1944, June No., p. 155.
84. Ward, «Turkey», op. cit.
85. O. M., 1940, p. 398.
86. Up to the time of the fall of France, Turkey had kept in touch with the neighbouring Middle-Eastern governments. For example Nuri Said had talks with İnönü on 28th June, 1940 (See «Ankara» of 4th July, 1940); and three months previously M. Puaux, High Commissioner for Syria, had paid a visit to the Turkish capital for the signature of a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood between Syria and Turkey.
87. «La revue de la presse turque», Jan., 1946, p. 12, published in Berne.
88. O. M. for 1941, pp. 239, 281, 397, 474, 568.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

1. «Revue de la Presse Turque», Berne, Jan., 1946, op. cit., p. 2. (Henceforward referred to as R. P. T.)
2. «The Problem of the Turkish Straits», op. cit., p. 47. U.S.A. Govt. Printing Office, Washington. Dept. of State Publication No. 2752, Near Eastern Series 5.

3. «Aksam» and «Cumhuriyet» of Dec. 5th, 1945.
4. Accounts in all Turkish papers from Dec. 5th up to the end of the year.
5. «Aksam» of 5th Dec., et seq.
6. R. P. T., 1946, Jan., p. 5.
7. R. P. T., Jan., 1946, p. 6. The headmaster of an Armenian school in Istanbul made a similar declaration; nevertheless the statement that the Armenians have full equality with Turks does not correspond to the reality.
8. Ditto, p. 12.
9. See Turkish press which gives headline articles for days to American friendship and to the naval visit; also, R. P. T., April 1946, p. 9.
10. See Turkish press during Jan. and Feb. 1946.
11. R. P. T., April 1946, p. 13.
12. «Politique Etrangère», 1945, Article by Maurice Pernot, p. 140.
13. See Impt. and Expt. Tables.
14. R. P. T., June, 1946.
15. «The problem of the Turkish Straits», op. cit., p. 38-39.
16. Ibid., p. 39. This was followed up by a very similar British note.
17. Ibid., p. 44.
18. The exchange of letters died down again in October. So did world interest.
19. See «Journal de Genève» of 18.8.1946 and R. P. T., Aug., 1946.
20. R. P. T., Sept., pp. 1-9.
21. One of the first to do so appears to have been Yalchin in «Tanin» of June 22, 1945, when he claimed, «Turkey is the backbone of the Middle East and the last wall of world peace».
22. The speech was mainly devoted to the more urgent plight of the Greeks. I am concerned here only with those aspects of it which dealt with Turkey. A full account of the speeches can be found in Dept. of State Publication, Vol. XVI, No. 409 A of May 4, 1947.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. See for example an article in the «Journal de Genève» of April 6, 1948.
26. «Aksam» of 24 Feb., 1948 for summary report.
27. Ibid.
28. «Continental Daily Mail» of Jan. 27, 1948. Article by Jon Kimche.
29. The words of Necmeddin Sadak speaking at Sivas on May 23. See Turkish press of May 24 and also «Times» of the same day for summaries of speech.
30. «Continental Daily Mail» of Dec. 1, 1948. This view is also expressed by a Turkish writer, Aslan Kumburaci in «New Statesman» of June 4th and 11th, 1949.
31. The «Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung» also previously caused a diplomatic incident by questioning the ability of the Turkish army to use the new equipment that the Allies had given them. For this see R. P. T., Oct., 1946.
32. See article «Where America may fight Russia» in «Cont. Daily Mail» of 16 Nov., 1948.
33. Ibid.; also for a detailed and scholarly analysis of the American position, see Harry Howard, «The United States and the Question of the Turkish Straits» in «Middle East Journal», Vol. I, No. 1, Jan., 1947.
34. «La Suisse» of 3 April, 1948.
35. «Cont. Daily Mail» of Oct. 1, 1948.
36. See «Journal de Genève» of 19 April, 1949, for a good analysis by M. Benda of Turkey's position vis-à-vis the Atlantic Pact.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. «Siyasi Ilimler», March, 1946, Say 1, 180, pp. 666-667.
40. «Aksam» of 30 May, 1948.
41. Turkish comic papers «Karagoz» and «Amcabey» occasionally have cartoons poking fun at Jewish politics.
42. «Times» of Dec. 15, 1948.
43. «Aksam» of 30 May, 1946.
44. «La Suisse» of 3 April, 1948.
45. «La politique étrangère», 1948: Article by P. A. Argyropoulos, p. 313.
46. See articles in «Aksam».
47. «Cont. Daily Mail» of Dec. 1, 1948.



48. See the Ottoman Bank report on Turkey in the « Times » of 24 June, 1949, for an enlightening Survey of Turkey's economic and industrial Situation.
49. Aslan Kumburaci in the Articles quoted (Note 30) claims that the Ankara Statesmen are playing too much into American hands. He quotes sections of the Turkish press which have expressed fears that the American business men will be allowed to exploit the rich oil veins recently discovered at Ramandag in Southern Turkey. For the early history of the quest for petrol in Turkey, see Nacil Sükün (Bibliog.) and for root sources, various Nos. of « Madem Tetkik Arama Enstitünün Mecmuasi », Ankara, Bimensual. See too « The Annals », Vol. II, 1948, pp. 8-13; Article on « Strains and Stresses in the Middle East » by Emil Lengyel.

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## APPENDIX

### I

### DRAMATIS PERSONAE

**ARAS**, Dr. Rüstü : Minister of Foreign Affairs in Turkey from 1923 to 1938.  
**ABDUL-HAMID II** : Sultan; Born 1842; became Sultan in 1876, overthrown in 1909-died in 1918.  
**ARIKAN**, Saffet : 1940-41, Minister of Finance; 1942-44, Turkish Ambassador in Berlin.  
**ATATURK**, Mustafa Kemal (title of 'Gazi') : President of the Turkish Republic up to his death in 1938.  
**BAYER**, Celal : A former Prime Minister who in 1945 was permitted to form a Democratic opposition to the People's Party.  
**BRELL**, German, journalist : Chief of German D. N. B. News service-visited Turkey in 1940.  
**CIANO** : Italian Foreign Minister up to 1943.  
**CHURCHILL**, Winston S. : British Prime Minister from 1940 to 1945; payed personal visit to Turkey in 1943.  
**COX**, Sir Percy : British High Commissioner in Iraq at the time of the Mosul dispute-attended the Constantinople Conference in 1925 as Chief British representative.  
**CLAUDIUS**, Dr. : Chief of German delegation sent to Turkey to conclude a commercial treaty with the latter in 1941.  
**CRIPPS**, Sir Stafford : British Ambassador in Russia 1940-42. His extreme pro-Russian views alarmed the Turks.  
**EDEN**, Anthony : British Foreign Minister 1940-45.  
**ENVER**, Pasha : Leader of the Young Turk party-helped involve Turkey in First world war-killed fighting against the Russians in 1922.  
**ERKILET**, Hüseyin Hüsni : Germanophile, Turkish retired general who wrote articles in Turkish Press against Allies (1940-43). Was a leader of the neo-Pan-Turanians.  
**FEVZI ÇAKMAK** : Turkish Chief-of-staff till 1944; pro-Axis.  
**GEREDE**, Hüseyin : 1939-42, Turkish Ambassador in Berlin.  
**HITLER**, Adolf : German Dictator 1933-1945.  
**İNÖNÜ**, İsmet : Second President of the Turkish Republic 1938 to present day.  
**KARABEKİR**, Kazım : Turkish general, victor over Armenians in 1920.  
**LLOYD GEORGE**, David : Responsible for British policy in Middle-East (1918-23); thereafter remained strongly Turcophobe.  
**MENEMENÇİOĞLU**, Numan : 1937, Secretary General of Turkish Foreign Ministry; 1942-44, Foreign Minister; subsequently Permanent Turkish delegate at Lake Success.  
**MASSIGLI** : French Ambassador in Ankara up to 1940.  
**MACDONALD**, Ramsay : British Labour Prime Minister at time of Mosul dispute.  
**MOLOTOV** : Russian Foreign Minister from 1938 to 1949.  
**OMURTAK**, Salih : Created General Chief-of-Staff in 1947.  
**PEKER**, Recep : Prime Minister of Turkey, 1946.  
**PAPEN**, Fritz von : German Ambassador in Ankara, 1939-1944.  
**PETERSON**, Sir Maurice : British Ambassador in Ankara, 1944-1946.  
**PEHLEVI**, Shah Riza Khan : Shahinshah of Persia 1925-1942.  
**SAMI**, Bekir : Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs 1920-23.  
**SADAK**, Necmeddin : Editor of «Aksam» newspaper; Foreign Minister from 1947 up to present.  
**SAFA**, Peyami : Turkish novelist and independent press columnist.  
**SARACOĞLU**, Sukru : Foreign Minister 1938 to 1942 (August). Thereafter President of the Grand National Assembly.  
**SAYDAM**, Refik : Turkish Prime Minister during 1939 and 1940.  
**SFORZA**, Count Carlo : Italian Foreign Minister at time of Lausanne Treaty. Pursued a pro-Turk policy.  
**SERTEL**, Sabiha and Zekeriya : Prominent Turkish journalists and editors of «Tan».  
**VINOGRADOV** : Russian Ambassador in Ankara 1945 and 1946.

TRUMAN, Harry : American President from 1945 onwards.  
 SEVKET, Memdu : Turkish Ambassador in Kabul during the second world war.  
 SCHULENBERG : German Ambassador in Russia 1938-1941.  
 TOGAN, Velidi Zeki : Leader of neo-Pan-Turanians.  
 WILSON, Maitland : Commander of British 9th Army in the Middle East during 1941. Earlier had visited Ankara for talks with Turkish H. Q. 1942-43. In charge of all British Forces in Middle East.  
 WAVELL, General : Visited Ankara in early 1940.  
 YALÇIN, Hüseyin Cahit : Chief-editor of « Tanin »—often supposed to be official government mouthpiece.  
 YALMAN, Ahmed Emin : International reputation as a writer on Turkish affairs. Liberal who is often in trouble with the People's Party. In 1945 he formed his own opposition paper, « Vatan », to make propaganda for the « Democrat Party » headed by Celal Bayer.

## II

### CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT DATES (1918-1948)

1918

March 3 : Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Bolshevik Russia and Central Powers.  
 April 13 : Armenia and Georgia reject cession of land under Brest-Litovsk; fighting breaks out in Batum, Kars, Ardahan, when Turks begin operations.  
 July 28 : Kars, Batum, and Ardahan. (Plebiscite) to unite with Turkey  
 October 30th. Turkey signs armistice of Mudros.

1919

April 29 : Italian forces land in Adalia.  
 May 14 : Greek forces land at Smyrna. Beginning of Greco-Turkish war (1919-22).  
 June 29 : Treaty between Allies and Germany.  
 July 11 : Mustapha Kemal outlawed by Constantinople government.  
 July 23 : Erzerum Congress.  
 July 29 : Greco-Italian agreement about division of Turkish territory.  
 September 9 : Sivas Congress.  
 November 27 : Treaty of Neuilly.

1920

January 23 : The Constantinople parliament ratifies the Turkish national Pact.  
 March 16 : British occupation of Constantinople.  
 April 18-27 : San Remo conference.  
 April 23 : Grand National Assembly adopts National Pact at Ankara.  
 August 10 : Treaty of Sèvres.  
 October 30 : Turks take Kars.  
 December 3 : Turco-Armenian peace.

1921

March 1 : Turco-Afghan treaty.  
 March 12 : Turco-Italian treaty.  
 March 16 : Turco-Russian treaty of Moscow.  
 October 15 : Treaty of Kars between Turkey and Transcaucasian states.  
 October 20 : Treaty of Ankara between Turkey and France (Franklin-Bouillon).

1922

January 2 : Treaty of friendship with Georgian S. S. R.  
 March 20 : Treaty of friendship with Georgian S. S. R.

August 22 : Victories of Afyon and Dumlupinar over the Greeks.  
 September 9 : Turkish advance armies enter Smyrna.  
 October 11 : Mudanya Armistice ends Turco-Greek war.  
 November 1 : Abolition of the Sultanate.  
 November 17 : Abdul Mecid becomes Sultan.  
 November 20 : Opening of the First Lausanne Conference.

1923

February 4 : Break-up of First Lausanne Conference.  
 July 24 : Treaty of Lausanne signed.  
 August 13 : Grand National Assembly chooses Mustapha Kemal as president.  
 August 6 : Turco-American treaty of Lausanne signed.  
 October 6 : Turkish forces reoccupy Constantinople.  
 October 14 : Ankara voted the new capital.  
 21

1924

March 3 : Abolition of the Caliphate.  
 April : Revised constitution adopted.

1925

December 16 : Mosul awarded to Great Britain by League Council.  
 December 17 : Turco-Russian Treaty of Friendship.

1926

June 5 : Treaty of Ankara (concerning Mosul) between Great Britain, Turkey, and Iraq.

1928

May 30 : Turco-Italian Treaty.  
 November 3 : Latin alphabet introduced.

1929

December 17 : Russo-Turkish neutrality Pact.

1930

March 1 : Anglo-Turkish treaty of commerce and navigation.  
 June 10 : Greco-Turkish Pact.

1932

July 18 : Turkey's entry into the League of Nations.

1933

September : Pact of Cordial Friendship with Greece.  
 Hitler takes power in Germany.

1934

February : Signature of the Balkan Pact.

1935

Italy invades Abyssinia.  
 Germany reoccupies the Rhineland.

1936

July : The Montreux Convention.  
 August : Refortification of the Straits begins.

1937

July : Saadabad Pact signed. Austrian « Anschluss ».



- 1938**  
August : Munich crisis. Germans enter Czechoslovakia.
- 1939**  
May : Turco-British declaration of 'Mutual assistance' in Mediterranean.  
July : The cession of the Hatay (Alexandretta) to Turkey.  
September : Germans invade Poland. France and England declare war on Germany.  
October : Anglo-Franco-Turkish Alliance.  
November : Russia invades Finland.

- 1940**  
January : Commercial agreement between Allies and Turkey.  
April : Germans invade Denmark and Norway.  
June : Fall of France, « Dunkerque » withdrawal. Italy declares war on Allies.  
November : Ribbentrop and Molotov make Russo-German plans for a new Straits Régime.

- 1941**  
March : Eden's meeting with Saraçoglu in Cyprus.  
April : German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia.  
May : Ali Raschid's rebellion against British in Iraq.  
June 18 : Turco-German Non-aggression Pact signed.  
June 22 : Germans invade Russia. Russians renew pledge to Turks to uphold clauses of Montreux.  
August : British and Russian troops invade Iran.  
October : Turco-German trade agreement.  
December : Pearl Harbour, America enters war against Japan and other Axis members.

- 1942**  
January : Moscow talks-uneasiness in Ankara. Rommel begins Africa offensive.  
February 15 : Japanese capture of Singapore.  
February 22 : Attempt to assassinate von Papen in Ankara. America announces that Turkey is open to receive supplies under the Lease-and-Lend scheme.  
September : Germans held at Stalingrad. 8th Army offensive against Rommel begins.

- 1943**  
January 30 : Churchill and Cadogan visit Turkey for Adana conference.  
November : British launch attack on Dodecanese—failure due to lack of air support—worsening of Turco-Allied relations.  
December 4 : Cairo conference. Turkish neutrality confirmed.

- 1944**  
March : Allies discontinue Lease-and-Lend.  
April : Turks announce discontinuation of chrome deliveries to Germany.  
August : Severance of Diplomatic relations with the Axis.

- 1945**  
Yalta Conference.  
Capitulation of Bulgaria.  
April : Turkish declaration of war on Germany and Japan. Potsdam Conference.  
December 4 : Anti-Russian riot in Istanbul.  
December 7 : Turkish reply to America accepting principle of revision. Russian claims put forward in Russian and satellite press and radio to Kars, Ardahan and other Eastern areas of Turkey. Bases on the Straits also claimed.

- 1946**  
April : Visit of « Missouri » to Istanbul.  
June : Friendship Pact signed with Iraq.  
August to October : Exchange of notes between Turkey and Russia over the question of Straits revision. Russia claims the right to « joint defense measures » at Straits.
- 1947**  
March : Truman puts Aid to Greece and Turkey project before Congress.
- 1948**  
February : First report is issued on Aid to Turkey.
- 1949**  
April : Foreign Minister requests that Turkey should be made a member of the Atlantic Pact.

### III

## EXPORT AND IMPORT TABLES

(In millions of Turkish Liras).

### TURKEY'S TRADE WITH PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES

(Figures taken from « Annuaire Statistique Turque »)

YEAR	IMPTS. TO TURKEY	% VALUE	EXPTS. FROM TURKEY	% VALUE
1. GERMANY :				
1925	27.4	11.3	27.6	14.3
1928	31.6	14.8	22.1	12.7
1931	27.0	21.3	13.6	10.7
1934	29.3	33.8	34.4	37.3
1937	48.1	42.0	50.4	36.5
1940	8.1	11.7	9.6	8.7
1941	8.9	11.9	26.8	21.8
1942	41.0	28.0	40.7	24.7
1943	76.6	37.7	61.1	23.8
1944	50.2	30.4	52.8	22.7
1945	0.7	0.6	0.06	0.0
1946	0.7	0.0	0.9	0.2
1947	0.2	0.0		
2. U. S. A. :				
1925	19.6	8.11	25.1	13.0
1928	10.2	4.5	27.6	15.9
1931	4.1	3.2	12.6	9.9
1934	3.7	4.3	9.4	10.2
1937	17.2	15.3	19.2	13.9
1940	7.4	10.8	15.7	14.1
1941	4.0	5.4	16.6	13.5
1942	7.1	4.9	28.1	17.0
1943	4.8	2.4	52.7	20.5
1944	7.6	4.6	55.6	23.9
1945	22.2	17.6	95.9	43.8
1946	70.1	31.3	82.7	19.2
1947	278.6	33.4	147.5	23.6

YEAR	IMPTS. TO TURKEY	% VALUE	EXPTS. FROM TURKEY	% VALUE
<b>3. UNITED KINGDOM :</b>				
1925	37.8	15.6	17.4	9.0
1928	27.4	12.3	17.6	10.1
1931	14.4	11.3	10.8	8.5
1934	8.6	9.9	5.2	5.7
1937	7.1	6.2	9.8	7.2
1940	9.6	14.0	11.5	10.4
1941	18.3	24.6	19.9	16.2
1942	34.6	23.5	25.2	15.3
1943	32.3	15.9	27.8	10.8
1944	29.5	17.9	51.3	22.1
1945	29.4	23.3	32.6	14.9
1946	43.2	19.3	75.6	17.5
1947	85.9	12.6	102.5	16.4

**4. ITALY :**

1925	43.4	17.9	50.5	26.15
1928	26.4	11.8	31.6	18.2
1931	18.4	14.5	30.7	24.1
1934	7.4	8.5	10.3	11.2
1937	6.0	5.3	7.2	5.2
1940	11.2	16.3	17.9	16.1
1941	2.3	3.2	2.8	2.3
1942	4.4	3.0	5.0	3.1
1943	3.4	1.7	4.7	1.8
1944	0.4	0.2	0.9	0.1
1945	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1
1946	12.9	5.8	12.1	2.8
1947	95.6	14.0	66.2	10.6

**5. FRANCE :**

1925	26.0	10.7	24.2	12.5
1928	29.1	13.0	18.4	10.6
1931	12.7	10.1	12.1	9.5
1934	6.4	7.4	2.8	3.0
1937	1.2	1.0	5.2	3.8
1940	1.2	2.8	6.6	5.9
1943	0.4	0.0	1.7	0.7
1947	15.8	2.3	28.1	4.5

**6. RUSSIA :**

1925	6.1	2.5	4.9	2.5
1928	12.0	5.4	6.4	3.7
1931	7.2	5.7	4.6	3.9
1934	3.9	4.5	3.6	3.9
1937	7.1	6.2	6.5	4.7

**SIGNIFICANT CURRENT TRENDS OF TRADE**

YEAR	IMPTS. TO TURKEY	% VALUE	EXPTS. FROM TURKEY	% VALUE
<b>7. PALESTINE :</b>				
1944	6.0	3.6	6.3	2.3
1946	8.9	4.0	38.6	9.0
1947	9.8	1.4	46.4	7.4

YEAR	IMPTS. TO TURKEY	% VALUE	EXPTS. FROM TURKEY	% VALUE
<b>8. CZECHSLOVAKIA :</b>				
1946	4.1	1.9	4.7	1.1
1947	33.7	4.9	35.2	5.6
<b>9. BELGIUM :</b>				
1946	2.4	1.1	12.8	3.0
1947	21.4	3.1	29.0	4.7
<b>10. GREECE :</b>				
1944	0.2	0.2	1.1	0.5
1946	0.9	0.5	37.9	8.8
1947	0.8	0.1	27.2	4.4